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Outside View: 9/11 report sidesteps Pakistan Atlanta, GA, Jul. 26 (UPI) -- A quick search of the unanimous final report submitted by the independent 9/11 commission yields 536 references to Afghanistan, 419 references to Saudi Arabia and 311 references to Pakistan. This is not surprising because the governments and individuals belonging to these three nations played decisive roles in the events leading up to the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001. Afghanistan's role under the Taliban is well known by now, given that it was sheltering the al-Qaida leadership. The Saudis, despite murky financial ties to al-Qaida were cleared of official involvement by 9/11 panel. That leaves Pakistan. While the commission documents the high-level ties that al-Qaida had with Pakistan's government agencies, it has failed to confirm or refute persistent, credible reports connecting key Pakistan government officials to the 9/11 attacks. Since the late 1990s, it has been well known to South Asia watchers that Pakistan's spy agency -- the Inter Services Intelligence Directorate, known as the ISI -- was the puppet-master behind the Taliban's military campaigns in Afghanistan. It was also open knowledge that the Taliban and Osama bin Laden established a working arrangement around the same time. However, the exact nature of direct ties between the ISI and al-Qaida remained nebulous. All that changed after the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 report states the ISI that facilitated bin Laden's entry into Afghanistan after he was forced to flee to Sudan. "It is unlikely that bin Laden could have returned to Afghanistan had Pakistan disapproved," it says. "The Pakistani military intelligence service probably had advance knowledge of his coming, and its officers may have facilitated his travel." The report adds, "Pakistani intelligence officers reportedly introduced bin Laden to Taliban leaders in Kandahar, ... to aid his reassertion of control over camps near Khowst." But whose camps were they? On the eve of the second anniversary of 9/11, the U.S. government declassified 32 documents relating to the Taliban and al-Qaida. These included secret memos from the State Department and the Defense Intelligence Agency. According to one of the DIA documents, "Bin Laden's al-Qaida network was able to expand under the safe sanctuary extended by Taliban following Pakistan directives. If there is any doubt on that issue, consider the location of bin Laden's camp targeted by U.S. cruise missiles, Zahawa. Positioned on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it was built by Pakistani contractors, funded by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate. ... If this was later to become bin Laden's base, then serious questions are raised by the early relationship between bin Laden and Pakistan's ISI." There is more evidence of ISI's command role of al-Qaida camps and facilities. In his March 24, 2004, testimony to the 9/11 commission, President Clinton's national security adviser Samuel Berger averred that the August 1998 U.S. cruise missile attacks aimed at killing Osama bin Laden "also killed apparently a number of Pakistani intelligence officials who were at the camps at the same time." It seems the United States was aware that Pakistani intelligence controlled and operated al-Qaida camps and possibly directly liaised with Osama bin Laden himself. Given this and the tight monitoring by the ISI of Pakistani hub cities like Karachi and the fact that many of the 9/11 plotters and hijackers actually transited through Pakistan, when and what did Pakistan's intelligence operatives know about the 9/11 attacks? While 9/11 commission co-chairman Thomas Kean considers the panel's report definitive, it has a glaring hole with the money trail. The panel says the attacks cost somewhere between $400,000 and $500,000 to execute. Where did the money come from? Despite reports of ISI links, the report says al-Qaida had many sources of funding, but the commission could not find out where the 9/11 funds originated. On Oct. 9, 2001, the Pakistani daily Dawn reported the ISI director-general, Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed, was fired after FBI investigators established a link between him and a $100,000 wire transfer to 9/11 lead hijacker Mohammed Atta in the summer of 2000. This report was also carried by the Wall Street Journal. Paul Sperry, Washington bureau chief for WorldNetDaily.com, wrote in his Jan. 30, 2002, column that Dennis Lormel, who until the end of 2003 led the FBI's terrorist finance investigations, confirmed this transaction. Lormel -- an expert the 9/11 commission interviewed to track down the attackers' finances -- gave a clean chit to the Saudis regarding their official involvement in the attacks. Yet the panel did not mention this theory. Asking Lormel could have put the matter to rest. Another interesting snippet revolves around the happenings in Pakistan on the eve of the 9/11 attacks. On Jan. 28, 2002, CBS Evening News, quoting multiple sources, reported that on the night before the Sept. 11 terrorist attack, Osama bin Laden received kidney dialysis treatment in a military hospital in the garrison town of Rawalpindi, just outside Pakistan's capital Islamabad. The report quoted a medical worker who wanted her identity protected, saying that some Pakistani troops "moved out all the regular staff in the urology department and sent in a secret team to replace them" with the aim of treating a "special patient." Some say the 9/11 commission cannot be blamed for not exploring every angle of the conspiracy. There are many strange conspiracy theories on 9/11, including some which accuse the U.S. government of prior knowledge and even complicity. While these these allegations can be discounted, the biggest reason for investigating the ISI link is that many family members of the 9/11 victims had specifically asked the commission to look into it. On May 15, 2003, a group of 9/11 victims' relatives met with the commission co-chairman Thomas Kean and other senior staff and submitted a list of questions, which included a mention of Lt. Gen. Mahmoud Ahmed. A June 17, 2004, the New York Times reported that Lorie Van Auken, whose husband died in the World Trade Center, was "irate" that the June 16 commission narrative of the 9/11 attacks did not even mention the allegation about Ahmed's role in the $100,000 transfer to Mohammed Atta. Clearly, the ISI link is no mere conspiracy theory. One possible explanation for the commission's reluctance to cover the ISI angle could be that the panel investigated, found nothing solid, and decided not to embarrass a key ally in the "war on terror." But that theory does not explain why the 9/11 commission exonerated Saudi officialdom of any role in the attacks, but chose not to do so with Pakistan. Possibly also there was a view that while the ISI may have been involved, it was better to look to the future than to punish Pakistan. This theory is plausible because it eerily resembles the Bush administration's strategy in dealing with the Pakistan-centered nuclear proliferation network, when it glossed over the role of Pakistan government officials in exchange for co-operation in shutting the network down. For all the well-intentioned focus on Iraq, Pakistan is the real locus of global Islamist terrorism. Virtually every jihadist attack in the past few years, before and after 9/11, has had some sort of connection with Pakistan. Karachi was a key planning and financial hub for the 9/11 plotters. The Bali (Indonesia) bombers, "Virginia jihad" members, Istanbul bomb suspects, the Madrid carnage ringleaders, and key suspects in thwarted attacks in Australia and Britain studied in radical Pakistani madrasses or trained in camps belonging to Pakistani jihadist groups linked to the ISI. Trying to clean up the Pakistan-based jihadi networks without a detailed exposé of the ISI's link with these groups is like trying to bust the Gambino crime family without arresting anyone whose name ends with a vowel -- it is simply not possible. Given the Pakistan military's nuclear weapons, Pakistan's jihad-friendly spy agency is as big a global threat as al-Qaida itself. The truth about the ISI's ties with al-Qaida is still out there. -0- (Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance commentator on U.S. policy on South Asia and its effects on the war on terror and non-proliferation. He can be reached at contact@kapisthalam.com) -0- (United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)
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