Fight the Ship: Death and Valor on a Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

ProPublica ^ | Feb. 6, 2019 | T. Christian Miller, Megan Rose and Robert Faturechi

[Vineyard]

Which acronyms do you want to know? BTW - check the article - some acronyms are inserted after use ...like ‘Surface Warfare Officers’ - or SWO is included in the article. AIS - had the meaning explained before it was used.

The ONLY term I found in skimming the article again was for MV ACX - MV = Motor Vessel. (ACX might be a designation for a Container ship...could not find further info..)

BTW - standard procedure for using acronyms when writing a paper is to use the full ‘spelled out’ term, then follow with the approved acronym - then thereafter in the paper - one can use the acronym instead of the full term. (And - if a reader has an electronic copy - they can do a ‘search and find’ on the acronym - go to the first occasion of its use - then look at the text before it to find the meaning of it.) This process is important since an acronym can have MANY different meanings, depending on the service, program, weapon system, etc. So - it is important to ‘define’ the use of the acronym before using it regularly.

[Vineyard]

BTW - another ‘gift’ of Obama - the training time was mis-managed also. In the same manner that Obama told the NASA Director that his primary mission was to make Muslims feel better...we had politically correct leaders promoted to high positions who were willing to make the primary mission of our military to be SOCIAL ENGINEERING. Allow gays to serve openly. Allow transgenders to serve openly. Force ‘straights’ to accept the idea that a guy who feels he is a woman to shower and berth with women on ships....and spend time training the personnel to ACCEPT (or be disciplined, and maybe removed from the service.) Yup - lots of military training was focused on social engineering and not being a more lethal war fighter! SUCKS!!

https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/science/space/7875584/Barack-Obama-Nasa-must-try-to-make-Muslims-feel-good.html

[TalonDJ]

If you run a red light and someone broadsides you then yeah, they hit you, but you never shoulda been in front of them. If you read the article you would know the Fitz deliberately turned across the Crystal’s path. When a smaller, faster, more maneuverable ship cuts across in front of you and you hit them... Well that is clearly the smaller ship’s fault.

Go pass a semi truck and then just as you are almost clear, turn hard in front of them. Try it and see if the cop rules it to be the trucks fault you are splat.

Read the article. It breaks the incident down clearly based on official sources.

[JME_FAN]

“Which acronyms do you want to know?”

These:

MK I MOD IV
DESRON
COLREGS

BTW, the only acronym that applies to this incident - and our present naval preparedness - is “FUBAR!” ....

And that’s what you are guaranteed to get when bringing women into combat roles, because they ...

Can’t Understand Normal Thinking!

[Vineyard]

Okay

COLREGS (that can be googled) - Coast Guard Regulations to prevent collisions at sea. To qualify as an Officer of the Deck (OOD) - one must pass various navigation and ‘rules of the road’ tests to demonstrate the knowledge of safe operations at sea. Quartermasters (those who maintain the charts, record and log the ship’s position, provide recommendations to the OOD during maneuvering in restricted waters - near shore, or in heavy ship traffic areas) - must also pass similar tests before standing watch as QMOW (Quartermaster of the Watch).

DESRON - Destroyer Squadron. * IIRC - Yokosuko has 4 destroyers assigned - and they would be under the nominal control of the Commodore of the Squadron...and when deployed on various ‘missions’ - they would be under the operational control of the Task Force that they are assigned to while underway. So - the CO of a destroyer might get operational orders, thru the DESRON - directing him to get underway and proceed to a place where he would CHOP (CHange of OPerational assignment) to Commander, TASK Force 71.711.XX (number made up...) - and that person would assume operational control until released and directed to go somewhere else and CHOP to some other authority....until returned home and returned to the DESRON control.

MK I MOD IV (I couldn’t find that in the article...)
Mark I Mod IV. BUT - that would typically be based on whatever system it was appended to. For example - the Navy has had a variety of torpedoes...MK (Mark) 46 (lightweight torpedo), MK 48 (heavy weight, fired from subs), MK 54 (lightweight torpedo - replacing the Mk 46).
For the MK 48 - I went to sea on subs with MK 48 Mod 1, 2 and 4. Now - the subs have Mk 48 Mod 5 and Mod 6.
OTOH - You might look at some systems, and they use a V...as in SPS67(V)1 or (V)2 ....where the V stands for Variant... (similar to MOD..). AND much of the equipment might have a prefix...like AN/SPS67 - and IIRC - the AN stands for “Army/Navy”. Some one gets paid good money to keep up these nomenclature systems!!

[Blood of Tyrants]

I went the 6 yr, Advanced First Term Avionics (AFTA) program. I enlisted as an E-3 in November and was an E-4 by July. I would have been an E-5 by the next December if a PO in the training section hadn’t lost my paperwork.

[Portcall24]

This is one of the most exceptional piece of analysis I have seen in a very long time. Wow!

[Portcall24]

In the old Navy the young officers had to go to an actual school to learn the basic of seamanship. Now they give them a DVD and send them to the first assignment on a ship and tell the ship’s leadership to train them. Seriously. Someone here knows the name of a retired Admiral who screamed at the top of his lungs about the lack of training and was ignored.

[centurion316]

In the old Navy the young officers had to go to an actual school to learn the basic of seamanship

I have heard this, but only for SWO's. Submariners and Aviators still attended a basic course leading to certification and eventually wings and dolphins. I have also heard that such a basic course is being brought back as a result of the obvious symptoms of lack of training. In the Georgian Navy, a candidate for Lieutenant could not stand the examination without six years of service at sea as a Midshipman, Master, or Mate. After that promotion came through patronage and seniority, but there was a high bar for a basic understanding and experience of seamanship.

[JME_FAN]

Thanks for the explanations.

I’m familiar with the AN and MS inventory system, since I spent 23 years in aviation. The other nomenclature is all new to me; although I do understand the MK / MOD designations, now that you clarified them.

[TXnMA]

Now that this and several other reports have revealed the pitiable state of the Fitzgerald's crew and their culpability in the incident, there is no further need for us to attempt to guess behavior from hours of AIS tracks.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

My focus has, all along, been on the dynamics of the Fitzgerald / ACX Crystal collision, itself -- and the very few minutes leading up to it.

(I realize this is not "good form"), but in the interest of clear understanding by all concerned, I've decided to start with the "punch line":

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Before she made her "avoidance decision", OOD Coppock reportedly went out onto the starboard bridge wing, where she saw this view:

Obviously, that is a "Must Yield" situation!

When she returned to the bridge, she had these available choices:

1. 1. STOP and WAIT (for the 24 seconds required for the Xtal to cross)

   2. SLOW and steer to STARBOARD to pass behind Xtal

2. Steer to PORT and ACCELERATE -- trying to cut in front of Xtal.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~
NOTE: Going to FULL REVERSE from 20 knots, (Fitzgerald's route speed) can stop her in her own length (~500 feet)].
~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Here's a rough graphic approximation of the scenario:

(Using AIS data, + knots converted to feet per minute, + scaled sketches of the two vessels, I'm working on a scaled-to-time version of the above sketch...)

~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Hypothetical question #1: What automobile driver, facing an oncoming semi truck, angling toward them and crossing their path -- at nearly their own speed -- would chose "Option 2"?

Hypothetical question #2: Does Lieutenant Coppock even have a license to drive an automobile?

Hypothetical question #3: With simulators and games that can do this -- how difficult would it be to program a simulator that starts with any AIS scenario data and produces a "virtual collision avoidance practice" training simulation?

~~~~~~~~~~~~

In my next major post I'm planning to discuss Collision Dynamics -- damage analysis indicating, "Who hit Whom"...

[mad_as_he$$]

Excellent analysis.
Here is a Burke in soft “crash back”. Starts at about 1:45.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IuXOr4Z9RDI

[TXnMA]

WOW!!!

Thanks for that "crash back" video link!

From 31 Knots to dead stop and reverse in a little over 12 seconds!!

~~~~~~~~~~~~

Now, tell me that the Fitzgerald -- at 20 Knots -- couldn't have avoided the ACX Crystal...

TXnMA
 

[daniel1212]

I dare say it is a testimony how reliance upon high tech does not mean it will always be better than ancient means. In this case a sailor up in a crows nest and shouting down what he sees would have enabled avoidance.

Instead, due to broken equipment, poor leadership, training and and discipline, fatigue and incommunication - some of which is part and parcel with giving a priority to political correctness, and or a result of it - meant that the massive container ship might as well as have been in stealth mode. (Not that I would necessarily have done better.) but

Both ships lost track of their situations completely, said Capt. Rick Hoffman, a retired cruiser captain who reviewed the documents for Defense News. “The thing that stood out to me was in both situations they had minimal situational awareness,” said Hoffman. “In the case of Fitzgerald, nearly criminal negligence on the part of the bridge watch team. And in neither case did the ship sound five short blasts or raise the general alarm to let anyone know they were in danger.”

The CO, Cmdr. Bryce Benson, did not know the ship had been involved in a collision until the bow of the ACX Crystal punched into his stateroom. He was ultimately rescued by crew-members as he clung to the outside of the ship. He had been in command for less than a month. Also, at no point prior to the collision, did the officer of the deck attempt to make contact with the Crystal on bridge-to-bridge radio, nor did the OOD try to maneuver to avoid Crystal until only a minute before the collision. Meanwhile, down in the Fitzgerald’s combat information center, which displays inputs from the ship’s weapons systems and radars, the watch standers there failed to “tune and adjust their radars to maintain an accurate picture of other ships in the area,” the report found. That means CIC failed to track the multiple ships exiting the channel. The Fitzgerald’s watch-standers also failed to use the Automated Identification System, a publicly accessible computer program that provides real-time updates on the location and speed of merchant ships in the area. Fitzgerald’s lookouts failed as well, with the investigation indicating the sailor or sailors assigned to look out for hazards were literally looking the other way the whole time. Watch-standers performing lookout duties did so only on Fitzgerald’s port side, not on the starboard side where the three ships were present with the risk of collision,” the report reads.http://www.kbismarck.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=8233

But while the Navy is opposed to having any intercourse with a foreign container ship, it supports sanctioning sexual union btwn those of the same gender.

[daniel1212]

One account says,

At about 01:17 Fitzgerald’s OOD (Officer of the Deck, responsible for the ship’s course and maneuvering) misjudged the course of ACX Crystal. At 01:25 the OOD, Lieutenant Sarah Coppock,[8] noticed ACX Crystal getting closer, and ordered a turn to 240T (that is, to turn to the right and pass behind ACX Crystal), but then rescinded the order. Instead she “ordered an increase to full speed and a rapid turn to the left (port)” (to pass ahead of ACX Crystal), but “these orders were not carried out.” At 01:29 the “Bosun Mate of the Watch [BMOW], a more senior supervisor on the bridge, took over the helm and executed the orders.”[9] The Navy has not said what those orders were, nor what transpired on the bridge following the collision at 01:30. Among other failings the Navy says “physical look out duties” were not performed on the starboard (right) side, where ACX Crystal and two other ships were approaching...

Seven deaths were reported, all of them US Navy sailors aboard Fitzgerald. Three other sailors aboard Fitzgerald were injured, including the commanding officer, Commander Bryce Benson... Flooding extended to a main engineering space and radio central, destroying equipment worth millions of dollars.[29
- https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Fitzgerald_and_MV_ACX_Crystal_collision]

[GreyHoundSailor]

We had a simple solution to that on my DDG - every single person stood a watch. Command Master Chief, Supply officers, career counselor - everybody had a watch. No more little cliques of non-watch standers playing cards on the mess decks and eating popcorn until all hours. It worked, probably because they had little free time to complain.

[Midwesterner53]

The OOD punched a diversity ticket that was more important to the Navy than operational readiness.

[higgmeister]

You guys were squared away as it should be! Although I suspect the Command Master Chief might have had his watch covered by someone else as the Captain might have required.   ;^)

[GreyHoundSailor]

Never happened - we had a great CMC and he never missed his watch. One of our best OOD’s was a SM1. Amazing what happens when there’s no bickering about who stands watch and who doesn’t because everybody’s equally tired and equally contributing.