Posted on 06/14/2017 3:13:05 PM PDT by GreyFriar
The researchers compiling the U.S. Army’s accounts of Iraq and Afghanistan have an unprecedented—and overwhelming—volume of material to work through.
When Major Spencer Williams was ordered to “shut down shop and move out” of Afghanistan in 2005, he closed his final message from the field as he always did—quoting a long-dead historian. “Plant yourself not in Europe but in Iraq; it will become evident that half of the roads of the Old World lead to Aleppo, and half to Bagram.”
Williams made up one-third of the U.S. Army’s historical field staff in Afghanistan—a team directed to cover the breadth of the country, vacuuming up media, documents, and oral histories so that some future soldier or academic could better understand the course of the war and how one might respond to circumstances should they arise again. The war offered more than enough material to keep Williams and the others busy, but they weren’t able to communicate the importance of that work to those leading the mission in the country. Following a command from the highest-ranking officer in Afghanistan, the historians were on their way out of Kabul.
(Excerpt) Read more at theatlantic.com ...
The real problem with Army records not being collected is that the Army Records Management and Declassification Agency (RMDA) that was created after the 1990-91 Gulf War records fiasco has NOT, repeat NOT done the job it was created to do i.e. collect all of the Army's records from overseas combat operations. The GS-15 head of RMDA has maintained for the last 15 years that his agency 'only writes records management policy, we do not enforce it or collect unit records. It is up to units to collect and preserve their own records.' I was in RMDA when it was created, and its sole reason for being created was to ensure that there was an organization to collect and preserve the Army's combat records. CMH's records collection was done on an adhoc basis and done because we saw the RMDA had no interest in doing its primary mission and reason for being created in 1998.
Ping to anyone and everyone interested in military history of the US campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2001 thru today, 14 June 2017.
....and in another decade when the senior Army leadership is made up of the captains and lieutenants from OIF/OEF, they’ll be wishing they had their old combat histories to brush up on.
I recommend that folks interested in why this problem still exists read the article by Mr. Peter Sleeth, that he wrote in 2012 for ProPublica.com Please do not do an auto-matic criticism of ProPublica as with out its support Mr. Sleeth would not have been able to uncover the ongoing problem with RMDA not collecting Army unit records; I’m NOT talking about individual soldier personnel files and medical records, those are being preserved at a 99% rate.
https://www.propublica.org/article/army-says-war-records-gap-is-real-launches-recovery-effort
Unfortunately the Army did not carry through with forcing RMDA to collect the records, but told CMH to continue doing it and for units to send any records they may have saved to CMH. Please note that nearly all of those records are still classified and will remain so until CENTCOM and ARCENT declassify them. CMH does NOT have the authority to declassify any of the records it still maintains. Also it has transferred all of the records to RMDA for transfer to the National Archives and Records Administration.
Unfortunately the vast majority those captains and lieutenants did NOT write any histories, at least nothing that got sent to CMH. There will be some ‘histories’ written for the various branch officer advanced courses they attend, if the Army schools preserve them.
That’s what happens when wars last 4 times as long as WWII, have no strategy, and no goals, and no leaders.
Bookmark
Link to questions that Mr. Sleeth was asked about his series of article on missing Army records:
Sleeth’s lead article on Nov 9, 2012:
The 2009 CMH Conference of Army Historians presentation Mr. Sleeth sites in his article:
https://www.propublica.org/documents/item/403788-cah-2009-presentation#document/p17/a65657
As a USAF historian, I appreciate the dilemma. Attempting to capture just the records from one unit is almost impossible. Our histories were about 10 gig and tens of thousands of files.
With just a handful of Historians in the field, we can’t process even a tiny percentage of records. The records from WWII were meticulously maintained. The unit clerks and their arcane filing systems put our modern systems to shame in many regards.
Add the Combatant Command Structure with its unwieldy Joint Service agreements, and the exponential increase in records, and it’s amazing if we end up with anything useful. It will be decades before real historians piece together a narrative that shows this period in context. It will also take a special talent to sift out all the propaganda.
You posted: “The records from WWII were meticulously maintained. The unit clerks and their arcane filing systems put our modern systems to shame in many regards.”
The ‘arcane filing systems’ was known as the “War Department Filing System.” It is based upon the same concept at the old library “Dewey Decimal System.” The US Army Center of Military History still uses it for its Historical Reference Files i.e. ‘vertical files’. You can find a downloadable copy of the 1943 edition on NARA’s website.
I’m sorry. I should have put arcane in quotes. The reference was in regard to the modern viewpoint that all automated systems are better than a manual system that was consistent across time and location despite being refined over decades.
I am seriously envious when I look at the difference between Army and Air Force records. The USAF never learned that new is not always better. (USAF: Unusually Shiny Aquisition Force)
Ping.
Thanks for posting this and for your explanation at post #2.
you’re welcome. the opening paragraph about Spence Williams did not state the real reason he and his MHD were kicked out of Afghanistan that added to the official reason of needing to cut ‘boots on the ground’ strength
Actually the reason is that the Army disbanded “The Adjutant General’s Office” in 1987 because ‘computers were replacing paper and saving records could be made automatic. Unfortunately the being saved ‘made automatic’ never happened. Records, paper and electronic stopped being saved at nearly all levels.
The ‘fix’ of creating RMDA after the 1st Gulf War was a start, but generals retired and the 2nd head of RMDA decided he would only ‘write policy’ and avoid doing anything else. He has been avoiding that for the last 18 years.
And now, just 4 years after Mr. Sleeth’s articles and SecArmy McHugh’s telling units to send their records to CMH, there is no command interest in actually fixing RMDA...and SecArmy McHugh never really inquired as to why Steve Raho, the head of RMDA kept avoiding doing his primary mission.
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