Joe Rochefort bump!
Posted on 06/03/2002 5:45:32 AM PDT by E Rocc
Edited on 04/29/2004 2:00:36 AM PDT by Jim Robinson. [history]
HONOLULU, Hawaii (AP) -- Sixty years after the Battle of Midway, ceremonies across the nation and on the tiny atoll itself will commemorate the day U.S. forces sunk four Japanese aircraft carriers and turned the tide of World War II.
(Excerpt) Read more at cnn.com ...
-Eric
Scouts Out! Cavalry Ho!
A lot of Americans dying for their country at Midway didn't give us victory. Making a lot of Japanese die for THEIR country gave us victory.
Midway was an epic battle for many reasons....it was also the first naval battle in history where the opposing ships never even saw one another. It cemented the carrier as king, kicking the battleship off its throne as the supreme ship of the sea. Here is a link to photos of the island
I bought a DVD on this battle recently, and one thing caught my attention.
An old Japanese naval officer was being interviewed through an interpreter. Allow me to paraphrase his remarks:
"We could not believe the tenacity and bravery of the Americans. We had never encountered anything like them. Not the Chinese, not the British, no one! They fought like us. They were fierce, cunning, and tenacious! They were warriors."
Count me as one of those, we destroyed their carrier fleet, as they had hoped to do to us at Pearl Harbor.
Many squadrons suffered heavy losses, like Torpedo Squadron 8, whose sacrifice has become part of Navy lore.
Only one of the squadron's 30 pilots and gunners survived.
Can you imagine how that would be reported if a similar loss were to occur today? The media would question the "reckless" loss of life and demand and "bi-partisan" investigation into what did the CIC know...blah.. blah... blah.
Here's links to to some photos of USS Yorktown CV-5
Also, a link to an interview with Lt. George Gay
See: Herman Wouk's "War and Remembrance" .
BTW - Admiral Chester Nimitz and his staff stationed at Pearl Harbor were during their best to get Spruance to follow up the victory. Spruance's caution was the biggest blunder of the Pacific War.
I know the scence you are talking about. It is a priceless scence; the shock of the Japanese officer as three of the Japs priceless carriers are burning hulks within a span of 10 minuts.
There are two versions of the movie "Midway". The one that airs most of the time cuts out the full Battle of the Coral Sea segment (about fiteen minutes to a half hour from the begining of the film). I think it should be left in. I saw it once in the theater and ABC aired the entire movie a couple of years ago. Notice how TBS always cuts the word "Japs" out of their version. Not a nice term i'll admit, but still part of the movie.
Had Admiral Spruace followed up the victory the next day, after sinking all the 4 Japanese carriers, and went after the rest of the Japanese fleet the next day; not only might we have sunk the entire Japanese fleet, the Japanese might have been forced to agree to surrender.Actually, Wouk's "Victor Henry" and "Armin von Roon" characters, based on American and German military historians respectively, disagree.See: Herman Wouk's "War and Remembrance" .
BTW - Admiral Chester Nimitz and his staff stationed at Pearl Harbor were during their best to get Spruance to follow up the victory. Spruance's caution was the biggest blunder of the Pacific War.
Spruance lost one of his three carriers and 150 planes, including most of the torpedo bombers. His remaining pilots were exhausted. His original objective was to protect the island base of Midway from a potential Japanese invasion. He had done that, inflicting tremendous damage on the Japanese task force in the process of forcing them to retreat.
Had he pressed his luck, he may have prevailed. Contrarily, he may not have. Had air attacks failed to destroy the fast and powerful Yamato and Nagato, they could have destroyed the American task force. This would have allowed Yamamoto to turn right back around and take Midway, threating the virtually undefended Hawaiian islands in the process. Had we lost Enterprise and Hornet, there would have been no carriers left in the Pacific. Also, submarines would have had to sail an extra four days to reach Japanese home waters, decreasing their strike time there. The effect of submarine warfare on the Japanese home islands is an often-overlooked key to our victory in the war.
Spruance chose to seal his victory rather than tossing the dice again. Sometimes that's the right thing to do. It may or may not have been in this case, but it certainly was not a blunder. Spruance entirely achieved his pre-battle objective: to defend Midway.
-Eric
Joe Rochefort bump!
That honor actually goes to the Battle of the Coral Sea, fought one month earlier.
Raymond Spruance had extensive experience with destroyers and cruisers, but not naval air power. Even though he discovered that the enemy carriers were vulnerable to air attack, there was no way for him to feel certain that a carrier task force could sink the largest battleships then afloat. At the same time, he knew *exactly* what those battleships could do to his task force. He made the right call, based on the information then available - especially considering the number of aircraft and pilots that he lost at Midway.
That honor actually goes to the Battle of the Coral Sea, fought one month earlier.
Technically wasn't that true of Pearl Harbor? Granted one of the fleets was never at sea.
You are correct Sir!
They interviewed a Japanese reporter who was there on this documentary. He said that he was interned when he got back to Tokyo for 6 weeks. He was not allowed outside contact with anyone.
Since the military ran things in Japan back then, even some people in the Japanese Government were kept in the dark about what happened. The "official" release was that only one carrier was sunk, and one damaged. Only later did they learn the truth.
Technically wasn't that true of Pearl Harbor? Granted one of the fleets was never at sea.The British "did a Pearl Harbor" to the Italians at Taranto in May of 1941. Of course, the two nations were officially at war at the time.
-Eric
They interviewed a Japanese reporter who was there on this documentary. He said that he was interned when he got back to Tokyo for 6 weeks. He was not allowed outside contact with anyone.What's the title of the documentary?
-Eric
Admiral Samuel Elliot Morrison defends Admiral Spruance in his epic history of U.S. Naval forces in WWII.
But if you "read between the lines" one could question Admiral Spruance's tactics, also bearing in mind that Admiral Nimitz and staff wanted Admiral Spruace to follow-up the victory.
Also bumping some of the "canteeners"
Dang it, you beat me to it. Second-guessing past military decisions on the basis of more complete current knowledge is great sport, but ultimately futile (as the Dems are now finding out vis a vis WTC).
The idea was to avoid a night action, and the next day June 5th, launch planes at dawn to destroy the Japanese crusiers and destroyers (actually Spruance did that on June 6th).
Admiral Spruance's blunder at the Battle of Midway was to do nothing on June 5th, because his forces were out of position having sailed east the night before.
BTW - That's why Admiral Nimitz gave Sprucane minimal praise and recognition for the victory.
The SBD Dauntless Dive Bomber, hero of the Battle of Midway.
The Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bomber became a mainstay of the Navy's air fleet in the Pacific, with the lowest loss ratio of any U.S. carrier-based aircraft. Douglas delivered a total of 5,936 SBD/A-24s between 1940 and the end of production in July 1944.
The Dauntless was developed at the Douglas/Northrop facility at El Segundo, California, and was based on the Northrop Model 8 attack bomber developed for both the Army and the export market.
The SBD Dauntless featured "Swiss cheese" flaps — dive brakes punched with 3-inch holes — so that it could achieve pinpoint accuracy by diving to the target, dropping the bomb and then pulling out of the near-vertical dive.
In addition to the U.S. Navy, Marine Corps and Army Air Forces, the Dauntless served forces in New Zealand and Mexico.
The first enemy ship sunk by the U.S. Navy in World II is credited to a Dauntless from the USS Enterprise. The diving Dauntless went on to destroy 18 enemy warships, including a battleship and six carriers.
The real heros of Midway were the TBD pilots who knew they were making an uncovered attack on the carrier group that was suicidal.
That attack made it possible for the SBDs to come in right after and deliver the knockout.
In just a few weeks the Hypo team was able to significantly "break" the main Japanese Navy code, known as JN-25. This insight into "reading" the enemy's mail - and more important, their intentions - provided a clearer picture of Japanese naval force movements in the Pacific. The fusion of code breaking and an intimate knowledge of the Japanese Navy allowed this Pacific Fleet intelligence team to provide Admiral Nimitz an almost "clairvoyant" understanding of Admiral Yamamoto's plans to take the tiny Atoll of Midway.
As we know it today, the Japanese used a separate code table to conceal geographic locations. While cryptanalysts in Washington, the Philippines and Hawaii were all convinced that intercepted Japanese communications indicated a forthcoming major Japanese offensive, there was significant disagreement over the intended target. In order to prove to the doubters in Washington, CDR Jasper Holmes devised a plan to prove that the Japanese Code designation AF (Alpha Foxtrot) was indeed Midway Atoll. CDR Holmes convinced CDR Layton to approach Admiral Nimitz with a plan to prove that Station HYPO's cryptanalytic methods were correct.
Admiral Nimitz agreed to this test and he instructed Midway to send a clear text message saying falsely they were low on fresh water. The Japanese obligingly intercepted the message and reported AF was low on fresh water. This was the proof that Admiral Nimitz needed to show Washington that his plan was correct. Admiral Nimitz was able to position Admiral Spruance and all our remaining Pacific Fleet Carriers to defeat Admiral Yamamoto and turn the tide of the war in the Pacific.
Afterwards, then Fleet Admiral Nimitz was quoted years later as saying, "The success of our Naval Forces at the Battle of Midway is, in large measure, due to the excellent intelligence received from the Hawaii Unit of Communications Intelligence…" This is a standing testament to the superior service provided by you, the veterans of Pacific Fleet Intelligence and Cryptologic team.
Here's a speech given by Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, at the CPF Intelligence/Cryptology Dedication Ceremony in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii on June 1, 2001.
Aloha and good morning. It's great to have you all here. Let me start by welcoming Admiral Showers, Admiral Cook, Admiral McFarland, Admiral Stephens, Admiral Levitre, General Triantafellu, honored guests and most importantly, our intelligence and cryptologic veterans of World War Two and the Battle of Midway.
Before I begin my remarks, I'd like to recognize all the people who have worked so hard to bring this all about. A special note of thanks goes to retired CAPT Richard McDonald. Dick was in effect on loan to CINCPACFLT as Professor Emeritus when it came to getting the historical facts. Dick, the Pacific Fleet appreciates your tireless support, thank you. And LCDR Jim Fanell, a current generation star who has worked mightily to bring us this gathering and present our history.
Now, let me tell you, it is a real honor to stand in the presence of this group of intelligence veterans. After all, their selfless devotion to duty, creativity and analytical prowess contributed greatly to the Pacific Fleet's victory at the Battle of Midway that we celebrate this week and to our overall success in the Pacific Campaign.
In some respects this is a difficult task this morning. Winston Churchill used to say the three most difficult things to do in life are:
Climb a wall leaning towards you
Kiss a woman leaning away from you
And talk to an audience who knows more than you do.
Sun Tzu is quoted as saying, "What is called 'foreknowledge' cannot be elicited from spirits, nor from gods, nor by analogy with past events, nor from calculations. It must be obtained from men who know the enemy situation." The heroes we honor today certainly demonstrated the truth of that saying, and thankfully they did so for all of us.
These men were the architects of what has become know as OPINTEL - Operational Intelligence. They blazed a trail that gave the Navy and the Nation today's disciplines of naval intelligence and cryptology.
The pioneers honored today had no models to follow; they had no manuals or Standard Operating Procedures to instruct them on the proper manning, training and equipping for an OPINTEL system. This group exemplified CDR Joe Rochefort's posted slogan: "there is no limit to what you can do, so long as you don't care who gets the credit." Joe's two grandsons are in the audience today - Charles and Joseph - you should be very proud of your grandfather, he was a true hero. This mindset is just another example of the great American "can-do" spirit that built this nation and contributed to the defense of this country, especially at the Battle of Midway.
Just imagine the commitment and dedication these professionals displayed following the disaster on December 7th, 1941. Instead of quitting after what was called an "intelligence failure", men like Commander Edwin Layton, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Officer, Commander Joe Rochefort, Officer in Charge of the radio intelligence unit known as Station Hypo and Commander Jasper Holmes, assistant to CDR Rochefort, rolled up their sleeves and set about the daunting task of breaking the Japanese Naval HF radio codes.
In just a few weeks the Hypo team was able to significantly "break" the main Japanese Navy code, known as JN-25. This insight into "reading" the enemy's mail - and more important, their intentions - provided a clearer picture of Japanese naval force movements in the Pacific. The fusion of code breaking and an intimate knowledge of the Japanese Navy allowed this Pacific Fleet intelligence team to provide Admiral Nimitz an almost "clairvoyant" understanding of Admiral Yamamoto's plans to take the tiny Atoll of Midway.
As we know it today, the Japanese used a separate code table to conceal geographic locations. While cryptanalysts in Washington, the Philippines and Hawaii were all convinced that intercepted Japanese communications indicated a forthcoming major Japanese offensive, there was significant disagreement over the intended target. In order to prove to the doubters in Washington, CDR Jasper Holmes devised a plan to prove that the Japanese Code designation AF (Alpha Foxtrot) was indeed Midway Atoll. CDR Holmes convinced CDR Layton to approach Admiral Nimitz with a plan to prove that Station HYPO's cryptanalytic methods were correct.
Admiral Nimitz agreed to this test and he instructed Midway to send a clear text message saying falsely they were low on fresh water. The Japanese obligingly intercepted the message and reported AF was low on fresh water. This was the proof that Admiral Nimitz needed to show Washington that his plan was correct. Admiral Nimitz was able to position Admiral Spruance and all our remaining Pacific Fleet Carriers to defeat Admiral Yamamoto and turn the tide of the war in the Pacific.
Afterwards, then Fleet Admiral Nimitz was quoted years later as saying, "The success of our Naval Forces at the Battle of Midway is, in large measure, due to the excellent intelligence received from the Hawaii Unit of Communications Intelligence…" This is a standing testament to the superior service provided by you, the veterans of Pacific Fleet Intelligence and Cryptologic team.
The war did not end at the Battle of Midway; we still faced another three years of arduous fighting throughout the Pacific. The Central Pacific campaign increased the need for more detailed intelligence about Japanese ground and air force dispositions across the islands of the Pacific. The small radio intelligence unit of 1941 was to develop by war's end into a force of over 2,000 people in the Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas (JICPOA) and the Fleet Radio Unit (FRUPAC). Time limits me from saying as much as I would like to about the work of these extraordinary people. Fortunately, you will see them depicted in the display we will shortly be dedicating.
But I would like to single out one group in the JICPOA for special recognition. There was a cadre of some 50 Army Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Nisei linguists. At a time when Japanese were being discriminated against and interned, these patriotic Americans provided an invaluable service in translating captured Japanese documents. A number of these men volunteered to forward deploy with front-line Marine and Army Units to serve as interpreters and interrogators of Japanese POWs. I would just take this moment to thank you, the Army MIS Nisei translators - and all the unsung heroes of naval intelligence - for the personal sacrifice you made in service to this nation.
To the assembled active duty naval intelligence and cryptologic professionals, the challenge for the future is clear. You must continue to adhere to the standards these founding fathers of OPINTEL established: unwavering dedication to the mission; commitment to analytical methods - even in the face of detractors; a culture of innovation and creativity; and operational relevance.
For you, the current and future leadership of Pacific Fleet intelligence and cryptology, the following quote from CDR Joe Rochefort still rings true: "I can offer lots of excuses, but an intelligence officer has one task, one job, one mission. This is to tell his commander, his superior, today, what the [enemy is] going to do tomorrow." And on a personal note, I have always valued our intelligence professionals who were not afraid to "vote" on their estimates.
We remember the past to help us prepare for the future. We honor you, the heroes of naval intelligence and cryptology, as an inspiration to the young men and women who will lead us through the decades ahead.
E Rocc thank you for this thread.We must never forget this battle and how important it was to America and WW11.
The real heros of Midway were the TBD pilots who knew they were making an uncovered attack on the carrier group that was suicidal.Wouk made a point of listing every member of Torpedo Squadron Eight in War And Remembrance.That attack made it possible for the SBDs to come in right after and deliver the knockout.
-Eric
TBD Devastator Torpedo Bomber
When the Navy placed a contract with Douglas Aircraft Company for the development of the TBD torpedo bomber in 1934, a new era in naval aviation began. Biplanes on carrier decks would soon be consigned to history. The TBD Devastator was the Navy's first all-metal, monoplane torpedo bomber. It was also the Navy's first carrier-based plane to come with an enclosed cockpit, and the first to use main landing gear wheel brakes. While most carrier-based aircraft of the day had manually folded wings for storage aboard ship, the TBD featured hydraulic folding wings. The plane had a crew of three (pilot, bombardier and gunner), and carried a half-ton torpedo. It entered service with the fleet in 1937. One sailor, after looking it over, said: "It's got everything but the kitchen sink."
In December 1941, TDB Devastators formed the backbone of the Navy's carrier torpedo force in the Pacific. During hit-and-run raids against Japanese bases in the Central Pacific in early 1942, TBDs sank two transports and destroyed or damaged 10 other vessels. In May 1942, during the Battle of the Coral Sea, TBDs helped sink one enemy carrier and heavily damage another. These early actions, however, revealed the Devastator's shortcomings in speed and range and exposed problems with its main offensive weapon. Its torpedoes often failed to explode.
The TBD next saw action in the Battle of Midway in June. This was a complete victory for the U.S. Navy, but of the 41 Devastators that took part in the battle's first day, only six made it back to their carriers. The TBD's slow speed, light defensive armament and lack of maneuverability made it easy prey for the famous Japanese Zero fighter. On the last day of the battle, however, three TBDs did help sink one heavy cruiser and seriously damage another.
An aircraft of advanced design in 1934, the Devastator was obsolete by 1942. Its first six months of combat would be its last. The TBD was withdrawn from front-line service in the summer of 1942, but continued in service as an advanced trainer until the end of the war. A total of 130 TBDs were built.
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