Posted on 06/27/2008 10:17:45 AM PDT by DesScorp
To Darleen Druyun, wherever you are now... your name may soon no longer be tied to the most egregious procurement process in the history of the US Air Force's incredibly protracted bid for a new aerial tanker. It seems the latest attempt may just have surpassed your 2003 scandal. According to the unedited Government Accountability Office report on the USAF's recent KC-X bid, released this week, the Air Force took its level of bungling to new heights in awarding an initial $40 billion contract to a partnership comprised of EADS and Northrop Grumman. Overall, the GAO said, the Air Force selection process was "undermined by a number of prejudicial errors that call into question the Air Force's decision," reports The Washington Post. ... In the 67-page review -- which was released in full Wednesday, one week after a heavily-redacted version was made public -- the GAO took Air Force officials to task for miscalculating maintenance costs, failing to follow their own evaluation process, and failing to adhere to their own self-aggrandizing statements that KC-X was an "incredibly open and transparent" process. Among its findings is the revelation the Air Force may have held Northrop's hand in dealing with some shortcomings of its bid. In one case, USAF officials told Boeing it had met a set of objectives... but later said it had not, after discussions had already closed. Conversely, the Air Force told Northrop about areas its bid had fallen short on, then gave the company time to alter its proposal. "It is a fundamental precept of negotiated procurements that discussions, when conducted, must be meaningful, equitable, and not misleading," the GAO said, adding the USAF "treated the firms unequally" when discussing their proposals.
(Excerpt) Read more at aero-news.net ...
thanks for posting this.
What are the chances that this is going to end up with us buying the airplane with the least capability at the greatest cost? Or, are we going to get the best airplane but be paying shutup money to the loser?
Don’t let ethics or right and wrong get in the way.
“What are the chances that this is going to end up with us buying the airplane with the least capability at the greatest cost? Or, are we going to get the best airplane but be paying shutup money to the loser?”
If you read the full article (and especially the full GAO report), three things becomes clear...
1- Boeing gave USAF exactly what they asked for, then USAF moved the goal posts.
2- Boeing’s entry was cheaper to buy, and cheaper to operate. Cost was supposed to be a huge factor in the competition.
3- USAF leadership on several occasions seemed to indicate that they wanted the Airbus-NG entry regardless of the merit’s of Boeing’s entry.
He was later replaced.
/johnny
i would assume all major-price bid projects are hopelessly corrupt, but apparently there is going to be fallout from this contract.
Follow the money, as always.
This is a misleading headline (by ANN, not by DesScorp.)
The GAO report that is linked to is the redacted version.
Example:
In the aerial refueling area, the SSAC noted major discriminators in favor of Boeing under several KPP No. 1 objectives, including its capability to [Deleted] and [Deleted], and for a noteworthy non-KPP/KSA capability to [Deleted]. Id. at 13.
The System Requirement Document very clearly stated a desired fuel offload vs. distance chart, and neither aircraft was to be awarded 'extra credit' for exceeding those parameters.
However, the SRD did not specify how many pallets, how many passengers, or how many aeromedical litters the aircraft needed to carry, therefore extra credit could legitimately be given to the KC-30 proposal for carrying more cargo/pax/patients.
As bad as this might sound, it is a common, encouraged, practice to help all of the offerers to present their best proposals. Then choose the best value from their best proposals. Nothing new here.
I appreciate the huge difficulty of picking an airplane. I evaluate and recommend computer equipment and software for my employer. There is a lot of emotional turmoil involved in spending a huge sum of money and I can imagine the pressure at that level could be overwhelming.
Even now I’m having to choose between cheap and better and its a pretty subjective process. I can see how Boeing might have been led on and was single mindedly pursuing and trying to perfect their “cheap” proposal while all the time the Airforce was being entranced by some other feature of their competitor’s submission.
I’ll think we’ll never see an uncensored version.
Here are links to the official source:
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.htm
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311344.pdf
Another factor was
IFARA Fleet Effectiveness Value
1.79 for KC-767AT
1.90 for KC-45
One KC-45 would replace 1.90 KC-135 and one KC-767AT just 1.79 Stratotankers.
Looks not much but with 263 KC-45 you can replace the whole fleet of 500 KC-135. You'll need 279 KC-767AT to do the same.
According to this calculations after the first batch of 179 KC-45 you just need 84 more aircrafts of the same type to replace the complete KC-135 fleet.
According to the IFARA Factor Evaluation GOA says:
Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA did consider the agencys evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms proposals under this factor, and therefore find no basis to object to the agencys evaluation.
Both aircrafts are nearly identical in terms of production risk or costs (0.1 %). But one aircraft is about 6 % more efficient in its main task of aerial refueling.
But only when you need the full capacity. If you return with fuel in the tanks it is not more efficient.
I recent study found that the average KC135 mission delivered about 60,000-70,000 pounds of fuel.
So there will be many missions where you will brun more fuel becuase of the heavier airplane.
The maximum fuel offload for KC-135 at 1,000 nm is 100,000 lb. A tanker waiting for fighters guzzles about 200 lb of fuel a minute. A boom can offload 6,000 lb a minute. A hose-and-drogue system about 2,000 lb. Most fighter aircraft with boom receptacles just can accept offload at 1,000 to 3,000 lb per minute.
A B-52 is filled within 17 minutes with 100,000 lb of fuel. With fighter aircrafts it's differently. With a boom or for fighter aircraft it's about 50 minutes pure refueling time without aircrafts changing positions. That's about 7,000 lb fuel less to offload.
For more information look here.
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/permalink/meta-crs-9722:1
The average number of fuel offloaded is a useless number as long you don't know the missions. On backup missions a tanker may guzzles all the fuel without offloading one pound.
So there will be many missions where you will brun more fuel becuase of the heavier airplane.
You can save fuel because you can stay longer on station. You don't need to fly back to base so often. The numbers you posted may be limits for KC-135.
Obviously the missions make a difference. The AF said there was a mission that would take 22 fewer A330s to complete. But the larger airplane can't always be better. It means that sometimes the airplane is too big. So how much does it cost you at those times.
The AF has now pretty much admitted that the A330 burns more fuel. A good question is what price did they use for their analysis? Because at higher prices that difference is going to be even more pronounced.
And you might save fuel by staying on station but then again there are times where that won't be needed.
The AF came up with an efficiency score.
AFE = (Fuel Off-Loaded) ÷ (Fuel Off-Loaded + Fuel Burned)
The KC-30 only generates the higher efficiency metric when it flies to a range and off-loads a full load with just enough fuel to get back to base, an extremely rare event.
The feeling you get reading the GAO report is that the procurment team wanted the A330 to win and they just didn't back up their decision with hard analysis. Or that they didn't make a documentaiton trail for it. (which in the military probably means it wasn't done)
Thanks. Been there, downloaded that, and stuffed it in the same folder as the full redacted KC-X RFP that used to be on the Goverment Procurememt website until last March.
I still find it handy to actually read the requirement document and see what was and was not really ‘specified.’
I can only point out that if the KC-30 continues to be the selected tanker (which is looking less and less likely,) then even at the end of the 20 year long procurement period we will still have about 200 KC-135Rs in the USAF inventory, including the 45 modified with wingtip hose-and-drogue pods, and the R/Ts that have refueling acceptors.
The KC-30 can offload more fuel, and the KC-135 will still be in the inventory for those unusual cases where a smaller apron footprint or less offload capability is required.
The KC-30 is much more efficient than the KC-767AT at overseas deployment missions, because it can carry more personnel and more spares to a remote base, and can drag a flight of fighters with it at the same time. So when you get to the remote location, you have the fighters, the ground personnel, and the LRU spares on hand from the first minute. And with it's larger fuel capacity, you can deploy over the Pacific farther than the KC-767AT.
This is also what the KC-10A is for, and the KC-10A carries 100,000lbs more fuel than the KC-30, but carries fewer pax and cargo than the KC-30 due to it's permanent combi layout. That is why the KC-X specified a fully convertible interior, so that the KC-X could be all pax, all cargo, or a combi layout with a little of both.
The one thing that did disturb me in the GAO report, however, about the KC-30 was it's lower max airspeed may not allow it to perform a breakaway maneuver safely with some aircraft. Sadly, the details were so heavily redacted from the 67 page report that I couldn't gleen any meaningful details.
Facinating read. I wonder if the USAF F-35A aircraft will be equipped with refueling probes. It is a certanity that the F-35As sold to foreign buyers will be, so the capability should be 'built in.'
I am convinced by the arguments presented in that paper that future USAF aircraft should be equipped with probes.
Air Force made several simulations with different scenarios and not just some simple calculations. It's possible that in some scenarios a smaller plane fits better but on average the numbers are 1.90 to 1.79.
The A330 is more fuel efficient than a 767. That is a fact for general aviation.
No, that is less than the capacity of the KC135. So it is returning with fuel left over most of the time.
You don't know that because your number of delivered 60,000-70,000 lb of fuel didn't mention with what amount of fuel the aircrafts takeoff and with how much fuel they returned to base. You can't demonstrate with these numbers whether the offloaded amount is due to the mission or due to the limitation of KC-135.
I'd like to see the same figures for KC-10. That'll be interesting.
Imagine the RAF is able to refuel 3 fighter aircrafts at once with old VC-10 tankers. I think Navy would like to have several KC-whatever with hose-and-drogue only or a additional center unit.
On the IFARA score they did have a higher score but only after they reduced the wing tip spacing, allowed the A330 to operate out of airfieds that were not rated to support its weight, etc.
So a simulation is only as good as the assumptions. They adjusted the assumptions to favor the A330.
This wing tip spacing is already used at forward air bases for KC-135. GAO found the IFARA score to be valid.
Can you cite one source without redirecting to Boeing which could approve that tarmac strength was ignored?
The wingspan difference is legit, but the airfield weight restrictions are not.
The KC-30 can operate on any apron that the KC-767AT can, as long as both have the same fuel load. The argument has always been the KC-767 can operate out of more airfields at it's max fuel capacity than the KC-30 can operate out of at its max fuel capacity.
However, fill up the KC-30 to the KC-767's max and both can operate out of the same fields. Added bonus: The KC-30 can takeoff from a shorter runway than the KC-767 with identical fuel loads. How many more airfields does that open up?
So the question is: Is it better to hamstring yourself with a reduced fuel load (equal to the KC-767 max fuel load) some of the time, or be hamstrung with the KC-767 fuel load all the time, no matter where you're operating from?
I know my answer, and I think I know yours.
How about the oft quoted Loren Thompson:
3. The Air Force says that a computerized simulation of how the competing tankers would function in an actual wartime scenario strongly favored the larger Airbus plane. But the simulation assumed longer runways, stronger asphalt and more parking space than actually exists at forward bases, and failed to consider the consequences of losing bases in wartime. How can such unrealistic assumptions be relevant to the selection of a next-generation tanker?
It was widely reported that the IFARA (using CMARPS) could only accept one number for an airfields rating and the AF used the highst number instead of the lowest. The analogy I think of is ice skating on a pond. Do you want to know the thickest part of the ice or the hinnest?
At the same fuel load an A330 would weigh about 50,000 pounds more than a 767. So the laoding on the runway would still be higher.
Can you give a source for the 25 foot wing tip spacing. (an official policy not Sue Payton saying, well we asked a couple of guys...)
3. The Air Force says that a computerized simulation of how the competing tankers would function in an actual wartime scenario strongly favored the larger Airbus plane. But the simulation assumed longer runways,[...]
That would favor the tanker with second best takeoff performance.
[...]stronger asphalt and more parking space than actually exists at forward bases,[...]
Will Air Force get the tankers next week? I won't think so. Therefore Air Force can use data for already planed improvements.
[...]and failed to consider the consequences of losing bases in wartime.
That would favor the aircraft with shorter range.
[...]How can such unrealistic assumptions be relevant to the selection of a next-generation tanker?
Longer runways favors KC-767 and no loss of forward bases favors KC-767.
Is the difference between KC-767’s MTOW of 400,000 lb and 500,000 lb for KC-45 really such a big issue?
I found nothing to compare Pavement Classification Number (PCN) or Aircraft Classification Number (ACN) for both aircrafts.
I found something about Aircraft Load Ratings (ALR)
ALR (kN)
13.3 B-52
12.4 B-1B
12.2 A380 (or 11.3 ?)
11.9 C-17A
11.3 KC-10
11.3 KC-45 (2264 kN)
10.9 KC-767 (1784 kN, MTOW > 400,000 lb)
10.0 C-5
9.8 KC-135
http://www.tc.gc.ca/CivilAviation/International/Technical/Pavement/Downloads/ALR_Table_e.pdf
The main military tarmac killers are B-52, B-1B and C-17.
MTOW of KC-45 is 25 % heavier than KC-767 but the pressure on tarmac is just about 4 % heavier. May be due to bigger wheels.
It was widely reported that the IFARA (using CMARPS) could only accept one number for an airfields rating and the AF used the highst number instead of the lowest.
GAO accepted this part of fact finding by Air Force despite the contrary claim of Boeing.
Can you give a source for the 25 foot wing tip spacing. (an official policy not Sue Payton saying, well we asked a couple of guys...)
Al Udeid Air Base
25.1373°, 51.3142°
(Just copy to Google Earth)
There are five KC-135 parked in a row. From first KC-135 nose to the last nose about 650 ft. With KC-135's wingspan of 130 ft there is 120 ft space left. 30 ft between each aircraft.
And look what Air Force have done for the C-17s. A separate apron for them. Located east of runway center.
There are also bases within CONUS where tankers are parked with 30 ft spacing. I learned that these are not AMC tankers. They are operated by Air National Guard.
32.644°,-83.5893°
Robins AFB, 19th Air Refueling Group.
47.6169°,-117.662°
Fairchild AFB, 92d Air Refueling Wing.
Both with 30 feet spacing.
47.6169°,-117.662°
Fairchild AFB, 92d Air Refueling Wing.
Both with 30 feet spacing.
I looked at both of those places on Google Earth, and it is obvious why the USAF cannot buy the KC-30.
They'd have to repaint all those guide lines on the tarmac to allow for more wingtip space.
</sarc>
BTW the IFARA score was the lowest ranked rating factor. Below cost, which we now know that the 767 had the lower Life Cycle costs and if Milcon was correctly factored in it would have been a more significant difference.
I also read somewhere that the difference between 1.79 and 1.9 on the IFARA was within the margin of error.
Was it a statistic or systematic error? Can you provide a source?
Can you also provide a source for several other claims? Not a source like "according to our source within Pentagon ...".
- “if Milcon was correctly factored in it would have been a more significant difference.”
- “Losing bases during wartime was a problem for EADS. The KC30 could not even complete some of the missions if certain bases were unavailable.”
Why?
Look at page 17 here: http://www.victoriaairport.com/pdfs/exec%20summary%20final%2007mar2008.pdf
767-300ER needs a longer runway than A330-200.
But you keep pointing out that the Boeing tanker isn’t a 767-300ER. (but the EADs is a A330-200)
One has been optimized as tanker the other has not.
767-300ER is closest to KC-767AT. Nearly same MTOW and engines. AT got same wings but different flaps.
One has been optimized as tanker the other has not.
I would say one aircraft was stretched to its limits to reach the requirements.
And the other was “take it or leave it, if you don’t change to the rules to our benefit we won’t bid.”
Thanks for making my point.
Try to explain which part of the final RFP did favor KC-45 over KC-767?
We did not, and do not now, agree with the Air Force and Northrop Grumman that Boeings protest is a challenge to the ground rules established by the RFP for this procurement. We find that Boeing, rather than objecting to any of the RFPs requirements or evaluation criteria, is instead protesting that the Air Force failed to reasonably evaluate proposals in accordance with the RFPs identified requirements and evaluation criteria.40
Well, GAO thinks differently.
According to the IFARA Factor Evaluation GOA says:
Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA did consider the agencys evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms proposals under this factor, and therefore find no basis to object to the agencys evaluation.GAO-Decision, page 50:
[page 16]
IFARA Fleet Effectivness Value: Boeing 1.79 / NG 1.90
Boeing also protests the Air Forces conclusion in the aerial refueling area that Northrop Grummans proposed larger boom envelope (relative to that offered by Boeing) offered a meaningful benefit to the Air Force. See AR, Tab 55, PAR, at 14. From our review of the record, including hearing testimony on this issue, we do not find a basis to object to the Air Forces judgment that Northrop Grumman had offered a larger boom envelope and that this offer provided a measurable benefit.Page 50f
Boeing also challenges the Air Forces evaluation judgment in the airlift area that Northrop Grummans proposed aircraft offered superior cargo, passenger, and aeromedical evacuation capability than did Boeings aircraft. From our review of the record, including the hearing testimony, we see no basis to conclude that the Air Forces evaluation that Northrop Grummans aircraft was more advantageous in the airlift area is unreasonable.Effectiveness, cargo capability and so on is nothing compared to more sockets on main cargo deck or brighter bulbs.
But in reading Boeing's announcement I think there is an undertone that says that they are keeping their options open and might still take the original decision to Federal Claims Court on the basis that with the 2 KPPs not met they actually won the original bid as NG should have been eliminated.
We will have to wait and see what the clarifications are to the RFP. If it looks like the clarifications are just an attempt to codify the unwritten advantage given to NG then expect a legal fight.
what utter BS. read the gao REPORT. the kc-767 met the requirements of the RFP.
its spins the EADS/NG PR. POOR THE KOOLAID
The problem is Air Force accepted NG proposal. Boeing protested Air Force changed assessment without telling that. GAO supported this protest. NG will protest also against such a decision.
In this early hours I'm just aware of one KPP GAO got problems with, the overrun airspeed of NG aircraft and therefore compliance with current air refueling procedures.
GAO’s report didn't assessed Boeing's aircraft. I'm not sure KC-767AT meets all KKP.
We will have to wait and see what the clarifications are to the RFP. If it looks like the clarifications are just an attempt to codify the unwritten advantage given to NG then expect a legal fight.
So Boeing will sue Department of Defense for clarifying what Air Force needs?
No Boeing we seek redress at the federal claims court for awarding the contract to NG in the first place. If they can prove that by not meeting requirments (fuel all aircraft and depot in 2 years) then NG was not eligible for the award. If Boeing had met all requirments they shoud have won the bid.
So if Boeing smells that the changes are a cover for the flaws and just aimed and being a do-over for NG they may take it to court.
I have not figured out how you clarify “unequal and prejudicial treatment” in the revised RFP.
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