Posted on 04/15/2018 5:21:09 PM PDT by BBell
The prospect of a summit between President Donald Trump and North Korean supreme leader Kim Jong-un offers a unique opportunity to move Northeast Asia away from more than seven decades of confrontation and conflict. But the meeting might be stillborn or end badly, even if it does occur.
An important challenge is the difference between the two leaders’ official expectations. The Trump administration presumably believes it has a commitment by Pyongyang to denuclearize. However, Kim, to the extent that he genuinely contemplates abandoning weapons so expensively acquired and so tightly connected to his own legitimacy, is likely willing to do so only over time, and in return for concessions that enhance his regime’s survivability. When I visited the North last year, officials well remembered the fate of Libya’s Muammar el-Qaddafi, who negotiated away his missile and nuclear programs, only to be later ousted by the United States and its European allies.
What might satisfy the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea? The regime’s representatives regularly speak of ending America’s “hostile policy.” During my visit officials also pointed to Washington’s “military threats” and “nuclear threats.” Last July, the Korean Central News Agency reported that Kim said “the DPRK would neither put its nukes and ballistic rockets on the table of negotiations . . . unless the U.S. hostile policy and nuclear threat to the DPRK are definitely terminated.”
In the past, Pyongyang has proposed negotiation of a peace treaty to formally end the conflict, and cancellation of the annual U.S.–South Korean military exercises. Washington could add diplomatic recognition, agree to a nonaggression pact and promise no first use of nuclear weapons. No doubt sanctions would have to end. The DPRK also likely would expect aid, not only from the Republic of Korea, but also from Japan, which accompanied its recognition of the ROK with de facto reparations for its colonial rule. The United States might offer humanitarian assistance as well as support the North’s membership in multilateral development banks.
Still, all of these are essentially paper guarantees. Once North Korea abandons its hard-won deterrent, all it would have in return would be promises. Ukrainians discovered the limited value of Washington’s good wishes in the Budapest Memorandum, signed by the United States, Russia and other governments, after relinquishing nuclear weapons left behind when the Soviet Union dissolved. Moreover, Washington could make additional demands—over human rights and democratic practices, for instance—and threaten to ignore or revoke any guarantees given if Pyongyang did not comply.
Moreover, none of the foregoing provisions would prevent a subsequent attempt at regime change. The DPRK would retain a sizeable but decrepit conventional force; however, no nonnuclear power has been able to stand up against the U.S. military. Washington easily ousted governments in Grenada, Panama, Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq; imposed a geopolitical settlement on Bosnia; and dismembered Serbia.
Even more, el-Qaddafi’s gruesome fate, recorded for the world to see, illustrated Washington’s willingness to ignore past promises. Indeed, Saddam Hussein could make a similar complaint: the Reagan administration supported him after he invaded Iran and George H. W. Bush’s ambassador in Baghdad indicated that Kuwait’s fate was of little concern in Washington. He didn’t expect to end up on the wrong end of a U.S. invasion.
Moreover, President Trump’s behavior does not give confidence that he would keep his word. Nor would a future president feel it necessary to live up to a deal made by President Trump. After all, he has spent most of his first fourteen months in office repudiating trade agreements made by his predecessors and working to kill the nuclear accord with Iran. He is also threatening to escalate U.S. involvement in Syria, and toyed with military intervention in Venezuela. Incoming secretary of state Mike Pompeo recently hinted that he supported regime change in Pyongyang. How trusting will be the DPRK’s supreme leader, who has been exceedingly ruthless—at least measured by public executions of former aides—in preserving his rule? Probably not very.
China and Russia could offer security guarantees, but the North always maintained its independence from both of its dominating neighbors. Indeed, Kim appears sensitive to the possibility that his frenemies in Beijing might want to replace him: in 2013 he executed his uncle, who was the regime’s chief interlocutor with China, and last year he presumably ordered the execution of his half brother, who could have been used by Beijing as the frontman for a more docile regime. Kim might prefer not to rely on a potentially overbearing China for protection.
Instead, Kim could demand more from the administration—most likely the end of Washington’s alliance with the South and removal of U.S. troops from the peninsula. The North long has denounced the ROK as a puppet regime and insisted that America stay out of Korean affairs. While the United States replies that its force presence is defensive, those troops and bases would be useful in any military action against a weakened DPRK. Indeed, from Pyongyang’s standpoint, withdrawal would seem a reasonable price for yielding both nukes and long-range missiles.
However, the possibility of North Korea making such a demand worries some Korea analysts. For instance, Thomas Wright of the Brookings Institution complained that doing so would trade away “one of America’s most important alliances” and “signal that the United States cares little for its friends and is only concerned about direct threats to the homeland.”
Yet the alliance is important primarily to the extent that it advances America’s security, not to the extent that it subsidizes one of America’s many prosperous and populous defense clients. And direct threats to the American homeland are precisely the dangers against which Washington should be most alert, since they matter far more than threats against friendly nations, especially those able to defend themselves.
Before negotiations begin, Washington decisionmakers should ponder their priorities. Which is more important, getting rid of North Korea’s nuclear weapons or keeping U.S. forces on the peninsula? Administration officials might wish to do both. And maybe it will be possible to do so.
But an American withdrawal would be the single most effective step to reduce the likelihood of a future U.S. attempt at regime coercion or change. And that would be the best way to fulfill Kim’s reported condition for denuclearization, that “the military threat to the North was eliminated and its security guaranteed.”
Obviously, the United States would retain substantial military assets aground and afloat elsewhere in the region. (Kim conceivably could insist that American troops leave the region entirely and even that the United States, China and Russia also denuclearize, a possibility suggested by one of my interlocutors in Pyongyang. But this would move beyond the realm of the possible, as Pyongyang would know. That would demonstrate that Kim was not serious about negotiation.)
Nevertheless, backing away militarily would symbolically turn the region’s future over to its members. It would be harder for an American president to make the case for military action if there was little connection, let alone threat, to America. While the United States could intervene without an alliance, there would be neither a treaty commitment to ensure attention nor a troop trip wire to trigger action.
If Pyongyang makes such a demand, the answer should be a quick and easy yes. If genuine détente befell the peninsula, why should Washington’s forces stay? The alliance was created in 1953 to preserve a war-ravaged ROK during the Cold War from North Korea, backed by the barely post-Stalin Soviet Union and Maoist China. That world disappeared long ago.
Seoul is well able to defend itself. The South possesses upwards of forty-five times the North’s GDP, and twice the population. South Korea’s military is better trained and equipped, and could be expanded as necessary to ensure its ability to deter and defeat any DPRK attack. The only serious argument for a continued American military presence is the North’s nuclear arsenal. (In fact, Washington’s nuclear umbrella does not require a conventional presence on the peninsula.)
If the North does denuclearize, then the United States should bring home its forces as a matter of course. If proposing withdrawal would be useful in achieving denuclearization, then the card should be played during negotiations. After all, the overriding objective is to eliminate a potential North Korean attack on the American homeland.
Indeed, the DPRK’s ability to strike U.S. cities would force Washington to rethink its commitment to the ROK in any case. There is nothing at stake in Korea that would justify risking mass death and destruction in America. Better than being forced to back away, the administration should offer to leave in order to preclude the clear and present danger.
Nevertheless, an unnamed administration official told Reuters that if the North brings up the withdrawal of U.S. forces, “things could get ugly quickly despite the summit.” Instead, the aide hoped they would “present something more realistic.” Naoko Aoki of the University of Maryland similarly asserted that this demand would be “a nonstarter for the United States.”
Why isn’t withdrawal a realistic option? Indeed, the president seems in sympathy with this view. In mid-March, he complained, “We have a very big trade deficit with them, and we protect them.” In his view, the United States was losing money on both trade and “the military,” with “32,000 soldiers on the border between North and South Korea. Let’s see what happens.” Although the White House said the president was not proposing to remove the troops, that would be the logical response. It certainly would make no sense to keep losing money on “the military” if the South no longer needed defending.
To reject withdrawal would treat the alliance as an end, not a means, and one worth the risk of nuclear war. The Korean Peninsula played an important role during the Cold War, but the threats have lessened, and would fall even more dramatically with the North’s denuclearization. Moreover, the ability of allied states to protect themselves and Northeast Asia has dramatically increased. Further, the United States and South Korea can cooperate when convenient without being formally linked militarily. Trade is one such tie, despite the president’s seeming antagonism to any economic agreement which allows Americans to purchase other nations’ products.
Much could go wrong on the way to a Trump-Kim summit. The best case probably is creating a positive atmosphere in which the United States and North Korea can achieve some degree of détente and disarmament even if not full denuclearization. But more is possible. And the United States should go all in to make the most of the opportunity. That includes offering to end a security guarantee and military commitment which would lose their raison d’être after denuclearization. Washington’s priority should be to eliminate the North’s nuclear weapons and the regime’s ability to strike America. All else pales in comparison.
Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute. A former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan
North Korea thinks if the US troops go they can march in as Liberators ,LOL
South Korea is a top 5 world economy. They are no longer starving and destitute. If they cannot defend themselves from the starving and destitute North they don’t deserve to be free. They even have well developed indigenous military arms and munitions industry and make their own tanks, ships, and some ordinance.
The US could use those troops on the Southern border.
Have they ever paid for our protection? I don’t think so, but I’d like to know definitively.
It’s brilliant that Trump put a US withdraw on the table in these talks.
It’s a BENEFIT to us, forces Japan and So Korea to defend themselves (and they are eminently capable), and gives Norklandia something to crow about. It’s even of benefit to China in their weird calculus.
And he makes it look like we’re giving something up.
“Have they ever paid for our protection? I don’t think so, but I’d like to know definitively.”
The US is under a UN mandate in S. Korea. So it should be the UN paying, not S. Korea. But, I don’t think the UN has provided any reimbursement either.
I agree in principle but it has to be done in a way so it doesn’t look like “Elder Brother is abandoning Little Brother”. It’s Asia you have to look at your actions in Confucian terms - meaning in terms of family relationships. In the past we have been the “Big Brother” protecting them. They have been a good ally and have been helpful we have asked them
It’s brilliant that Trump put a US withdraw on the table in these talks.
If you read the article, there’s a good chance, particularly as NK sees it, that Lucy Van Pelt is the US and Charlie Brown is Qaddafi, Saddam Hussein, or Ukraine. I’d add the Kurds.
We should withdraw RIGHT before we nuke them.
I thought the Cato Institute was a libertarian, not leftist, organization.
Why not? Germany did okay reuniting with East Germany. A strong, united Korea might be the best way to stop Chinese expansion.
Yup, the terms should be ALL American and the troops stay as long as WE need them to. Norkers dictate NOTHING.
“In the past we have been the “Big Brother” protecting them. They have been a good ally and have been helpful we have asked them”
Yes, you are right but that would not be hard to do in this case for the reasons I mentioned. As I wrote above, S. Korea is a modern industrialized nation. It has about twice the population of the north. IIt is prosperous, stable, and peaceful. It also has a large, well-trained military including an airforce and navy. There is no reason that the nation of S. Korea should not be given the honor of standing on their own while the (using Confucian term)older brother stands by beaming with pride. In fact, I think a majority of S. Koreans would welcome that.
I think that these same arguments could be used for Japan. This would not be a retreat but a victory because US troops are no longer needed to protect those countries.
great news
Bolton will only accept an agreement with unfettered access and the loading of cargo ships with dismantled parts.
Your .gif is outdated. It only exemplifies clinton, bush and obama.
It’s protection from the war mongering deep state they should be seeking.
From the article: Nevertheless, an unnamed administration official told Reuters that if the North brings up the withdrawal of U.S. forces, “things could get ugly quickly despite the summit.” Instead, the aide hoped they would “present something more realistic.” Naoko Aoki of the University of Maryland similarly asserted that this demand would be “a nonstarter for the United States.”
West Germany took in a 1950s - 1960s level society in East Germany and it wasn’t starving and chronically malnourished. It still took the German economy 15 years to recover. The east is still poorer then the west. (It took the German cultural work ethic to sort of make communism work, but only sort of!) South Korea absorbing North Korea would mean integrating in a medieval society after it was ravaged by war and famine. Because of that South Korean governments aren’t as anxious to save their kin as you might think.
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