Click on the above image to read author Martin Geddes' excellent article
explaining the role Q plays in President Trump's Plan
The follow-on re the American Thinker Q article
Hackers targeted American Thinker after it put up a post about Q
FTA:
Nevertheless, just in case either Q is the real deal or Qs opponents are worried (or know) that Q is the real deal, American Thinker will continue to post occasionally about the Q phenomenon in order to keep readers informed about whats either a really cool military operation or a really persuasive, giant conspiracy hoax.
By the way, ransom, apologies for not bringing articles over recently, though everyone else is doing a bangup job of that and got a lot of them. I spent 12 hours posting GREAT articles in festival all through the day. It was one of those days of phenomenal writers. Ended up too zapped to bring them to the thread when the frying pan finally landed athwart my head. Today I’m searching and searching and finding almost zip.
Back to work. Found a good one.
https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2020/01/potus_popping_in_the_polls.html
POTUS Popping in the Polls
By Brian C. Joondeph
FTA:
Meanwhile the Senate passed the USMCA trade agreement, now ready for Trumps signature, another promise made and kept by the accidental president who has no idea what he is doing. The rube of a president also announced a trade deal with China, quite favorable to the U.S., fulfilling yet another campaign pledge.
The stock market ticks up while unemployment ticks down, so much that the new problem is a labor shortage. From workers on unemployment lines during the Obama years, we will soon have companies on employment lines, waiting for the next available worker.
This is what Democrats are running against peace and prosperity. They tell us these are not the best of times, but rather the worst of times, and that their socialistic schemes like Medicare-For-All and the Green New Deal are the solutions to problems that exist only in the minds of the far left.
Even the polls are popping for President Trump.
Good article but something I wanted to point out within it:
“***Barr, who has been given full declassification authority by Trump***, eluded in an interview that Durham may finish his probe by Spring or early this summer.”
Declass already happened.
-SB
Ok,
I am
@momof3not4
on tweeter.
Please follow and let me know if you are a
Freerepublic with a FR in a reply.
Article two reads:
The Commander in Chief Clause of Article II, Section 2 provides that The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States. As Justice Jackson put it in the Steel Seizure case (Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952)), These cryptic words have given rise to some of the most persistent controversies in our constitutional history, with Presidents at various points claiming that it vests power to do anything, anywhere, that can be done with an army or navy.
At a minimum, all agree that the Clause has two separate but related purposes: First, in response to the charge in the Declaration of Independence that the King had affected to render the Military independent of and superior to the Civil Power, it ensures civilian superintendence over the militaryand, as such, the subordination of the military to civilian (and democratically accountable) control. Second, and in contrast to the experience under the Articles of Confederation, it places such civilian superintendence in the hands of a single person. As David Barron and Martin Ledermans definitive academic study of the Clause explains, the textual designation of the President as the Commander in Chief was intended to ensure that that officer, and no other, would be ultimately responsible for performing that role, whatever it was to entail. To that end, they continue, the Clause suggests that, at least with respect to certain functions, Congress may not (by statute or otherwise) delegate the ultimate command of the army and navy . . . to anyone other than the President.
Although that principle, read narrowly, would only prohibit Congress from literally placing someone other than the President atop the U.S. military hierarchy, it presumably also means that Congress cannot insulate parts of the military from the Presidents superintendence or interfere with the Presidents supervisory role, lest Congress have the power to effectively undermine the Presidents command authorityand, in Justice Jacksons words, convert the Clause into an empty title.
Thus, as a case in point, Congress likely violated the Clause in an 1867 appropriations rider that sought to insulate Ulysses S. Grantthen the commanding general of the U.S. Armyfrom President Andrew Johnson by, among other things, requiring all orders to go through Grant (and voiding all orders that didnt); precluding Grants removal by Johnson without Senate approval; and fixing Grants headquarters in Washington (where, presumably, he would be closer to Congress).
As a result of this superintendence principle, when Congress authorizes military operations (such as through a declaration of war), it necessarily puts the President in charge of them. Thus, as Chief Justice Chase explained in his concurring opinion in Ex parte Milligan (1866), the Commander in Chief Clause enshrines the Presidents authority not just over the command of the forces, but also over the conduct of campaigns. And as Barron and Lederman explain, more than 200 years of usage and court precedents reflect the view that the Commander in Chief Clause does confer broad substantive war powers on the President.
A more difficult question is how much authority the Clause gives the President beyond operations approved by Congress. In the debates at Philadelphia, James Madison said that giving Congress the power to declare war would leave the President with power to repel sudden attacks. Presumably this power arises from the Commander in Chief Clause, read to convey independent substantive power to the President to direct the military on matters not related to war initiation. On this basis, Presidents have claimed authority over a range of military actions, including attacking pirates, rescuing U.S. citizens abroad, and making military deployments, although this authority is presumably circumscribed by other provisions of the Constitution and perhaps, some have argued, by international law.
In the Steel Seizure case, the Court rejected the Presidents argument that the Clause empowered the President to seize steel mills in the United States to support the Korean War, and in Milligan, the Court rejected the argument that the Clause allowed the President to use military commissions to try civilians in areas where civilian courts were still operating. These cases indicate that the independent authority conveyed to the President by the Clause generally does not extend to interference with the rights and duties of U.S. civilians, at least outside the battlefield.
The most controversial aspect of the Clause is whether it limits Congresss ability to enact statutes directing how military operations are conducted. For example, multiple Presidents have claimed that the War Powers Resolution, which limits the Presidents ability to deploy troops into hostilities without Congresss approval, is unconstitutional on this ground. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Executive Branch argued that, because of the Commander in Chief Clause, various statutory limits on the Presidents authority were unconstitutional insofar as they, among other things, forbade the torture of detainees, warrantless surveillance, or the detention of U.S. citizens as enemy combatants. As a controversial 2002 government memorandum argued,
Congress can no more interfere with the Presidents conduct of the interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical decisions on the battlefield. Just as statutes that order the President to conduct warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be unconstitutional, so too are laws that seek to prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States.
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), the Supreme Court appeared to reject this argument in invalidating military tribunals created by President Bush to try non-citizen terrorism suspects. As Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, [w]hether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers. However, the scope of Hamdan remains unclear, and in 2015 President Obama suggested that a statute completely limiting his ability to transfer detainees from the military prison at Guantánamo might unconstitutionally infringe his Commander in Chief powers.
In sum, the Commander in Chief Clause gives the President the exclusive power to command the military in operations approved by Congress; it probably gives the President substantial independent power to direct military operations so long has the President does not infringe exclusive powers of Congress or other provisions of the Constitution; and it may (but may not) limit Congress power to pass statutes directing or prohibiting particular military activities.
Jeff Bezos Phone Hacked By Saudi Crown Prince: Report
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/jeff-bezos-phone-hacked-saudi-crown-prince-report
I have to leave and will be gone awhile.
I claim IN @ #2 by proxie for the next thread.
Virginia Senate advances ‘red flag’ gun law, despite rally
https://news.yahoo.com/virginia-senate-advances-red-flag-211406126.html
Venezuela reportedly has less than $1 billion in cash
https://news.yahoo.com/venezuela-reportedly-less-1-billion-152218034.html