Maginot Line or Fort Apache? Using forts to Shape the Counterinsurgency Battlefield

It is an incontestable fact that no kind of fortress, wheresoever placed, however strongly manned, however expensively constructed, and however numerous its garrison, has ever given permanent security to a State-has seldom indeed given it even temporary protection. Moreover, a fortress once invested is certain to fall, unless a relieving field-army can beat the besiegers away. We read in the history of one generation of the "virgin" fortress of Ingoldstadt or of Metz, but when we open the records of another generation, we find that its pride has bitten the dust. In some cases a very small fort in a well-chosen position may puzzle a general of genius. -T. Miller-Maguire1

As the 19th century waned and the 20th century dawned, T. Miller-Maguire, a noted, prolific military writer, disparaged the fortification mentality of the French, citing the futility -----

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America's brutal but successful counter insurgency in the Philippines was fought by senior officers who had fought the Indian wars of 1865-1890. The foundations of these operations were forts from which Cavalry and infantry units sortied to conduct operations against the hostiles. Such forts and their usage were copied and emulated by the forces in the P I in 1900-06 (inclusive of the Moro conflict). So there is much precedent for this kind of operation.

It was less successful in Vietnam, given the quality of weaponry and skill demonstrated by the regular North Vietnamese forces. Far superior in equipment comparable to American arms than either the Indians or Filipinos. It would seem that the hostiles in Iraq would be more susceptible to this kind of operation. BTW the Iraqi hostiles are far less insurgents than the Filipino followers of Aguinaldo. He led a true movement with aspirations for nationhood and his resistance was organized as a government. No such animal exists in Iraq. They are at best hostiles and at worst murderers.

What a lovely topic.
SunTzu said that the least desirable attack was on the enemy's forts.
Would Khe Sanh have fallen without ground relief? I believe that if a means had been found to deal with the 130mm's in Laos, Khe Sanh could have held out indefinitely, and that's with the unfavorable terrain added in.
If you can't find the enemy, make him come to you and set up a killing ground for him - desert terrain is good for this, as are forts. As long as air supply can be maintained it will work - especially if a fortress box contains an airfield.
It would draw insurgents away from cities and publicity, and set up a target they couldn't ignore - in fact make it necessary that they have to invest these forts or lose.
The trouble with forts in Vietnam was that they grew villages around them, impairing their efficiency. This could be prevented in a hostile terrain like a desert.
This would reduce contact with the population and reduce collateral losses.
Fortress box/airheads would assure air superiority for the allied host government, and provide an enduring stable link with the host country.
There are exceptions to every rule and I think this is one of them. There would be other benefits as well.

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