Devin Nunes, House Intel Committee Prepare to Find FBI in Contempt for Mueller Cover-up

Just another act in the Big Dog and Pony show being put on by CONgress.

Congress has ALL the power in washington, the executive and judicial branch operate according to the whims of CONGRESS!

“U.S. CODE
TITLE 2—THE CONGRESS
CHAPTER 6—CONGRESSIONAL AND COMMITTEE PROCEDURE; INVESTIGATIONS
Sec. 193. Privilege of witnesses
No witness is privileged to refuse to testify to any fact, or to produce any paper, respecting which he shall be examined by either House of Congress, or by any joint committee established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two Houses of Congress, or by any committee of either House, upon the ground that his testimony to such fact or his production of such paper may tend to disgrace him or otherwise render him infamous.”

Simply look up Hinds Precedents, especially chapters 53 and 51, and Cannon’s Precedents, especially chapters 184-185. You’ll find numerous detailed cases of Congress asserting its power, arresting people, holding them until they agreed to answer questions, and then releasing them. Some of these people did not refuse to appear, but simply failed to satisfactorily answer questions. One has to wonder how a previous Congress might have responded to Alberto Gonzales’s endless recitations of “I do not recall.”

Congress can Remove the President
Congress can remove the head of every executive agency Congress can remove ALL of their employees
Congress can Abolish every agency they so choose
Congress can remove EVERY JUDGE IN AMERICA, including every supreme court justice.
Congress can abolish every federal court except the supreme Court
Congress can decide which cases the Judicial Branch can hear and decide
CONGRESS can Imprison ANYONE they want for any reason they so desire for as long as they wish.
Congress can declare WAR

No other governing body has even 10% of the power CONGRESS has!!

CONGRESS IS ALLOWING ALL OF IT!!!

Congress has the authority to arrest and imprison those found in Contempt. The power extends throughout the United States and is an inherent power (does not depend upon legislated act)

If found in Contempt the person can be arrested under a warrant of the Speaker of the House of Representatives or President of the Senate, by the respective Sergeant at Arms.

Statutory criminal contempt is an alternative to inherent contempt.

Under the inherent contempt power Congress may imprison a person for a specific period of time or an indefinite period of time, except a person imprisoned by the House of Representatives may not be imprisoned beyond adjournment of a session of Congress.

Imprisonment may be coercive or punitive.

Some references

[1] Joseph Story’s Commentaries on the Constitution, Volume 2, § 842 http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/print_documents/a1_5s21.html

[2] Anderson v. Dunn - 19 U.S. 204 - “And, as to the distance to which the process might reach, it is very clear that there exists no reason for confining its operation to the limits of the District of Columbia; after passing those limits, we know no bounds that can be prescribed to its range but those of the United States.” http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/19/204/case.html

[3] Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/294/125/case.html 73rd Cong., 78 Cong. Rec. 2410 (1934) https://archive.org/details/congressionalrec78aunit

[4] McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 - Under a warrant issued by the President of the Senate the Deputy to the Senate Sergeant at Arms arrested at Cincinnati, Ohio, Mally S. Daugherty, who had been twice subpoenaed by the Senate and twice failed to appear. http://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/273/135/case.html

[5] Rules of the House of Representatives, Rule IV Duties of the Sergeant at Arms - [] execute the commands of the House, and all processes issued by authority thereof, directed to him by the Speaker. http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/HMAN-105/pdf/HMAN-105-pg348.pdf

[6] An analysis of Congressional inquiry, subpoena, and enforcement http://www.constitutionproject.org/documents/when-congress-comes-calling-a-primer-on-the-principles-practices-and-pragmatics-of-legislative-inquiry/

In 1857, a New York Times reporter refused to say which members of Congress had asked him to get them bribes (protecting his “sources” just as various Judith Millers today protect the people who feed them proven lies that costs thousands of lives), so Congress locked him up until he answered and then banned him from Congress.

In 1924 an oil executive appeared but refused to answer certain questions, so the Senate held — literally held — him in contempt. Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana argued that this question of contempt was of the gravest importance, and that it involved “the very life of the effective existence of the House of Representatives of the United States and of the Senate of the United States.” The matter was taken to court, and the witness fined and imprisoned.

Chapter LI.*
POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT.
1. General discussion. Sections 1597-1598.
2. Cases of Randall and Whitney. Sections 1599-1603.
3. Senate case of William Duane. Section 1604.
4. Arrest of officer of House by magistrate. Section 1606.
5. Case of John Anderson. Sections 1606, 1607.
6. Case of Hallet KUbourn. Sections 1608-1611.
7. Senate case of Elverton K. Chapman. Sections 1612-1614.
8. Assault on the resident’s secretary in the Capitol. Section 1616.
9. Case of Samuel Houston. Sections 1616-1619.
10. Various other cases arising from assaults. Sections 1620-1630.
11. Cases arising from reports in the press. Sections 1631-1640.
1597. Discussion by Jefferson as to the inherent power of the House
to punish for contempts without prior sanction of law.—Thomas Jefferson,
in his Manual written for the use of the Senate and in 18.37 adopted as a guide for
the House in all cases not provided for by its rules and orders, has the following in
his discussion of the subject of privilege:
So far there will probably bo no difference of opinion as to the privileges of the two Houses of
Congress; but in the following cases it is otherwise: In December, 1795, the House of Representatives
committed two persons of the name of Randall and Whitney for attempting to corrupt the integrity of
certain Members, which they considered as a contempt and breach of the privileges of the House; and
the facts being proved, Whitney was detained in confinement a fortnight, and Randall three weeks, and
was reprimanded by the Speaker. In March, 1796, the House of Representatives voted a challenge
given to a Member of their House to be a breach of the privileges of the House;’ but satisfactory apologies
and acknowledgments being made, no further proceeding was had. The editor of the Aurora having,
in his paper of February 19, 1800, inserted some paragraphs defamatory of the Senate, and failed in his
appearance, he was ordered to be committed. In debating the legality of this order it was insisted in
support of it that every man, by the law of nature, and every body of men, possesses the right of selfdefense;
that all public functionaries are essentially invested with the powers of self-preservation;
that they have an inherent right to do all acts necessary to keep themselves in a condition to discharge
the trusts confided to them; that whenever authorities are given, the means of carrying them into execution
are given by necessary implication; that thus we see the British Parliament exercise the right of
punishing contempts; all the State legislatures exercise the same power, and every court does the same;
that if we have it not, we sit at the mercy of every intruder who may enter our doors or gallery, and,
by noise and tumult, render proceeding in business impracticable; that if our tranquillity is to be perpetually
disturbed by newspaper defamation, it will not be possible to exercise our functions with the
requisite coolness and deliberation; and that we must therefore have a power to punish these disturbetB

§ 1598 POWER TO PUNISH FOR CONTEMPT. 1047
of our peace and proceedings. To this it was answered that the Parliament and courts of England have
cognizance of contempts by the express provisions of their law; that the State legislatures have equal
authority because their powers are plenary; they represent their constituents completely, and possess
all their powers, except such as their constitutions have expressly denied them; tliat the courts of the
several States have the same powers by the laws of their Stat<>s, and those of the Fiideral Government
by the same State laws adopted in each State, \>y a law of Congress; that none of these bodies, therefore,
derive those powers from natural or necessary right, but from express law; that C’ongress have no such
natural or necessary power, nor any powers but such as are given them by the Constitution; that tliat
has given them directly exemption from personal arrest, exemption from question elsewhere for what is
said in their House, and power over their own Members and proceedings; for these no further law is
necessary, the Constitution being the law; that, moreover, by that article of the Constitution which
authorizes them “to make all laws necessary and proper for caiTying into execution the powers vested
by the Constitution in them,” they may provide by law for an undisturbed exercise of their functions,
e. g., for the punishment of contempts, of affrays or tumult in their presence, etc., but, till the law be
made, it does not exist, and does not exist from their own neglect; that, in the meantime, however,
they are not unprotected, the ordinary magistrates and courts of law being open and competent to punish
all unjustifiable disturbances or defamations, and even their own sergeant, who may appoint deputies ad
libitum to aid him (3 Grey, 59, 147, 255), is equal to small disturbances; that in requiring a previous
law, the Constitution had regard to the inviolability of the citizen, as well as of the Member; as, should
one House, in the regular form of a bill, aim at too broad privileges, it may be checked by the other,
and both by the President; and also as, the law being promulgated, the citizen will know how to avoid
offense. But if one branch may assume its own privileges without control, if it may do it on the spur of
the occasion, conceal the law in its own breast, and, after the fact committed, make its sentence both
the law and the judgment on that fact; if the offense is to be kept undefined and to be declared only
ex re nata, and according to the passions of the moment, and there be no limitation either in the manner
or measure of the punishment, the condition of the citizen will be perilous indeed. Which of these
doctrines is to prevail time will decide. Where there is no fixed law, the judgment on any particular
case is the law of that single case only, and dies with it. WTien a new and even a similar case arises, the
judgment which is to make and at the same time apply the law is open to question and consideration, as
are all new laws. Perhaps Congress in the meantime, in their care for the safety of the citizen, as well as
that for their own protection, may declare by law what is necessary and proper to enable them to cany
into execution the powers vested in them, and thereby hang up a rule for the inspection of all, which
may direct the conduct of the citizen, and at the same time test the judgments they shall themselves
pronounce in their own case.
1 598. It was found inexpedient to define the offense of contempt of the
House by law and provide a punishment.—On February 13, 1837,^ Mr. Andrew
Beaumont, of Pennsylvania, moved the following resolution:
Resolved, That the Committee on the Judiciary be instructed to inquire into the expediency of
bringing in a bill defining the offense of a contempt of this House, and to provide for the punishment
thereof.
After debate a motion was made that the resolution lie on the table, and was
decided in the negative. Then, after further debate, the resolution was disagreed to.
1599. The contempt cases of Randall and Whitney in 1795.
On the evidence of Members who in their places gave information of
attempts to bribe them, the House issued an order for the arrest of the
person charged with the offense.
Arrests are made by the Sergeant-at-Arms on authority of a warrant
duly signed, attested, and sealed; and on performing the duty that officer
makes return on the warrant.
‘ Second session Twenty-fourth Congress

Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.