New Understanding of the Civil War

Sometimes I get sick of all the Civil War arguments that never seems to go anywhere and wonder whether people don't have present-day real world things to worry about.

But when the arguments stop, I sort of miss them. Having real world things to worry about isn't as much fun as one might think.

woodpusher: "Chase et al did not dissent.
They concurred."

quoting BJK: "Like I said, they dissented on at least one point."

So, my use of "dissented" is the wrong word here, I should have said, "disagreed".
They wrote concurring opinions, meaning agreed on the conclusions but disagreed on at least one point.

woodpusher on suspension of habeas corpus: "The baseless assertion, citing no source of legal authority, is directly contrary to the words of the Constitution, and a unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court."

First, you are here drawing a lawyer's fine line distinction between a writ itself and the privilege of a writ.
Second, Lincoln often disagreed with this Missourian slaveholder Attorney General Edward Bates, notably on the Emancipation Proclamation and on recruitment of blacks into the Union army.
In 1865 Bates opposed Missouri's new abolitionist state constitution.

On the question of habeas corpus, your own quote from Bates says:

"But if we are at liberty to understand the phrase to mean that in case of a great and dangerous rebellion like the present the public safety requires the arrest and confinement of persons implicated in that rebellion, I as freely declare the opinion that the President has lawful power to suspend the privilege of person arrested under such circumstances; for he is especially charged by the Constitution with the "public safety," and he is the sole judge of the emergency which requires his prompt action."

Bates himself was in charge of Lincoln's "arbitrary" arrests of "copperhead" Northerners, so presumably he kept all such legal niceties firmly in mind.

quoting BJK: "At the time Congress debated Lincoln's actions at length and eventually authorized him to suspend habeas corpus."

woodpusher: "No source of documentation or legal authority is cited or claimed for this.
In context, "at the time" was circa 1861.
In 1861, Congress debated Lincoln's habeas corpus actions and refused to approve or ratify those actions."

No, I reported it exactly correct: at the time Congress debated Lincoln's actions -- beginning in 1861 -- and eventually authorized him to suspend habeas corpus, the 1863 Habeas Corpus Suspension act.

In considering this bill Congress took testimony from, among others:

"Senator Thomas Holliday Hicks, who had been governor of Maryland during the crisis, told the Senate, 'I believe that arrests and arrests alone saved the State of Maryland not only from greater degradation than she suffered, but from everlasting destruction.'
He also said, 'I approved them [the arrests] then, and I approve them now; and the only thing for which I condemn the Administration in regard to that matter is that they let some of these men out.'[25] "

The numbers we have suggest that roughly 1/3 of Marylanders favored secession and war against the United States.

Regardless, the fact is that Democrats in Congress used every trick in the book to prevent passage of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, until they ran out of tricks in March 1863.

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That during the present rebellion, the President of the United States, whenever in his judgment the public safety may require it, is authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in any case throughout the United States or any part thereof.
And whenever and wherever the said privilege shall be suspended, as aforesaid, no military or other officer shall be compelled, in answer to any writ of habeas corpus, to return the body of any person or persons detained by him by authority of the President; but upon a certificate, under oath, of the officer having charge of any one so detained, that such person is detained by him as a prisoner under the authority of the President, further proceedings under the writ of habeas corpus shall be suspended by the judge or court having issued the writ so long as said suspension by the President shall remain in force and said rebellion continue.[31]"

woodpusher: "Nobody can lawfully delegate the suspension authority to military officers or secretaries.
Identify the purported congressional Act pertaining to the 1861 suspension of habeas corpus."

History has no problem identifying Lincoln as the author of that suspension of habeas corpus:

"Seven months later, faced with opposition to his calling up of the militia, Lincoln again suspended habeas corpus, this time through the entire country, and made anyone charged with interfering with the draft, discouraging enlistments, or aiding the Confederacy subject to martial law.[23]
In the interim, the controversy continued with several calls made for prosecution of those who acted under Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus; former Secretary of War Simon Cameron had even been arrested in connection with a suit for trespass vi et armis, assault and battery, and false imprisonment.[24] "

So, bottom line: despite Democrats best efforts to dismember & destroy the United States, Republicans in Congress found ways to protect & defend us (and Lincoln) against Democrat insanity.

woodpusher from post #271 on Mary Anna Custis vs. US gvt. regarding Arlington: "This was not a case of making reparations, compensating the owner for a loss.
The rightful owner of the land prevailed in a action of ejectment, an action to restore possession of property to the person entitled to it.
Not only must the plaintiff establish a right to possession in himself, but he must also show that the the other party is in wrongful possession.
The owner succeeded in a judicial proceeding taken up to the Supreme Court by the United States government after the owner had prevailed in the Circuit Court.
The rightful owner won back title to the l,100 acre estate, not reparations for any loss.
As the Court stated, the government, 'if satisfied that its title has been shown to be invalid, and it still desires to use the property, or any part of it, for the purposes to which it is now devoted, it may purchase such property by fair negotiation, or condemn it by a judicial proceeding, in which a just compensation shall be ascertained and paid according to the Constitution.' "

Here SCOTUS ruled that Due Process had not been fully followed, and now must be, so it was.
The net effect was Custis received just compensation -- aka reparations -- for her property.

woodpusher post #280, on post-war burials at Arlington: "For such purpose, the burials were not performed as a military necessity, but rather constituted a war crime.
That the acts regarding the Lee estate were held to be unlawful by the U.S. Supreme Court is documented fact."

And here we see, yet again, the boundless insanity of Democrats dedicated to the destruction of the United States.
In this particular case, woodpusher calls burials of Union soldiers at Arlington a war crime.

How much hatred & loathing for your own country do you need to say such a thing?

“burials of Union soldiers at Arlington a war crime.”

But Lee’s refusal to exchange black POW’s in 1864 was not a “war Crime”?

gotta love the lost cause hypocrisy.

Sorry - I just now saw your post....and agree. My takeaway is that some of these folks are indulging in a view of the world as they would like it - not the way it is. I would heartily encourage them to pursue litigation against the American government to right all of their perceived wrongs.

woodpusher: "No source of documentation or legal authority is cited or claimed for this. In context, "at the time" was circa 1861. In 1861, Congress debated Lincoln's habeas corpus actions and refused to approve or ratify those actions."

[BroJoeK] No, I reported it exactly correct: at the time Congress debated Lincoln's actions -- beginning in 1861 -- and eventually authorized him to suspend habeas corpus, the 1863 Habeas Corpus Suspension act.

In 1863, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus suspension Act. Awesome. He finally obtained authorization from Congress, two years late.

Lincoln was not Congress and could not assume the powers of Congress. Lincoln had unlawfully authorized military officers to suspend habeas corpus at their discretion and further delegate their bogus authority.

In 1861, Congress flatly refused to ratify the actions of Lincoln. The bill, SR-1, was offered on the first day of the special session. Last ditch efforts on the last day of the session were met with such protest that it was withdrawn from a vote, lest President Lincoln be humiliated.

SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION SR-1 OF 1861

The proposed resolution stated:

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all of the extraordinary acts, proclamations, and orders hereinbefore mentioned, be, and the same are hereby, approved and declared to be in all respects legal and valid, to the same intent, and with the same effect, as if they had been issued and done under the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of the United States.

The items "hereinbefore mentioned" were:

First. He did, on the fifteenth day of April last, issue his proclamation calling upon the several States for seventy-five thousand men to suppress such insurrectionary combinations, and to cause the laws to be faithfully executed.
Secondly. He did, on the nineteenth day of April last, issue a proclamation setting on foot a blockade of the ports within the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas.
Thirdly. He did, on the twenty-seventh day of April last, issue a proclamation establishing a blockade of the ports within the States of Virginia and North Carolina.
Fourthly. He did, by an order of the twenty-seventh day of April last, addressed to the commanding general of the army of the United States, authorize that officer to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at any point on or in the vicinity of any military line between the city of Philadelphia and the city of Washington.
Fifthly. He did, on the third day of May last, issue a proclamation calling into the service of the United States forty-two thousand and thirty-four volunteers, increasing the regular army by the addition of twenty-two thousand seven hundred and fourteen men, and the navy by an addition of eighteen thousand seamen.
Sixthly. He did, on the tenth day of May last, issue a proclamation authorizing the commander of the forces of the United States on the coast of Florida to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, if necessary.

Section 4 pertained to Lincoln authorizing General Scott to suspend habeas corpus at the discretion of General Scott, and to further delegate authority to suspend the writ. It never even attempted to justify General Scott authorizing other military officers to suspend habeas corpus.

At the beginning of war, in the famous Merryman case, it was not Lincoln who suspended the writ, but General Keim in Pennsylvania, under delegation of suspension authority from General Scott. That was a bridge too far to even attempt to cross.

QUOTES FROM THE SENATE RECORD REGARDING SR-1

Congressional Globe, official record of Congress

Mr. President, in the State of Missouri, there was no "Law of the United States opposed, or the execution thereof obstructed by combinations of men too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings." Indeed, sir, there was no resistance of any United States law. Yet Missouri, peaceful and law abiding, without cause, against law and in defiance of the Constitution, was invaded by United States troops, by troops from Illinois, by troops from Iowa, and by troops from Kansas. Indeed, sir, it seems that from the very moment in which the administration resolved upon this policy of coercion, the State of Missouri was marked as a victim for sacrifice, for invasion, and subjugation.
— Mr. Polk, July 11, 1861, page 64 ~
The joint resolution would seem, upon the face of it, to admit that the acts of the President were not performed in obedience to the Constitution and the laws. If that be true, I should be glad to hear some reasons assigned by gentlemen showing the power of the Congress of the United States, by joint resolution, to cure a breach of the Constitution or to indemnify the President against violations of the Constitution and the laws. If, in any respect that officer has violated the laws, he has also violated the Constitution; because one clause of that instrument declares that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." It confers on him the power to see that they are executed; but no power to violate them.
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 137
I deny, Mr. President, that one branch of this Government can indemnify any other branch of the Government for a violation of the Constitution or the laws. The powers conferred upon the General Government by the people of the States are the measure of its authority. Those powers have been confided to different departments, and the boundaries of those departments determined with perfect exactitude. The President has his powers and rights conferred on him by the Constitution; the legislative authority its powers and rights; the judicial authority its powers and rights; the judicial authority its powers and rights; and I deny that either can encroach upon the other, or that either can indemnify the other for a usurpation of powers not confided to it by the Constitution. Sir, Congress, by a joint resolution, has no more right, in my opinion, to make valid a violation of the constitution and the laws by the President, than the President would have by an entry upon the executive journal to make valid a usurpation of the executive power by the legislative department. Congress has no more right to make valid an unconstitutional act of the President, than the President would have to make valid an act of the Supreme Court of the United States encroaching upon executive power; or than the Supreme Court would have the right to make valid an act of the executive encroaching upon the judicial power.
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 137-138
It is proposed, sir, to approve and make valid the act of the President in enlisting men for three and five years. I ask you by what authority of Constitution or law he has done this act? The power is not conferred in the constitution; it has not been granted by the law. It is, therefore an unconstitutional and illegal act of executive power. The President, of his own will — and that is one of the acts enumerated in this joint resolution which is proposed to approve and ratify — has added immensely to the force of the regular Army. The Constitution says that Congress shall raise armies, and a law now upon your statute book limits the number of the regular force, officers and men. Hence, sir, that is an act in derogation both of the Constitution and of the laws.
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 138
The President has added immensely to the Navy of the United States. The Constitution says that Congress shall provide and maintain a navy; and there is now a law upon the statute book limited the number of men to be employed in the Navy. That, like the rest, sir, will not bear argument. I doubt if an attempt will be made to defend it upon constitutional or legal grounds. I pronounce it a usurpation.
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 138
I need not say to the Senate that in England, whence we derive this right, the legislative power alone can suspend it. We all know, sir, that the monarch of England cannot suspend it. We all know, sir, that the monarch of England cannot suspend that writ; but transatlantic freemen seem to be eager to approve and ratify acts which a European monarch would not dare to perform. Mr. President, it needs no elaborate argument to show that the executive authority of the United States has no right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus.
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 138
I enumerate what I regard as usurpations of the Executive to go upon the record as a protest of those of us who are not willing to see the Constitution subverted, and the public liberty trampled under foot, under whatever pretext, of necessity or otherwise.
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 139
I remember to have read, not long since, a speech made by the present able Secretary of War, in this city, in which he said that the southern States must be subdued, and that at the end of this contest there would be no more Virginians as such, or Carolinians as such; but only Americans all. Sir, the name of American is a proud one, and I love it; but it is the preservation of the names of Virginians and Pennsylvanians, and the distinctive existence of all these States, which alone can keep the name of American a proud one. I never want to see them blotted out. I said, sir, that in my opinion, the tendency was to change our character of government, and that the purpose, if not avowed, is acted upon to conduct those proceedings without regard to the limitation of the Constitution. these things I have enumerated go to show it. This Joint Resolution goes to show it. I call upon Senators to defend the constitutionality of these acts, or else to admit that we intend to conduct this contest without regard to the Constitution.
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 140
In the course of the same speech to which I have referred, that eminent Senator declared that not only must that country be ravaged by armies, but that unless the people of those States paid willing and loyal obedience to the Federal Government, their State form must be changed, and they must be reduced to the condition of Territories; to be governed by Governors sent from Massachusetts and Illinois. This was said seriously; and afterwards, when referred to by my colleague on a subsequent day, reaffirmed by that eminent Senator. If necessary, reduced to the condition of Territories! Is there authority in the Constitution to do it?
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 140-141
We can only hope that this flash of frenzy may not assume the form of chronic madness, and that in any event Divine providence may preserve for us and for posterity, out of the wreck of a broken Union, the priceless principles of constitutional liberty and of self-government. [Applause in the galleries.]
— Mr. Breckinridge, July 16, 1861, page 142
The suspension of the privilege of the habeas corpus by executive authority is a violation of the principles of public freedom which have been consecrated for centuries. These principles were dear to our Anglo-Saxon forefathers before the period of Magna Charta. From the days of Magna Charta, which, seeking to restore ancient rights, provided that no freeman should be taken or imprisoned without the lawful judgment of his peers, or the law of the land, down to the declaration of our independence, that principle has been dear to the freemen of England and America.
— Mr. Pearce, July 30, 1861, page 333
If necessity, which is an odious plea, known for hundreds of years as "the tyrant's plea" -- a plea by which you may overthrow all constitutional provisions -- if that plea is efficient here; if that is a justification for a violation of one provision of the Constitution, it is equally a justification for any and all violations of it.
— Mr. Pearce, July 30, 1861, page 333
So too, sir, these domiciliary visits, which are equally in violation of a provision of the Constitution, are sought to be justified by necessity. Now, let us see where these things are done. Nowhere, so far as I am informed, except in the State of Maryland, unless there be some exceptions in the State of Missouri.
— Mr. Pearce, July 30, 1861, page 334
My objection to taking up this resolution I will state in a word. I believe it is in order to state briefly the objection. This resolution which the Senator from Massachusetts seeks to take up is germane to the bill which is the unfinished business. The resolution proposed to declare legal the acts which have been done by the President in the recess of Congress. Will our declaration make them legal if they are not legal? Will it make them so if they were unconstitutional and void?
— Mr. TRUMBULL, August 2, 1861, page 392
The Senator from Maine evidently entertains a very sincere conviction that the action of the President has not been in violation of the constitution or the laws; because he has asserted it six or seven times in the course of the brief speech he has made to the Senate. His convictions are evidently deep and sincere. All I have to say in reply to that is, that it will be a very great comfort to the President to be assured of that fact; for he himself has been under the impression that he has been transcending both; and, indeed, he admits it in his message, and puts it expressly on the ground of a popular demand and what he deemed to be a public necessity. It has also been admitted by many Senators on the other side of the chamber. I have not believed, all along, that the resolution was going to be voted by the Senate. I do not believe it now. It may be; but I think not. My deliberate judgment is, that in some mode the Senate will avoid putting itself on record in favor of the principles contained in this resolution. It is indifferent to me whether it does or not. Of course, every Senator will vote his own convictions if brought to a vote; but I do not think there are many Senators who want their names to go upon history in favor of this resolution.
— Mr. Breckinridge, August 2, 1861, page 392
The President issued a proclamation calling into the service of the United States forty-two thousand and thirty-four volunteers. It was clearly illegal; I am not satisfied it was necessary. I am inclined to think it was not.
— Mr. Howe, August 2, 1861, page 395
I cannot consent to give my approval to the fourth and sixth acts enumerated in the resolution, by which the President authorized the commanding General to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. I do not rise to make a speech; but to give the reason why I cannot vote for the resolution.
— Mr. Thomson, August 2, 1861, page 395
MR. WILSON. Let us have a vote.

MR. TRUMBULL. Now, my friend is clamorous. He cannot keep still. He says "let us have a vote." I am not disposed to vote upon the resolution. I will tell the Senator from Kentucky I am not prepared to vote for the resolution, and it is not going to pass without consideration. It is not going to pass in the shape it is by my approbation.
—Messrs. Wilson and Trumbull, August 5, 1861, page 453.

Trumbull, a supporter of Lincoln, stepped in to save Lincoln from a most embarrassing vote.

Mr. Trumbull stated, "The resolution proposed to declare legal the acts which have been done by the President in the recess of Congress. And Mr. Trumbull asked, Will our declaration make them legal if they are not legal? Will it make them so if they were unconstitutional and void?

Or, as Wikipedia fudges it, "Senator Lyman Trumbull, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, had reservations about its imprecise wording, so the resolution, also opposed by anti-war Democrats, was never brought to a vote." Uh huh.

[woodpusher]: Chase et al did not dissent. They concurred.
quoting BJK: Like I said, they dissented on at least one point.
[BroJoeK]: So, my use of "dissented" is the wrong word here, I should have said, "disagreed".
They wrote concurring opinions, meaning agreed on the conclusions but disagreed on at least one point.

As was quoted clearly from Georgia State University, the Court was 9-0 unanimous in favor of Milligan on all three issues raised during the case.

Georgia State University wrote:

The Supreme Court ruled 9-0 in favor of Milligan in all three issues raised during the case.

So, what point, not an issue raised during the case, do you consider relevant to this discussion?

At 71 U.S. 134, the concurring opinion states:

The first question, therefore—Ought the writ to issue?—must be answered in the affirmative.

At 71 U.S. 135, the concurring opinion states:

The first section of the act authorized the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus generally throughout the United States. The second and third sections limited this suspension, in certain cases, within states where the administration of justice by the Federal courts remained unimpaired. In these cases the writ was still to issue, and under it the prisoner was entitled to his discharge by a circuit or district judge or court, unless held to bail for appearance to answer charges. No other judge or court could make an order of discharge under the writ. Except under the circumstances pointed out by the act, neither circuit nor district judge or court could make such an order. But under those circumstances the writ must be issued, and the relief from imprisonment directed by the act must be afforded. The commands of the act were positive, and left no discretion to court or judge.
An affirmative answer must, therefore, be given to the second question, namely: Ought Milligan to be discharged according to the prayer of the petition?
That the third question, namely: Had the military commission in Indiana, under the facts stated, jurisdiction to try and sentence Milligan? must be answered negatively is an unavoidable inference from affirmative answers to the other two.

That is all three questions decided by the Court. What is the pointless you do not identify or cite, but allude to as if it holds some significance to this discussion?

At 71 U.S. 135-137, the concurring opinion states:

We agree, therefore, that the first two questions certified must receive affirmative answers, and the last a negative. We do not doubt that the positive provisions of the act of Congress require such answers. We do not think it necessary to look beyond these provisions. In them we find sufficient and controlling reasons for our conclusions.
But the opinion which has just been read goes further; and as we understand it, asserts not only that the military commission held in Indiana was not authorized by Congress, but that it was not in the power of Congress to authorize it; from which it may be thought to follow, that Congress has no power to indemnify the officers who composed the commission against liability in civil courts for acting as members of it.
We cannot agree to this.
We agree in the proposition that no department of the government of the United States—neither President, nor Congress, nor the Courts—possesses any power not given by the Constitution.
We assent, fully, to all that is said, in the opinion, of the inestimable value of the trial by jury, and of the other constitutional safeguards of civil liberty. And we concur, also, in what is said of the writ of habeas corpus, and of its suspension, with two reservations: (1.) That, in our judgment, when the writ is suspended, the Executive is authorized to arrest as well as to detain; and (2) that there are cases in which, the privilege of the writ being suspended, trial and punishment by military commission, in states where civil courts are open, may be authorized by Congress, as well as arrest and detention.
We think that Congress had power, though not exercised, to authorize the military commission which was held in Indiana.
We do not think it necessary to discuss at large the grounds of our conclusions.

The concurring justices felt Congress had the power to authorize the military commissions held in Indiana, while acknowledging that the Congress, in fact, did not authorize any such commissions. It is a theoretical discussion about something that never happened.

While you may feel that reading Wikipedia gives you all the information you need to speak sensibly about Ex parte Milligan,, that just isn't so. While you remaining uninformed about the nature of their disagreement, a concurring opinion could not disagree about any point decided by the court. At best, that would be an opinion concurring in part, dissenting in part. The disagreement is about a dictum of a hypothetical point that was not before the court to decide.

[woodpusher on suspension of habeas corpus]: The baseless assertion, citing no source of legal authority, is directly contrary to the words of the Constitution, and a unanimous opinion of the Supreme Court.
[BroJoeK]: First, you are here drawing a lawyer's fine line distinction between a writ itself and the privilege of a writ.
Second, Lincoln often disagreed with this Missourian slaveholder Attorney General Edward Bates, notably on the Emancipation Proclamation and on recruitment of blacks into the Union army.

It is not a fine line. The Framers, the words of the Constitution, and the courts explicitly make the same important distinction. The privilege of the writ, for the body to be brought before the court, may be suspended. The writ continues to issue, and a return of the writ must be made. If the return of the writ satisfies the court that the privilege has been properly suspended, the court will not require the body to be produced. The Executive may not usurp the function of the Judicial branch and usurp the important part of habeas corpus. The Executive must assert a claim of a proper suspension and justify it before the Judiciary.

Permitting the Executive to be the judge of its own actions is not a fine line, especially when an unconstitutional court with no legal jurisdiction seeks to enforce an unlawfully obtained death sentence.

Lincoln not only disagreed with Bates at times, he also disagreed with the Constitution and other laws at times. This did not create exceptions to the Constitution or the laws.

[BroJoeK] On the question of habeas corpus, your own quote from Bates says:

"But if we are at liberty to understand the phrase to mean that in case of a great and dangerous rebellion like the present the public safety requires the arrest and confinement of persons implicated in that rebellion, I as freely declare the opinion that the President has lawful power to suspend the privilege of person arrested under such circumstances; for he is especially charged by the Constitution with the "public safety," and he is the sole judge of the emergency which requires his prompt action."
Bates himself was in charge of Lincoln's "arbitrary" arrests of "copperhead" Northerners, so presumably he kept all such legal niceties firmly in mind.
quoting BJK: "At the time Congress debated Lincoln's actions at length and eventually authorized him to suspend habeas corpus."

What is your point? Before and after, the Supreme Court stated the President had no such authority, that the powers of Congress did not inhere to the Executive. "If at any time the public safety should require the suspension of the powers vested by this act in the courts of the United States, it is for the legislature to say so." 8 U.S. 101 (1807).
Finally, you go on to quote, "Congress ... authorized him to suspend habeas corpus." Congress held the authority. Until 1863, Congress had not delegated that authority to Lincoln. That Congress authorized Lincoln in 1863 states that Lincoln did not have the power or authorization to suspend the privilege of the writ in 1861.

[BroJoeK] In considering this bill Congress took testimony from, among others:

"Senator Thomas Holliday Hicks, who had been governor of Maryland during the crisis, told the Senate, 'I believe that arrests and arrests alone saved the State of Maryland not only from greater degradation than she suffered, but from everlasting destruction.'
He also said, 'I approved them [the arrests] then, and I approve them now; and the only thing for which I condemn the Administration in regard to that matter is that they let some of these men out.'[25] "

Irrelevant nonsense from Wikipedia. The Constitution and other laws are not repealed, or set aside, by commentary from Holliday Hicks. Not even an affirmation from Barack Obama. Eric Holder and Loretta Lynch would do it.

[BroJoeK] The numbers we have suggest that roughly 1/3 of Marylanders favored secession and war against the United States.

Who is we? Supposed source, if there is one, not cited or linked.

Lincoln sent an army into the state of Maryland and arrested the members of the State congress to prevent them from voting. Perhaps he had different polling data to justify his act.

[BroJoeK] Regardless, the fact is that Democrats in Congress used every trick in the book to prevent passage of the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, until they ran out of tricks in March 1863.>

In 1863, Congress authorized Lincoln to suspend the privilege of the writ. That is after two years of doing it without authorization from the Congress, and after Congress had refused to ratify his actions of 1861.

[woodpusher]: Nobody can lawfully delegate the suspension authority to military officers or secretaries.
Identify the purported congressional Act pertaining to the 1861 suspension of habeas corpus."

Is your non-response an admission that you have discovered no such congressional act from 1861?

[BroJoeK]
History has no problem identifying Lincoln as the author of that suspension of habeas corpus:
"Seven months later, faced with opposition to his calling up of the militia, Lincoln again suspended habeas corpus, this time through the entire country, and made anyone charged with interfering with the draft, discouraging enlistments, or aiding the Confederacy subject to martial law.[23]
In the interim, the controversy continued with several calls made for prosecution of those who acted under Lincoln's suspension of habeas corpus; former Secretary of War Simon Cameron had even been arrested in connection with a suit for trespass vi et armis, assault and battery, and false imprisonment.[24] "

Quoted Wikipedia source is non-responsive. While Wikipedia internet "history" has no problems with identifying myth as fact, actual historical records overrule Wikipedia nonsense.

Wikipedia website history falls to the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion, official court filings, and Lincoln's documented writings.

Seven months later than when? The unprovided preceding sentence provides the context:

May's [irrelevant] bill passed the House in summer 1862, and it would later be included in the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which would require actual indictments for suspected traitors.[22] Seven months later, faced with opposition to his calling up of the militia, Lincoln again suspended habeas corpus,

Seven months later than the summer of 1862 was 1863.

Lincoln purported to delegate authority to suspend the writ in April 1861, along with authority for the delegated official to further delegate the authority. That is less than two months after Lincoln was inaugurated in March 1861. Neither Congress, nor the Courts, had even been consulted.

Nationwide suspension by Stanton occurred in August 1862. The Habeas Corpus Act was in March 1863.

Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, CW 4:347

To Winfield Scott
April 27, 1861
To the Commanding General of the Army of the United States:
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity of the military line, which is now used between the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washington, via Perryville, Annapolis City, and Annapolis Junction, you find resistence which renders it necessary to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you, personally or through the officer in command at the point where the resistenace occurs, are authorized to suspend that writ.
Abraham Lincoln
April 27, 1861

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, 146 (1861)

Handwritten opinion of Taney, CJ.

Colonel Lee, a military officer, appeared with General Cadwalader's return to the writ, which is as follows:
"Headquarters, Department of Annapolis, Fort McHenry, May 26 1861.
To the Hon. Roger B. Taney, Chief Justice of the Supleme Court of the United States, Baltimore, Md.
Sir: The undersigned, to whom the annexed writ, of this date, signed by Thomas Spicer, clerk of the supreme court of the United States, is directed, most respectfully states, that the arrest of Mr. John Merryman, in the said writ named, was not made with his knowledge, or by his order or direction, but was made by Col. Samuel Yohe, acting under the orders of Major-General William H. Keim, both of said officers being in the military service of the United States, but not within the limits of his command. The prisoner was brought to this post on the 20th inst., by Adjutant James Wittimore and Lieut. Wm. H. Abel, by order of Col. Yohe, and is charged with various acts of treason, and with being publicly associated with and holding a commission as lieutenant in a company having in their possession arms belonging to the United States, and avowing his purpose of armed hostility against the government He is also informed that it can be clearly established, that the prisoner has made often and unreserved declarations of his association with this organized force, as being in avowed hostility to the government, and in readiness to co-operate with those engaged in the present rebellion against the government of the United States. He has further to inform you, that he is duly authorized by the president of the United States, in such cases, to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, for the public safety.

Generals Keim and Cadwalader were supposedly authorized to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and did purport to suspend the privilege of the writ in 1861.

Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas 144, 147 (1861); In chambers opinion of U.S. Supreme Court Justice Taney, May 27, 1861

The petition presents. the following case: The petitioner resides in Maryland, in Baltimore county; while peaceably In his own house, with his family, it was at two o'clock on the morning of the 25th of May 1861, entered by an armed force, professing to act under military orders; he was then compelled to rise from his bed, taken into custody, and conveyed to Fort McHenry, where he is imprisoned by the commanding officer, without warrant from any lawful authority.
The commander of the fort, General George Cadwalader, by whom he is detained in confinement, in his return to the writ, does not deny any of the facts alleged in the petition. He states that the prisoner was arrested by order of General Keirn, of Pennsylvania, and conducted as aforesaid to Fort McHenry, by his order, and placed in his (General Cadwalader's custody, to be there detained by him as a prisoner.
A copy of the warrant or order under which the prisoner was arrested was demanded by his counsel, and refused: and it is not alleged in the return, that any specific act, constituting any offence against the laws of the United States, has been charged against him upon oath, but he appears to have been arrested upon general charges of treason and rebellion, without proof, and without giving the names of the witnesses, or specifying the acts which, in the judgment of the military officer, constituted these crimes. Having the prisoner thus in custody upon these vague and unsupported accusations, he refuses to obey the writ of habeas corpus, upon the ground that he is duly authorized by the president to suspend it.
The case, then, is Simply this: a military officer, residing in Pennsylvania, issues an order to arrest a citizen of Maryland, upon vague and indefinite charges, without any proof, so far as appears; under this order, his house is entered in the night, he is seized as a prisoner, and conveyed to Fort McHenry, and there kept in close confinement; and when a habeas corpus is served on the commanding officer, requiring him to produce the prisoner before a justice of the supreme court, in order that he may examine into the legality of the imprisonment, the answer of the officer, is that he is authorized by the president to suspend the writ of habeas corpus at his discretion, and in the exercise of that discretion, suspends it in this case, and on that ground refuses obedience to the writ.
As the case comes before me, therefore, I understand that the president not only claims the right to suspend the writ of habeas corpus himself, at his discretion, but to delegate that discretionary power to a military officer, and to leave it to him to determine whether he will or will not obey judicial process that may be served upon him. No official notice has been given to the courts of justice, or to the public, by proclamation or otherwise, that the president claimed this power, and had exercised it in the manner stated in the return. And I certainly listened to it with some surprise, for I had supposed it to be one of those points of constitutional law upon which there was no difference of opinion, and that it was admitted on all hands, that the privilege of the writ could not be suspended, except by act of congress.

Merryman was unlawfully held in custody for some months. He was never charged with any specific crime, nor was he ever indicted for any crime. He was eventually released for failure to prosecute, non prosequitur.

OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 3, vol 2, Part 1 (Union Letters, Orders, Reports)

Page 321 UNION AUTHORITIES.

Washington City, D. C., August 8, 1862.
ORDER AUTHORIZING ARRESTS OF PERSONS DISCOURAGING ENLISTMENTS.
Ordered:
1. That all U. S. marshals and superintendents or chiefs of police of any town, city, or district be, and they are hereby, authorized and directed to arrest and imprison any person or persons who may be engaged, by act, speech, or writing, in discouraging volunteer enlistments, or in any way giving aid and comfort to the enemy, or in any other disloyal practice against the United States.
2. That immediate report be made to Major L. C. Turner, judge-advocate, in order that such may be tried before a military commission.
Page 322 CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.
3. The expenses of such arrest and imprisonment will be certified to the chief clerk of the War Department for settlement and payment.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

OFFICIAL RECORDS: Series 3, vol 2, Part 1 (Union Letters, Orders, Reports)

Page 370 CORRESPONDENCE, ETC.

Numbers 104.
Washington, August 13, 1862.
The following orders are published for the information and guidance of all concerned:
I. WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington City, D. C., August 8, 1862.
By direction of the President of the United States, it is hereby ordered that until further order no citizen liable to be drafted into the militia shall be allowed to go to a foreign country. And all marshals, deputy marshals, and military officers of the United States are directed, and all police authorities, especially at the ports of the United States, on the sea-board, and on the frontier, are requested to see that this order is faithfully carried into effect. And they are hereby authorized and directed to arrest and detain any person or persons about to depart from the United States in violation of this order, and report to Major L. C. Turner, judge-advocate, at Washington City, for further instructions respecting the person or persons so arrested or detained.
2. Any person liable to draft who shall absent himself from his county or State before such draft is made will be arrested by any provost-marshal or other United States or State officer wherever he may be found within the jurisdiction of the United States, and be conveyed to the nearest military post or depot and placed on military duty for the term of the draft; and the expenses of his own arrest and conveyance to such post or depot and also the sum of $ 5 as a reward to the officer who shall make such arrest shall be deducted from his pay.
3. The writ of habeas corpus is hereby suspended in respect to all persons so arrested and detained and in respect to all persons arrested for disloyal practices.
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.

St. George Tucker, Tucker's Blackstone (1803), Appendix Note D, On the Constitution of the United States, page 290-292:

The writ of habeas corpus, is the great and efficacious remedy provided for all cases of illegal confinement; and is directed to the person detaining another, commanding him to produce the body of the prisoner, with the day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, submit to, and receive whatsoever the judge or court awarding such writ shall consider in that behalf. In England this is a high prerogative writ, and issues out of the court of king's-bench, not only in term time, but during the vacation, by a fiat from the chief justice, or any other of the judges, and running into all parts of the king's dominions. In Virginia it may issue out of the high court of chancery, the general court, or the court of the district in which the person is confined, and may be awarded by any judge of either of those courts in vacation: and if any judge in vacation, upon view of the copy of the warrant of commitment or detainer, or upon affidavit made, that such copy was denied, shall refuse any writ of habeas corpus, required to be granted by law, such judge shall be liable to the action of the party aggrieved. And by the laws of the United States, all the courts of the United States, and either of the justices of the supreme court, as well as judges of the district courts, have power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an enquiry into the cause of commitment. . . . Provided that writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners in gaol, unless they are in custody under, or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify.
Here a question naturally occurs: if a person be illegally committed to prison in any state, under, or by colour of the authority of the United States, can any judge, or court of the state in which he is confined, award a writ of habeas corpus, for the purpose of an enquiry into the cause of his commitment? To which, I answer, that if he be committed or detained for any crime, unless it be for treason or felony, plainly expressed in the warrant of commitment, and be neither convicted thereof, nor in execution by legal process, the writ (due requisites being observed) can not be refused him: for the act is imperative, as to awarding the writ. The court or judge, before whom the prisoner is brought, must judge from the return made to the writ, what course he ought to pursue: whether, to discharge him from his imprisonment, or bail him, or remand him again to the custody of the person from whom he may be brought.
In England the benefit of this important writ can only be suspended by authority of parliament. It has been done several times of late years, both in England and in Ireland, to the great oppression of the subject, as hath been said. In the United States, it can be suspended, only, by the authority of congress; but not whenever congress may think proper; for it cannot be suspended, unless in cases of actual rebellion, or invasion. A suspension under any other circumstances, whatever might be the pretext, would be unconstitutional, and consequently must be disregarded by those whose duty it is to grant the writ. The legislatures of the respective states are left, I presume, to judge of the causes which may induce a suspension within any particular state. This is the case, at least, in Virginia.

St. George Tucker

Tucker's Blackstone sold well from the beginning, and it quickly became the major treatise on American law in the early 19th century. Law reporter Daniel Call described it as "necessary to every student and practitioner of law in Virginia". Lawyers arguing before the Supreme Court of the United States would frequently cite to Tucker's Blackstone - more often than any other commentator until 1827. The United States Supreme Court itself cited Tucker's Blackstone frequently, referring to it in over forty cases, many of them significant. Modern lawyers, legal scholars, and judges still refer to this work as an important tool for determining how Americans understood both English and American law in the early days after the United States's independence.

William Rawle, A View of the Constitution, Second Edition, (1829), p. 117-19.

Reasons will be given hereafter for considering many of the restrictions, contained in the amendments to the Constitution, as extending to the states as well as to the United States, but the nature of the writ of habeas corpus seems peculiarly to call for this construction. It is the great remedy of the citizen or subject against arbitrary or illegal imprisonment; it is the mode by which the judicial power speedily and effectually protects the personal liberty of every individual, and repels the injustice of unconstitutional laws or despotic governors. After erecting the distinct government which we are considering, and after declaring what should constitute the supreme law in every state in the Union, fearful minds might entertain jealousies of this great and all-controlling power, if some protection against its energies when misdirected, was not provided by itself.
The national code in which the writ of habeas corpus was originally found, is not expressly or directly incorporated into the Constitution.
If this provision had been omitted, the existing powers under the state governments, none of whom are without it, might be questioned, and a person imprisoned on a mandate of the president or other officer, under colour of lawful authority derived from the United States, might be denied relief. But the judicial authority, whether vested in a state judge, or a judge of the United States, is an integral and identified capacity; and if congress never made any provision for issuing writs of habeas corpus, either the state judges must issue them, or the individual be without redress. The Constitution seems to have secured this benefit to the citizen by the description of the writ, and in an unqualified manner admitting its efficacy, while it declares that it shall not he suspended unless when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety shall require it. This writ is believed to be known only in countries governed by the common law, as it is established in England; but in that country the benefit of it may at any time be withheld by the authority of parliament, whereas we see that in this country it cannot be suspended even in cases of rebellion or invasion, unless the public safety shall require it. Of this necessity the Constitution probably intends, that the legislature of the United States shall be the judges. Charged as they are with the preservation of the United States from both those evils, and superseding the powers of the several states in the prosecution of the measures they may find it expedient to adopt, it seems not unreasonable that this control over the writ of habeas corpus, which ought only to be exercised on extraordinary occasions, should rest with them. It is at any rate certain, that congress, which has authorized the courts and judges of the United States to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases within their jurisdiction, can alone suspend their power, and that no state can prevent those courts and judges from exercising their regular functions, which are, however, confined to cases of imprisonment professed to be under the authority of the United States. But the state courts and judges possess the right of determining on the legality of imprisonment under either authority.

Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, (1833)

§ 1336. It is obvious, that cases of a peculiar emergency may arise, which may justify, nay even require, the temporary suspension of any right to the writ. But as it has frequently happened in foreign countries, and even in England, that the writ has, upon various pretexts and occasions, been suspended, whereby persons apprehended upon suspicion have suffered a long imprisonment, sometimes from design, and sometimes, because they were forgotten, [20] the right to suspend it is expressly confined to cases of rebellion or invasion, where the public safety may require it. A very just and wholesome restraint, which cuts down at a blow a fruitful means of oppression, capable of being abused in bad times to the worst of purposes. Hitherto no suspension of the writ has ever been authorized by congress since the establishment of the constitution. [21] It would seem, as the power is given to congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in cases of rebellion or invasion, that the right to judge, whether exigency had arisen, must exclusively belong to that body. [22]
- - - - - - - - - -
20. 3 Black. Comm. 137, 138; 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 291, 292.
21. Mr. Jefferson expressed a decided objection against the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in any case whatever, declaring himself in favour of "the eternal and unremitting force of the habeas corpus laws." 2 Jefferson's Corresp. 274, 291. — "Why," said he on another occasion, "suspend the writ of habeas corpus in insurrections and rebellions?" — "If the public safety requires, that the government should have a man imprisoned on less probable testimony in those, than in other emergencies, let him be taken and tried, retaken and retried, while the necessity continues, only giving him redress against the government for damages." 2 Jefferson's Corresp. 344. — Yet the only attempt ever made in congress to suspend the writ of habeas corpus was during his administration on occasion of the supposed treasonable conspiracy of Col. Aaron Burr. Mr. Jefferson sent a message to congress on the subject of that conspiracy on 22d January, 1807. On the next day, Mr. Giles of the senate moved a committee to consider the expediency of suspending the writ of habeas corpus be appointed, and the motion prevailed. The committee (Mr. Giles, chairman) reported a bill for this purpose. The bill passed the senate, and was rejected in the house of representatives by a vote of 113 for the rejection, against 19 in its favour. See 3 Senate Journal, 22d January, 1807, p. 127; Id. 130, 131. 5 Journ. of House of Representatives, 26th January, 1807, p. 550, 551, 552.
22. Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. R. 19. See also 1 Tuck. Black. Comm. App. 292; 1 Kent's Comm. Lect. 12, (2d edit. p. 262 to 265.)

And, of course, a unanimous Supreme Court stated, 71 U.S. 121 (1866),

The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times, and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false; for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been happily proved by the result of the great effirt to throw off its just authority.

[BroJoeK]

[woodpusher from post #271 on Mary Anna Custis vs. US gvt. regarding Arlington]:

Mary Anna Custis Lee was dead. Pursuant to the terms of her father's will, she was given a life tenancy on the land (she controlled but did not own the estate), and George W.P.C. Lee inherited the land upon her death. As stated before, the lawsuit, at the Supreme Court, was United States v. George W.P.C. Lee. George Washington Parke Custis Lee was the son of General Robert E. Lee.

The United States was the Plaintiff/Appellant, they brought the action to the U.S. Supreme Court, and George W.P.C. Lee was the Defendant/Appellee. It was the United States which brought the suit to the U.S. Supreme Court. The United States was not a party to the lawsuit decided in the Circuit Court, but rather made a failed effort to claim the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case. The case of Kaufman et al having been heard and decided unfavorably, the United States then filed a writ of error to the U.S. Supreme Court in its own name, a somewhat irregular action for a non-party.

As the Supreme Court stated, at 196 U.S. 197,

As the United States was not a party to the suit below, and, while defending the action by its proper officers, expressly declined to submit itself as a defendant to the jurisdiction of the court, there may exist some doubt whether it has a right to prosecute the writ of error in its own name; but as the judgment against Kaufman and Strong is here on their writ of error, under which all the questions are raised which could be raised under the other, their writ being prosecuted in the interest of the United States, and argued here by the Solititor-General, the point is immaterial, and the question has not been mooted.

[woodpusher from post #271 on the United States v. George W.P.C. Lee, regarding Arlington National Cemetary]: "This was not a case of making reparations, compensating the owner for a loss.
The rightful owner of the land prevailed in a action of ejectment, an action to restore possession of property to the person entitled to it.
Not only must the plaintiff establish a right to possession in himself, but he must also show that the the other party is in wrongful possession.
The owner succeeded in a judicial proceeding taken up to the Supreme Court by the United States government after the owner had prevailed in the Circuit Court. The rightful owner won back title to the l,100 acre estate, not reparations for any loss.
As the Court stated, the government, 'if satisfied that its title has been shown to be invalid, and it still desires to use the property, or any part of it, for the purposes to which it is now devoted, it may purchase such property by fair negotiation, or condemn it by a judicial proceeding, in which a just compensation shall be ascertained and paid according to the Constitution.

[BroJoeK]: Here SCOTUS ruled that Due Process had not been fully followed, and now must be, so it was.
The net effect was Custis received just compensation -- aka reparations -- for her property.

That is legal nonsense.

It was ordered that legal title to the property had never passed to the U.S. government, and that title to the property had never ceased to belong to the Lee family. Title was awarded to George W.P.C. Lee. Then the U.S. Government negotiated a purchase of the land which belonged to G.W.P.C. Lee. The Government then bought the land from the rightful owner.

You are free to imagine that is reparations, but it is not. That is the Lee family establishing title to their land and, only afterwards, selling it. When one sells something, the payment is not called reparations.

The government negotiated a purchase, but it could have condemned the property and seized it under eminent domain, and then the payment would have been characterized a just compensation. That did not happen.

War reparations are compensation in money or materials payable by a defeated nation for damages to or expenditures sustained by another nation as a result of hostilities with the defeated nation; the compensation for war damage paid by a defeated state. For example, after WW1, Germany was forced to pay war reparations by the treaty of 1919. The last payment was made on October 3, 2010. That is war reparations. The last time I checked, the United States had not been defeated. It most certainly did not pay war reparations to the Confederates. Contrary to your claimed belief of payment of reparations, the United States passed the 14th Amendment in 1868 which states in relevant part:

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

A claim for reparations in 1882 would have been unconstitutional. The Lee claim was that the property had never left the Lee family, and that the purported seizure and sale was null and void.

[woodpusher post #280, on post-war burials at Arlington]: "For such purpose, the burials were not performed as a military necessity, but rather constituted a war crime.
That the acts regarding the Lee estate were held to be unlawful by the U.S. Supreme Court is documented fact."

[BroJoeK] And here we see, yet again, the boundless insanity of Democrats dedicated to the destruction of the United States.
In this particular case, woodpusher calls burials of Union soldiers at Arlington a war crime.
How much hatred & loathing for your own country do you need to say such a thing?

And here we see more historical and legal fiction.

Political parties have nothing to do with it.

As for the land, it was unlawfully seized and sold at auction. With an unlawful seizure, the seller had no clear title, and the purchaser obtained no clear title. It was a very simple matter of law. The seizure and purported sale were null and void.

Burials for the purpose of making private property uninhabitable by the rightful owner is a war crime. Burials for military necessity is not. The documents of General Meigs go directly to what Meigs did, and why.

How much disrespect for veterans do you show by saying that the Government gave away Arlington National Cemetary as a war reparation?

Of course, you neither read the court opinions, nor knew enough history, to recognize I was describing Arlington National Cemetary.

Just because you embarrassed yourself does not justify your inanity that the Government of the winning side gave away Arlington National Cemetary, as a war reparation, to the son of General Robert E. Lee of the losing side. No war reparations were given to any of the Confederates.

The historical facts speak for themselves and do not support your fiction.

woodpusher: "In 1863, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus suspension Act. Awesome.
He finally obtained authorization from Congress, two years late.
Lincoln was not Congress and could not assume the powers of Congress.
Lincoln had unlawfully authorized military officers to suspend habeas corpus at their discretion and further delegate their bogus authority."

Republicans in Congress then, just as today, tried to protect their President against insane Democrat attacks intent on destroying the United States by whatever means possible -- in this case Lincoln's denial of Habeas Corpus.
Treasonous Democrats were sometimes aided & abetted by RINO's, in your example here, Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull.

woodpusher: "Or, as Wikipedia fudges it, 'Senator Lyman Trumbull, the Republican chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, had reservations about its imprecise wording, so the resolution, also opposed by anti-war Democrats, was never brought to a vote.'
Uh huh."

The 1861 S No. 1 was introduced by Massachusetts Republican Senator Henry Wilson (later President Grant's Vice President).
It was intended to protect President Lincoln against insanely traitorous Democrats and their Doughfaced Republican co-conspirators.
In 1861 Republicans had 62% of the US Senate and 58% of the House meaning they theoretically could have passed pretty much whatever they wanted.
But there were two problems, the first was the lack of a filibuster cloture rule, meaning Democrats could block pretty much anything in the Senate.
The second was Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

So Woodpusher wishes to explain Republican Trumbull by regaling us with 17 quotes from US Senators, from July & August 1861 -- 10 from the Democrat traitor Breckenridge, one from the Democrat traitor Polk, two from Maryland Democrat slaveholder Pearce, one from NJ Democrat Thomson, one from Wisconsin Republican Howe and two from Illinois Republican Trumbull.
In the end Trumbull appears to buy the traitors' arguments that Congress can't legitimize what Lincoln already did.

We should also notice that Trumbull had lived & practiced law in Georgia, was originally a Democrat, voted against convicting & removing President Andrew Johnson, and that he left the Republicans to eventually become a Populist defending Socialist Eugene Debs.
In 1864 Trumbull's abolition bill became the US 13th Amendment.
So, bottom line: former Democrat Trumbull was willing to vote to defend Democrat President Johnson, but not to defend Republican President Lincoln.
Trumbull was willing to take seriously the words of traitors Breckenridge & Polk, but not those of his fellow Republicans and the bill's sponsor Henry Wilson.
Result was: The final 1863 bill, which Trumbull was instrumental in passing, authorized Lincoln to suspend Habeas Corpus, but said nothing about past suspensions.

In Trumbull's defense we might suppose he thought Lincoln did not need defending, while people wrongfully arrested did, and that Trumbull could never imagine, 160 years later, Democrats would still want to disinter Lincoln's body so they could publicly flog it over habeas corpus.

By stark contrast, the Confederate congress had no trouble authorizing Jefferson Davis to suspend habeas corpus, for the obvious reason that there were no Confederate Republican "strict constructionists" there to object.

[woodpusher]: In 1863, Congress passed the Habeas Corpus suspension Act. Awesome.
He finally obtained authorization from Congress, two years late.
Lincoln was not Congress and could not assume the powers of Congress.
Lincoln had unlawfully authorized military officers to suspend habeas corpus at their discretion and further delegate their bogus authority.

[BroJoeK]: Republicans in Congress then, just as today, tried to protect their President against insane Democrat attacks intent on destroying the United States by whatever means possible -- in this case Lincoln's denial of Habeas Corpus.
Treasonous Democrats were sometimes aided & abetted by RINO's, in your example here, Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull.

Radical Republicans then tried to cover for the unconstitutional and unlawful acts of President Lincoln. That is not their proper function and only makes them accessories after the fact.

My objection to taking up this resolution I will state in a word. I believe it is in order to state briefly the objection. This resolution which the Senator from Massachusetts seeks to take up is germane to the bill which is the unfinished business. The resolution proposed to declare legal the acts which have been done by the President in the recess of Congress. Will our declaration make them legal if they are not legal? Will it make them so if they were unconstitutional and void?
— Mr. TRUMBULL, August 2, 1861, page 392

The obvious answer to Trumbull's questions is that a congressional declaration could not change Lincoln's acts to legal if they were not legal, nor could a congressional declaration make said acts legal if they were unconstitutional and void.

Despite insane Lincoln idolatry, Lincoln was not a King. His acts could not be made lawful by decree.

Those who would approve of violations of the constitution merely exhibit a form of Trump Degrangement Syndrome in reverse. There is no defense of unconstitutional acts by presidents regardless of party. You labor mightily under the absurd notion that there is some party duty to approve unlawful and unconstitutional acts by a president of the chosen party.

[BroJoeK]: The 1861 S No. 1 was introduced by Massachusetts Republican Senator Henry Wilson (later President Grant's Vice President).
It was intended to protect President Lincoln against insanely traitorous Democrats and their Doughfaced Republican co-conspirators.
In 1861 Republicans had 62% of the US Senate and 58% of the House meaning they theoretically could have passed pretty much whatever they wanted.

It was intended to protect President Lincoln from the consequences of unlawful acts in violation of laws and the constitution. Those radicals who approved of violating the constitution to further their desires were for such dictatorial acts. The majority of congress was against it. The measure could not pass in 1861, it could not pass in 1863, it did not pass ever.

[BroJoeK]: But there were two problems, the first was the lack of a filibuster cloture rule, meaning Democrats could block pretty much anything in the Senate.

The problem with SR-1 was most certainly not the filibuster rule. Nobody was filibustering. The opposition was clamoring for a vote. Lincoln supporter Republican Lyman Trumbull withdrew the bill to save Lincoln from a humiliating defeat. Your imaginative historical fiction is belied by the actual record.

Below are links for the debate which occurred on August 5, 1861 regarding SR-1, S69, and S72. As for the inability to reach a vote, because of the imposition of some impenetrable filibuster, in the immortal words of Barry Scheck, where is it, ~~Mr. Fung~~ Brother Joe? How did a filibuster escape the transcripts?

The debate which occurred on August 5, 1861 regarding SR-1, S69, and S72 is at the Congressional Globe at pages 442, 443, 448, and 449.

The debate which occurred on the last day of the session, August 6, 1861 regarding SR-1, S69, and S72 is at the Congressional Globe at pages 451, 452, 453, 454, 456, 458, and 459.

There is no filibuster to be found.

However, there are a few quotable quotes about the bill all Republicans were supposedly required to vote for.

At page 451, Senator Breckinridge stated,

I predicted that the Senate never intended to vote on this joint resolution No. 1; and I take it to be one gleam of sunshine in the midst of the gloom that surrounds us, that the Senate recoils from that.

At page 452, Senator Breckenridge stated,

Mr. BRECKINRIDGE. This resolution is more familiar to the Senate than any other resolution which has been before it during the session. It was earliest introduced. It was the pet measure of the majority here. It was put in just such shape as that majority thought was right. It was the outbreak of the patriotic ardor with which the Senate assembled. They matured it; and before the Senate got cool, Senators expressed their purpose to vote for it. It has been up again and again; it has been amendable for more than a month. It is just in the shape in which a majority of the Senate deliberately said they wanted it to be, for some time. So eager was the Senate to pass it, that it was difficult for any of us to get the floor to make a protest in the name of the Constitution against it; but at last we secured that right. There it is. It has gone to the country. It is on its passage, and not amendable. Let the Senate vote it down, or pass it.

At page 453, Senator Trumbull stated,

Mr. TRUMBULL. Mr. President, the Senator from Massachusetts is very anxious for a vote on this subject. I am not willing that a vote should be taken, under the misapprehensions which seem to exist in the Chamber, and the position which will be practiced by it upon the country. The Senator from Kentucky has, on several occasions, very good-naturedly alluded to this as being the “ pet measure” of this side of the Chamber; that it was brought forward at an early day, and matured, and then there was an indisposition to vote upon it; that we were all for it, our “pet measure;" matured and brought in here, one would think, by some general understanding. Now, I desire to say—and I desire to say it in part because of what has fallen from the Senator from Maine, who has undertaken to speak for this side of the Chamber, as he supposed—there never was a moment, from the time the resolution was introduced up to this hour, that it could have received my vote. It never was matured as a party measure—never. It is an entire misapprehension. The Senator from Massachusetts, I believe, reported it from a committee, and has urged it; but that it has been any “pet measure,” or anything that everybody was bound to vote for, whether he liked it or disliked it, is an entire misapprehension.

At page 453, the following colloquy followed:

Mr. COLLAMER. It was not reported from a committee.
Mr. TRUMBULL. It seems it never was before a committee. It is an individual proposition brought in here. Now what authority is there for undertaking to assume that this is a pet measure of any party in the country.
Mr. POWELL. If the Senator from Illinois will allow me, I will say it was reported from the Committee on Military Affairs.
Mr. TRUMBULL. I was just informed that — it was not reported from that committee, but was brought in by the Senator from Massachusetts on his individual responsibility.

[BroJoeK]: The second was Illinois Republican Senator Lyman Trumbull, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee.

The votes were not there. That was the problem. The votes were still not there in 1863 for the crap they tried to push in 1861.

[BroJoeK]: In 1864 Trumbull's abolition bill became the US 13th Amendment.

Nothing became the 13th Amendment in 1864. A proposal for an Amendment was approved to be sent to the States for ratification in 1865. The proposed amendment became the 13th Amendment on December 6, 1865.

[BroJoeK]: So, bottom line: former Democrat Trumbull was willing to vote to defend Democrat President Johnson, but not to defend Republican President Lincoln.

President Johnson was not guilty of any violation of law. Lincoln was. Trumbull did not defend Lincoln's unlawful acts. You still do.

[BroJoeK]: Trumbull was willing to take seriously the words of traitors Breckenridge & Polk, but not those of his fellow Republicans and the bill's sponsor Henry Wilson.

Trumbull was not willing to ignore violations of the laws and the Constitution. You are willing to make believe Lincoln's acts have some viable defence, even if you are incapable of articulating what it may be.

[BroJoeK]: Result was: The final 1863 bill, which Trumbull was instrumental in passing, authorized Lincoln to suspend Habeas Corpus, but said nothing about past suspensions.

The votes for that insane nonsense were still not there. The attempt to insert that crap into legislation did not fail for want of trying. Nor did it fail for want of a cloture rule. Authorization by Congress to suspend habeas corpus passed cloture and the requirement for votes. Approval of Lincoln's unauthorized and unconstitutional acts failed for want of votes.

[BroJoeK]: In Trumbull's defense we might suppose he thought Lincoln did not need defending, while people wrongfully arrested did, and that Trumbull could never imagine, 160 years later, Democrats would still want to disinter Lincoln's body so they could publicly flog it over habeas corpus.

In Trumbull's defense, there was no viable legal defense for Lincoln's acts. However, 169 years later, those with Lincoln Idolatry Syndrome continue to issue fiction as history.

[BroJoeK]: By stark contrast, the Confederate congress had no trouble authorizing Jefferson Davis to suspend habeas corpus, for the obvious reason that there were no Confederate Republican "strict constructionists" there to object.

The Confederate Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 9, cl. 3 stated:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

The United States Constitution, Article 1, Sec. 9, cl. 2 stated:

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it.

The two are identical, down to the punctuation.

What was different was that Davis sought, and obtained, the authorization of the Confederate congress before acting. Lincoln neither sought, nor obtained, the authorization of the United States congress before acting. Davis acted to issue a suspension pursuant to delegated authority. Lincoln had no delegated authority, but pretended to delegate said "authority" he did not have to a military officer, and pretended to empower that officer to further delegate the faux authority to issue suspensions. There is no legal defense whatever for what Lincoln did. That is why congress repeated puked the legislation back up.

Moreover, even had Davis acted as unlawfully as Lincoln, that would be no defense for the acts of Lincoln.

As for your imaginative fiction about how cloture prevented the passage of Senate Resolution SR-1 because of the "traitors" Trumbull and Brekinridge, how do you explain what happened with Senate Bill S-69 and Senate Bill S-72? (passed as a bill "to increase the pay of the non-commissioned officers, muscians, and privates of the regular Army, volunteers, marines, and seamaen and ordinary seamen in the service of the United States, and for other purposes") Or did your quest for historical knowledge not get past Wikipedia and extend to the actual records of what happened in the Congress? Those bills, and the attendant debate, lay waste to your historical fiction.

woodpusher: "The obvious answer to Trumbull's questions is that a congressional declaration could not change Lincoln's acts to legal if they were not legal, nor could a congressional declaration make said acts legal if they were unconstitutional and void.
Despite insane Lincoln idolatry, Lincoln was not a King.
His acts could not be made lawful by decree."

Say our America-hating Democrats.
But there's nothing insane -- zero, zip, nada insane -- about Republicans protecting their President from lunatic Democrats determined to destroy the United States by whatever means possible, in this case habeas corpus.
Further, setting aside the absurd opinions of crazy Roger Taney and the traitors Breckenridge and Polk, the Supreme Court itself has never ruled directly on the issue of Lincoln's power to revoke habeas corpus in time of rebellion or invasion.
Regardless of even Trumbull's opinion, it is not a fact that Lincoln violated the law.

woodpusher: "Those who would approve of violations of the constitution merely exhibit a form of Trump Degrangement Syndrome in reverse.
There is no defense of unconstitutional acts by presidents regardless of party.
You labor mightily under the absurd notion that there is some party duty to approve unlawful and unconstitutional acts by a president of the chosen party. "

So say our insane Democrats.
But a rational person understands that there was no definitive law or Supreme Court ruling forbidding Lincoln's actions regarding habeas corpus and that Congress, despite determined Democrat opposition, did eventually authorize suspension -- the 1863 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act.

Confederate General Breckenridge:

Further, those traitor Democrats who fought most strongly against authorizing Lincoln to suspend were totally happy when the Confederate Congress authorized Jefferson Davis to suspend -- no debate, no delays, and nothing sane about them.

woodpusher: "It was intended to protect President Lincoln from the consequences of unlawful acts in violation of laws and the constitution.
Those radicals who approved of violating the constitution to further their desires were for such dictatorial acts.
The majority of congress was against it.
The measure could not pass in 1861, it could not pass in 1863, it did not pass ever. "

Again, crazy Roger notwithstanding, there was then and still today no direct Supreme Court ruling against Lincoln's actions.
When Congress did act in 1863 it approved future suspensions and took no notice of past suspensions.

woodpusher: "The problem with SR-1 was most certainly not the filibuster rule.
Nobody was filibustering.
The opposition was clamoring for a vote.
Lincoln supporter Republican Lyman Trumbull withdrew the bill to save Lincoln from a humiliating defeat.
Your imaginative historical fiction is belied by the actual record. "

RINO Democrat Senator Lyman Trumbull Judiciary Chairman

First, Massachusetts Republican Senator Wilson was not "the opposition", he represented the majority Republicans.
Second, your unsupported claim that 1861's SR 1 would have been defeated rests on the assumption that RINO Trumbull would have been joined by at least three other RINO senators, and I've seen no evidence of that.

What's clear from your own posts is that RINO Trumbull was mesmerized by the traitors Breckenridge & Polk into remembering that he, Trumbull, was really a Democrat at heart and would rather see the United States destroyed than support his Republican president.
Trumbull was victimized by Democrats' Lincoln Derangement Syndrome.

woodpusher: "As for the inability to reach a vote, because of the imposition of some impenetrable filibuster, in the immortal words of Barry Scheck, where is it, Mr. Fung Brother Joe?
How did a filibuster escape the transcripts? "

I was referring to Democrats' filibuster against HR 591 in March, 1863.
That bill eventually passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses.
It authorized future suspensions of habeas corpus, but said nothing to either indemnify or censure previous suspensions.

In all fairness to Trumbull and other Republicans at that time, I have no doubt they didn't think Lincoln needed to be indemnified.

woodpusher: "However, there are a few quotable quotes about the bill all Republicans were supposedly required to vote for. "

I have no interest in the opinions of traitor Breckenridge except as they somehow seem to have infected the mind of RINO Trumbull.
The real question is whether there were Republicans besides RINO Trumbull willing to vote against 1861 SR-1?
I've seen no evidence of that, meaning Trumbull was simply acting in his authority as chairman to quash a bill he personally didn't like.

woodpusher: "The votes were not there.
That was the problem.
The votes were still not there in 1863 for the crap they tried to push in 1861. "

You don't know how many votes there were for or against.
You only know that Trumbull himself was against 1861 SR-1, and also against Thaddeus Stevens' original 1863 HR-591.
That's why Trumbull replaced Steven's HR-591 with his own, leaving off indemnification, and got it passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses.

Again, the lopsided vote for HR-591 suggests to me that Republicans at the time did not think indemnification was necessary.

woodpusher: "Nothing became the 13th Amendment in 1864.
A proposal for an Amendment was approved to be sent to the States for ratification in 1865.
The proposed amendment became the 13th Amendment on December 6, 1865. "

Now you're just being ridiculous.
In January 1864 Trumbull began working on the bill which eventually became the 13th Amendment.

woodpusher: "President Johnson was not guilty of any violation of law.
Lincoln was.
Trumbull did not defend Lincoln's unlawful acts.
You still do."

You have it exactly backwards.
The truth is that President Andrew Johnson was accused and impeached for violating an actual law, but RINO Trumbull voted against conviction because he personally thought the law itself was unconstitutional.
Trumbull put his own opinions above the law itself.

In the case of Lincoln, no actual law was violated, no accusations were made, outside the fantasies of crazy Roger Taney.
But RINO Trumbull seemed mesmerized by arguments of traitorous Democrats and so refused to indemnify Lincoln for saving the United States from Democrats' efforts to destroy it.

woodpusher: "Trumbull was not willing to ignore violations of the laws and the Constitution.
You are willing to make believe Lincoln's acts have some viable defence, even if you are incapable of articulating what it may be."

I'm no lawyer, but the defense here is simple: no laws were broken in this matter.

woodpusher: "The votes for that insane nonsense were still not there.
The attempt to insert that crap into legislation did not fail for want of trying.
Nor did it fail for want of a cloture rule.
Authorization by Congress to suspend habeas corpus passed cloture and the requirement for votes.
Approval of Lincoln's unauthorized and unconstitutional acts failed for want of votes. "

Now, typical Democrat, you've just descended down from ridiculous arguments to flat-out lying, why?
After much parliamentary maneuvering, Thaddeus Stevens' HR-591 eventually became the 1863 Habeas Corpus Suspension Act".
Why do you lie about that?

woodpusher: "In Trumbull's defense, there was no viable legal defense for Lincoln's acts.
However, 169 years later, those with Lincoln Idolatry Syndrome continue to issue fiction as history. "

159 years from 1861 to 2020 = ~160.
In Lincoln's defense, again, outside the fantasies of crazy Confederate Roger Taney, there was no serious accusation of wrongdoing on Lincoln's part.
As for alleged "Lincoln Idolatry Syndrome", that's never been seen on Free Republic, but Lincoln Derangement Syndrome drives our Democrats here into paroxysms of rage over their failure to utterly destroy the United States in the 1860s.

Sorry about that, FRiend, but it's long past time for you get over it.

woodpusher: "President Johnson was not guilty of any violation of law. Lincoln was. Trumbull did not defend Lincoln's unlawful acts. You still do."

You have it exactly backwards. The truth is that President Andrew Johnson was accused and impeached for violating an actual law, but RINO Trumbull voted against conviction because he personally thought the law itself was unconstitutional.
Trumbull put his own opinions above the law itself.
In the case of Lincoln, no actual law was violated, no accusations were made, outside the fantasies of crazy Roger Taney.
But RINO Trumbull seemed mesmerized by arguments of traitorous Democrats and so refused to indemnify Lincoln for saving the United States from Democrats' efforts to destroy it.

For what purpose do you invoke the Tenure of Office Act, an Act notoriously known to be unconstitutional?

How could President Andrew Johnson violate a "law" which was unconstitutional and null and void ab initio?

Trumbull was right, beyond any reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty. So was President Andrew Johnson, and more recently, President Donald J. Trump.

The knowledge that the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitution is notorious. For what ridiculous purpose do you raise it from its grave and support it?

woodpusher: "Trumbull was not willing to ignore violations of the laws and the Constitution.
You are willing to make believe Lincoln's acts have some viable defence, even if you are incapable of articulating what it may be."

I'm no lawyer, but the defense here is simple: no laws were broken in this matter.

Whatever makes you feel the compulsion to say that you are not a lawyer?

Argument based upon the Tenure in Office Act, notoriously known to be unconstitutional, makes that clear.

What is it with your strange penchant for unconstitutional acts?

woodpusher: "For what purpose do you invoke the Tenure of Office Act, an Act notoriously known to be unconstitutional?
How could President Andrew Johnson violate a "law" which was unconstitutional and null and void ab initio?"

First of all, "null and void ab initio" was not used in any report I've seen, instead parts of the Tenure of Office Act were said (in 1926 in dicta) to be "invalid".

So, you claimed that Lincoln broke the law and Johnson didn't when the truth is just the opposite: Johnson broke an actual law but Lincoln didn't.
Yes, SCOTUS declared, in dicta, 59 years later, parts of the law Johnson broke to be "invalid", but that was never Trumbull's call to make.

woodpusher: "Trumbull was right, beyond any reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty."

Nonsense, Trumbull assumed for himself the authority of the Supreme Court to overturn precedent and declare a law "unconstitutional".

woodpusher: "So was President Andrew Johnson, and more recently, President Donald J. Trump."

Both the law and precedent were different in 1868 than today.
At the time precedent was the SCOTUS Marbury vs. Madison decision and Tenure was the law.

woodpusher: "The knowledge that the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitution is notorious.
For what ridiculous purpose do you raise it from its grave and support it?"

Because you lied about it!
At the time it was the law and Johnson broke it.
By stark contrast Lincoln broke no laws and yet you constantly lie about that too.

woodpusher: "Whatever makes you feel the compulsion to say that you are not a lawyer?
Argument based upon the Tenure in Office Act, notoriously known to be unconstitutional, makes that clear."

I'm a citizen and student of history.
I notice that the 1867 Tenure in Office Act was amended for President Grant in 1869, then repealed entirely in 1887.
In 1926, Chief Justice (former President) Taft wrote for the 6-3 majority that a similar law was unconstitutional, also referring back, in dicta, to parts of the 1867 Tenure act as "invalid".

Sure, all that is well and good, some 59 years later, but at the time, in 1867 the precedent, as pointed out by Brandeis in 1926, was Marbury vs. Madison which:

"...assumed, as the basis of decision, that the President, acting alone, is powerless to remove an inferior civil officer appointed for a fixed term with the consent of the Senate; and that case was long regarded as so deciding." "

Indeed, McReynolds in 1926, also dissenting from Taft studied the Constitutional Convention notes and said that,

"he found no language in the Constitution or in the notes from the Convention intended to grant the President the 'illimitable power' to fire every appointed official, 'as caprice may suggest', in the entire government with the exception of judges."

Of course, I agree with Taft that the President can "at pleasure" fire confirmed executive branch officials, but at the time the Tenure of Office Act simply stated what had been assumed as Founders Intent since at least 1803.
The Act was valid and Johnson broke it, but Trumbull on his own authority declared it "unconstitutional".

By stark contrast Lincoln broke no law and was eventually authorized by Congress to suspend habeas corpus as necessary.

woodpusher: "What is it with your strange penchant for unconstitutional acts?"

What is it with your strange penchant for hatred of and lying about Lincoln?

woodpusher: "For what purpose do you invoke the Tenure of Office Act, an Act notoriously known to be unconstitutional?
How could President Andrew Johnson violate a "law" which was unconstitutional and null and void ab initio?"

First of all, "null and void ab initio" was not used in any report I've seen, instead parts of the Tenure of Office Act were said (in 1926 in dicta) to be "invalid".
So, you claimed that Lincoln broke the law and Johnson didn't when the truth is just the opposite: Johnson broke an actual law but Lincoln didn't.
Yes, SCOTUS declared, in dicta, 59 years later, parts of the law Johnson broke to be "invalid", but that was never Trumbull's call to make.

woodpusher: "Trumbull was right, beyond any reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty."

Nonsense, Trumbull assumed for himself the authority of the Supreme Court to overturn precedent and declare a law "unconstitutional".

woodpusher: "So was President Andrew Johnson, and more recently, President Donald J. Trump."

Both the law and precedent were different in 1868 than today.
At the time precedent was the SCOTUS Marbury vs. Madison decision and Tenure was the law.

woodpusher: "The knowledge that the Tenure of Office Act was unconstitution is notorious.
For what ridiculous purpose do you raise it from its grave and support it?"

Because you lied about it!
At the time it was the law and Johnson broke it.
By stark contrast Lincoln broke no laws and yet you constantly lie about that too.

woodpusher: "Whatever makes you feel the compulsion to say that you are not a lawyer?
Argument based upon the Tenure in Office Act, notoriously known to be unconstitutional, makes that clear."

I'm a citizen and student of history.
I notice that the 1867 Tenure in Office Act was amended for President Grant in 1869, then repealed entirely in 1887.
In 1926, Chief Justice (former President) Taft wrote for the 6-3 majority that a similar law was unconstitutional, also referring back, in dicta, to parts of the 1867 Tenure act as "invalid".

Your legal nonsense gets you nowhere. It appears to be more Wikipedia nonsense. Perhaps you should read what the U.S. Supreme Court said. Taft wrote "the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so.

From the Syllabus of Myers v United States.

The question, (1) Whether a judge appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate under an act of Congress, not under authority of Art. IlI of the Constitution, can be removed by the President alone without the consent of the Senate; (2), whether the legislative decision of 1789 covers such a case; and (3), whether Congress may provide for his removal in some other way, present considerations different from those which apply in the removal of executive officers, and are not herein decided. Pp. 154-158.
This Court has recognized (United States v. Perkins, 116 U. S. 483) that Congress may prescribe incidental regulations controlling and restricting the heads of departments in the exercise of the power of removal; but it has never held, and could not reasonably hold, that the excepting clause enables Congress to draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power. To do this would be to go beyond the words and implications of that clause and to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers. P. 161.
Assuming the power of Congress to regulate removals as incidental to the exercise of its constitutional power to vest appointments of inferior officers in the heads of departments, certainly so long as Congress does not exercise that power, the power of removal must remain where the Constitution places it,—with the President, as part of the executive power, in accordance with the legislative decision of 1789. P. 161.
Whether the action of Congress in removing the necessity for the advice and consent of the Senate, and putting the power of appointment in the President alone, would make his power of removal in such case any more subject to Congressional legislation than before, is a question not heretofore decided by this Court and not presented or decided in this case. P. 161.
Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and removals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the President with the Senate's consent. P. 164.

Myers, Administratrix, v. United States, 272 U.S. 106 (1926)

Opinion of the Court at 112-113:

On June 16, 1789, the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on a bill proposed by Mr. Madison for establishing an executive department to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs, in which the first clause, after stating the title of the officer and describing his duties, had these words: “to be removable from office by the President of the United States.” 1 Annals of Congress, 455. After a very full discussion the question was put: shall the words “to be removable by the President” be struck out? It was determined in the negative—yeas 20, nays 34. 1 Annals of Congress, 576.
On June 22, in the renewal of the discussion, “Mr. Benson moved to amend the bill, by altering the second clause, so as to imply the power of removal to be in the President alone. The clause enacted that there should be a chief clerk, to be appointed by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and employed as he thought proper, and who, in case of vacancy, should have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers appertaining to the department. The amendment proposed that the chief clerk, ‘whenever the said principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the United States, or in any other case of vacancy,’ should during such vacancy, have the charge and custody of all records, books, and papers appertaining to the department.” 1 Annals of Congress, 578.
“Mr. Benson stated that his objection to the clause ‘to be removable by the President’ arose from an idea that the power of removal by the President hereafter might appear to be exercised by virtue of a legislative grant only, and consequently be subjected to legislative instability, when he was well satisfied in his own mind that it was fixed by a fair legislative construction of the Constitution.” 1 Annals of Congress, 579.
“Mr. Benson declared, if he succeeded in this amendment, he would move to strike out the words in the first clause, ‘to be removable by the President’ which appeared somewhat like a grant. Now, the mode he took would evade that point and establish a legislative construction of the Constitution. He also hoped his amendment would succeed in reconciling both sides of the House to the decision, and quieting the minds of gentlemen.” 1 Annals of Congress, 578.
Mr. Madison admitted the objection made by the gentleman near him (Mr. Benson) to the words in the bill. He said: “They certainly may be construed to imply a legislative grant of the power. He wished everything like ambiguity expunged, and the sense of the House explicitly declared, and therefore seconded the motion. Gentlemen have all along proceeded on the idea that the Constitution vests the power in the President; and what arguments were brought forward respecting the convenience or inconvenience of such disposition of the power, were intended only to throw light upon what was meant by the compilers of the Constitution. Now, as the words proposed by the gentleman from New York expressed to his mind the meaning of the Constitution, he should be in favor of them, and would agree to strike out those agreed to in the committee.” 1 Annals of Congress, 578, 579.

- - - - - - - - - -

Opinion of the Court at page 114:

It is very clear from this history that the exact question which the House voted upon was whether it should recognize and declare the power of the President under the Constitution to remove the Secretary of Foreign Affairs without the advice and consent of the Senate. That was what the vote was taken for. Some effort has been made to question whether the decision carries the result claimed for it, but there is not the slightest doubt, after an examination of the record, that the vote was, and was intended to be, a legislative declaration that the power to remove officers appointed by the President and the Senate vested in the President alone, and until the Johnson Impeachment trial in 1868, its meaning was not doubted even by those who questioned its soundness.

Opinion of the Court at page 161:

But the Court never has held, nor reasonably could hold, although it is argued to the contrary on behalf of the appellant, that the excepting clause enables Congress to draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the right to participate in the exercise of that power. To do this would be to go beyond the words and implications of that clause and to infringe the constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers.

Opinion of the Court at page 174-176

What, then, are the elements that enter into our decision of this case? We have first a construction of the Constitution made by a Congress which was to provide by legislation for the organization of the Government in accord with the Constitution which had just then been adopted, and in which there were, as representatives and senators, a considerable number of those who had been members of the Convention that framed the Constitution and presented it for ratification. It was the Congress that launched the Government. It was the Congress that rounded out the Constitution itself by the proposing of the first ten amendments which had in effect been promised to the people as a consideration for the ratification. It was the Congress in which Mr. Madison, one of the first in the framing of the Constitution, led also in the organization of the Government under it. It was a Congress whose constitutional decisions have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instrument. This construction was followed by the legislative department and the executive department continuously for seventy-three years, and this although the matter, in the heat of political differences between the Executive and the Senate in President Jackson’s time, was the subject of bitter controversy, as we have seen. This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, acquiesced in for a long term of years, fixes the construction to be given its provisions. Stuart v. Laird, 1 Cranch 209, 309; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 1 Wheat. 304, 351; Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 420; Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 544, 621; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, etc., 12 How. 299, 315; Burroughs-Giles Lithographing Company v. Sarony, 111 U. S. 53, 57; Ames v. Kansas, 111 U. S. 449, 463-469; The Laura, 114 U. S. 411, 416; Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U. S. 265, 297; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 28, 33, 35; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 56; Fairbank v. United States, 181 U. S. 283, 308; Ex parte Grossman, 267 U. S. 87, 118.
We are now asked to set aside this construction, thus buttressed, and adopt an adverse view, because the Congress of the United States did so during a heated political difference of opinion between the then President and the majority leaders of Congress over the reconstruction measures adopted as a means of restoring to their proper status the States which attempted to withdraw from the Union at the time of the Civil War. The extremes to which the majority in both Houses carried legislative measures in that matter are now recognized by all who calmly review the history of that episode in our Government, leading to articles of impeachment against President Johnson, and his acquittal. Without animadverting on the character of the measures taken, we are certainly justified in saying that they should not be given the weight affecting proper constitutional construction to be accorded to that reached by the First Congress of the United States during a political calm and acquiesced in by the whole Government for three-quarters of a century, especially when the new construction contended for has never been acquiesced in by either the executive or the judicial departments. While this Court has studiously avoided deciding the issue until it was presented in such a way that it could not be avoided, in the references it has made to the history of the question, and in the presumptions it has indulged in favor of a statutory construction not inconsistent with the legislative decision of 1789, it has indicated a trend of view that we should not and can not ignore. When, on the merits, we find our conclusion strongly favoring the view which prevailed in the First Congress, we have no hesitation in holding that conclusion to be correct; and it-therefore follows that the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so.
For the reasons given, we must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876, by which the unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to the President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid.

The Court reviewed the history of the relevant constitutional provision, and found the 1867 legislation impossible to uphold, and attributed it to a Congress that went to extremes, as recognized by all who calmly review the history of that episode in our government, which apparently excludes BroJoeK.

And the Court noted that "we are certainly justified in saying that they should not be given the weight affecting proper constitutional construction to be accorded to that reached by the First Congress of the United States during a political calm and acquisced in by the whole Government for three-quarters of a century, especially when the new construction contended for has never been acquiesced in by either the executive or the judicial departments."

A dictum is a statement, remark, or observation in a judicial opinion not necessary for the decision of the case.

In Myers, where the Appellant's argument was based upon the unconstitutional Act of 1876, whose relevant provision was could not be distinguished from the Act of 1867. The Court directly found the Act of 1867 to have been repugnant to the Constitution, and therefore null and void ab initio, and that any subsequent legislation to the same effect, such as the Act of 1876, was therefore equally unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. And the Court further held that, "we must therefore hold that the provision of the law of 1876, by by which the unrestricted power of removal of first class postmasters is denied to the President, is in violation of the Constitution, and invalid."

It is not a dictum when it is necessary and central to the case.

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/imp_tenure.html

In 1926, in the case of Myers vs. United States, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held unconstitutional a law requiring the consent of the Senate for removal of certain non-Cabinet officials

Aside from the observable fact that it is not a dictum, my source here is a law school, yours is apparently some clueless, anonymous hockey puck on Wikipedia.

As a supposed student of history who expounds upon the law, you should get your head out of Wikipedia and try a few court opinions and law books.

When a law is struck down as repugnant to the Constitution, it is struck down ab initio, as if it never existed. The enacting body had no authority to enact it, and legally it never existed.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), Opinion of the Court

5 U.S.176:
The question whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United States, but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The Government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited
5 U.S. 177
and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it, or that the Legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written Constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written Constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this Court as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not, therefore, to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.
If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory, and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.
5 U.S. 178
So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written Constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that, if the Legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the Legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.

woodpusher: "As for the inability to reach a vote, because of the imposition of some impenetrable filibuster, in the immortal words of Barry Scheck, where is it, ~~Mr. Fung~~ Brother Joe?
How did a filibuster escape the transcripts? "

[BroJoeK #291]: I was referring to Democrats' filibuster against HR 591 in March, 1863.
That bill eventually passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses.
It authorized future suspensions of habeas corpus, but said nothing to either indemnify or censure previous suspensions.
In all fairness to Trumbull and other Republicans at that time, I have no doubt they didn't think Lincoln needed to be indemnified.

- - - - - - - - - -

No, you were not referring to HR 591 in March 1863, you explicitly referred to SR-1 of 1861, with nary a mention of HR 591 of 1863. You explicitly claimed that "The 1861 S No. 1 was introducted by Massachusetts Republican Senator Henry Wilson," and, still in reference to Wilson's Resolution, "here were two problems, the first was the lack of a filibuster cloture rule...."

You invented a filibuster that never happened, and when confronted by the official record of the relevant 1861 congressional debate, you seek to make believe you were talking about a bill from 1863.

The record of the debates does not lie. Neither does the FR record of what you actually wrote.

[BroJoeK #289]: The 1861 S No. 1 was introduced by Massachusetts Republican Senator Henry Wilson (later President Grant's Vice President).
It was intended to protect President Lincoln against insanely traitorous Democrats and their Doughfaced Republican co-conspirators.
In 1861 Republicans had 62% of the US Senate and 58% of the House meaning they theoretically could have passed pretty much whatever they wanted.

[woodpusher #290] It was intended to protect President Lincoln from the consequences of unlawful acts in violation of laws and the constitution. Those radicals who approved of violating the constitution to further their desires were for such dictatorial acts. The majority of congress was against it. The measure could not pass in 1861, it could not pass in 1863, it did not pass ever.

[BroJoeK #289]: But there were two problems, the first was the lack of a filibuster cloture rule, meaning Democrats could block pretty much anything in the Senate.

The problem with SR-1 was most certainly not the filibuster rule. Nobody was filibustering. The opposition was clamoring for a vote. Lincoln supporter Republican Lyman Trumbull withdrew the bill to save Lincoln from a humiliating defeat. Your imaginative historical fiction is belied by the actual record.
Below are links for the debate which occurred on August 5, 1861 regarding SR-1, S69, and S72. As for the inability to reach a vote, because of the imposition of some impenetrable filibuster, in the immortal words of Barry Scheck, where is it, ~~Mr. Fung~~ Brother Joe? How did a filibuster escape the transcripts?
The debate which occurred on August 5, 1861 regarding SR-1, S69, and S72 is at the Congressional Globe at pages 442, 443, 448, and 449.
The debate which occurred on the last day of the session, August 6, 1861 regarding SR-1, S69, and S72 is at the Congressional Globe at pages 451, 452, 453, 454, 456, 458, and 459.
There is no filibuster to be found.

So, you were clearly talking about SR-1 of 1861 and your blather about 1863 is merely an attempt at diversion. Be that as it may, the question was about where is your cited filibuster?

[BroJoeK #291]: When Congress did act in 1863 it approved future suspensions and took no notice of past suspensions.

What was the purpose of the Indemnity Bill again? The official record shows:

MESSAGE FROM THE HOUSE.
A message from the House of Representatives, by Mr. Etheridge, its Clerk, announced that the House of Representatives had agreed to the report of the committee of conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the bill (H. R. No. 591) to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and acts done in pursuance thereof.

[...]

Mr. TRUMBULL. The committee of conference on the bill of the House of Representatives (No. 591) to indemnify the President and other persons for suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and acts done in pursuance thereof, have agreed on a report, which I submit.

Mr. TRUMBULL. I will state, for the information of the Senate, that the report embraces nothing but the subject-matter of the bill which passed the House of Representatives, and the amendments which passed the Senate. The House of Representatives passed a bill containing two sections, the first with a preamble. The first section ratified all acts of the President in the arrest of parties, and indemnified and discharged all officers from suits or prosecutions in consequence of any arrests made under his authority....

At or about 7 p.m.:

Mr. TRUMBULL. I must insist on calling up the report of the committee of conference on the indemnity bill, which was laid aside until seven o'clock.

It was then agreed to take up the bill at 7 p.m. that evening. Its passage was at about 2 a.m. in the morning. It was done and dusted in seven hours, from time debate started until the voice vote was recorded. When did your alleged 1863 filibuster take place?

[BroJoeK #291]: That bill eventually passed with overwhelming majorities in both houses.

Let us look at the "overwhelming majority" as recorded in the record.

As you state that an overwhelming majority voted for the bill, do tell how many voted for and against.

Mr. FESSENDEN. Let us have the yeas and nays on the adjournment.
The yeas and nays were ordered; and being taken resulted—yeas 4, nays 33; as follows:
[recorded vote on adjournment omitted]
So the Senate refused to adjourn.
The PRESIDING OFFICER, (Mr. Pomeroy.) The question is on concurring in the report af the committee of conference. Those in favor of concurring in the report will say “aye” those opposed “no.” The ayes have it. It is a vote. The report is concurred in.
Mr. TRUMBULL. I move that the Senate now proceed to the consideration of House bill No. 599.
Mr. POWELL. I hope the Senate will proceed with this indemnity bill.
The motion of Mr. Trumbull was agreed to.
Mr. TRUMBULL. It is a bill relating to the validity of deeds of public squares and lots in the city of Washington.
Mr. POWELL. What has become of the other bill?
Mr. GRIMES. It has passed.

[BroJoeK #291]: In January 1864 Trumbull began working on the bill which eventually became the 13th Amendment.
[BroJoeK #289] In 1864 Trumbull's abolition bill became the US 13th Amendment.

You explicitly stated that "In 1864, Trumbull's abolition bill became the US 13th Amendment."

In 1864, Trumbull's proposal had not been approved, had not been sent to the people for ratification, and most certainly did not become the 13th Amendment. The proposed text became an amendment in December 1865.

When Trumbull started working on it is irrelevant. And stop calling it a bill. It was not a bill. Bills become Federal laws. Resolutions propose constitutional Amendments.

Of course, if you had bothered to actually look up the record, you could not help but notice that it was a Resolution. Your posts reveal your lack of even the most basic knowledge of what you are talking about, and your disinclination to be bothered to research any of your purported facts or hallucinations about the law.

woodpusher: "Taft wrote "the Tenure of Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to prevent the President from removing executive officers who had been appointed by him by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid, and that subsequent legislation of the same effect was equally so."

For anyone who's keeping score, I win this point.
Our legal expert woodpusher claimed the 1867 Tenure of Office Act (on which President Johnson was impeached) was "null and void ab initio".
In fact it was a perfectly valid law until repealed in 1887, then in 1926 SCOTUS declared it in dicta and in part, invalid.

Woodpusher's suggestions to the contrary, my point here is not to defend the repealed law, but simply to notice that it was a law and President Andrew Johnson broke it, for which he was impeached.
By contrast, Lincoln broke no laws, woodpusher's repeated claims to the contrary notwithstanding.

woodpusher: "The Court reviewed the history of the relevant constitutional provision, and found the 1867 legislation impossible to uphold, and attributed it to a Congress that went to extremes, as recognized by all who calmly review the history of that episode in our government, which apparently excludes BroJoeK. "

For propaganda reasons, because that's why he's here, our brand new FRiend woodpusher refuses to acknowledge either the real issue or his own lies, indeed, he doubles down on his lies.

In this case, woodpusher has made the preposterous claims that President Lincoln broke the law regarding habeas corpus and President Johnson broke no law regarding the 1867 Tenure of Office Act.
To make such claims he must fantasize for Lincoln a law which did not exist and for Johnson he must nullify a law which did exist.

woodpusher: "A dictum is a statement, remark, or observation in a judicial opinion not necessary for the decision of the case. "

Right, and here woodpusher perhaps unwittingly seems to confirm my point, which is that the 1926 SCOTUS ruling mentioning the 1867 Tenure Act did not call it "null and void ab initio" as woodpusher previously claimed.

woodpusher: "In Myers, where the Appellant's argument was based upon the unconstitutional Act of 1876, whose relevant provision was could not be distinguished from the Act of 1867.
The Court directly found the Act of 1867 to have been repugnant to the Constitution, and therefore null and void ab initio, and that any subsequent legislation to the same effect, such as the Act of 1876, was therefore equally unconstitutional and null and void ab initio. "

So far I've seen only the trade-craft of a highly sophisticated & trained propagandist, not an actual fact.
Once again our FRiend woodpusher pushes that term, "null and void ab initio," claiming "the Court" said it when, in actual quoted fact, what the SCOTUS wrote was "insofar as it..." the 1867 Tenure act was "invalid".

woodpusher: "Aside from the observable fact that it is not a dictum, my source here is a law school, yours is apparently some clueless, anonymous hockey puck on Wikipedia. "

You, woodpusher, are a "clueless anonymous hockey puck" who should not be throwing stones at others alleged.
Take a humble pill before you sit down to post, focus on pledging to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but.
Admit when you're wrong and stop substituting ad hominins for actual facts.

In the 1926 Meyers case SCOTUS ruled on an 1876 law directly and, as a side note, mentioned the repealed 1867 Tenure law in dicta.

woodpusher: "As a supposed student of history who expounds upon the law, you should get your head out of Wikipedia and try a few court opinions and law books. "

As a trained propagandist, woodpusher, you've avoided the real questions here by changing the subject and jumping down a legalistic rabbit hole with considerable justifiable confidence that nobody without serious legal training would be foolish enough to follow you there.
But I am foolish enough and for this reason: so far I've seen no honesty or moral integrity in your arguments, only highly sophisticated propaganda, as your repeated use of the words, "null and void ab initio" illustrates.

woodpusher: "When a law is struck down as repugnant to the Constitution, it is struck down ab initio, as if it never existed.
The enacting body had no authority to enact it, and legally it never existed. "

And yet that is not what happened to the 1867 Tenure Act.

woodpusher quoting from: "Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), Opinion of the Court "

And here, finally, we see a serious civics lesson presented in full, unedited and unencumbered with woodpusher's own propaganda opinions -- well worth the price of admission!

Now there are several points we can remember regarding Chief Justice John Marshall's 1803 Marbury v. Madison ruling:

Federalist Marshall is vilified by some of our Lost Cause posters as a "tyrant", "monarchist", "crony capitalist" and "living constitution" advocate.
So Virginian Marshall stands up there, right beside such other Founders, in our Lost Causers' pantheon of "Villains of the Republic", as John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay and (but don't tell anyone): George Washington.
In the 1926 Meyers case, Justice Brandeis used Marshall's ruling in Marbury vs. Madison to dissent from Chief Justice Taft's ruling.
Brandeis noted that Marshall's opinion:
So, are we to praise Marshall for his opinions regarding "strict construction" and in the same breath condemn him for his assumptions used later as precedent for the 1867 Tenure of Office Act?

Perhaps we can simply recognize that good people can have different opinions and that in this case the right opinions (Chief Justice Taft's) eventually prevailed.

My "foolish" point then remains victorious: that Lincoln broke no laws regarding habeas corpus, but Johnson did break the 1867 Tenure of Office law, woodpusher's propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding.

woodpusher: "No, you were not referring to HR 591 in March 1863, you explicitly referred to SR-1 of 1861, with nary a mention of HR 591 of 1863.
You explicitly claimed that "The 1861 S No. 1 was introducted by Massachusetts Republican Senator Henry Wilson," and, still in reference to Wilson's Resolution, "here were two problems, the first was the lack of a filibuster cloture rule...."
You invented a filibuster that never happened, and when confronted by the official record of the relevant 1861 congressional debate, you seek to make believe you were talking about a bill from 1863."

For anyone keeping score, woodpusher wins this point.
I did conflate 1861 SR-1 with 1862 HR-591 because both bills were part of Republicans' attempts to indemnify President Lincoln on habeas corpus, and I left the mistaken impression that Democrats' filibuster in March 1863 against HR-591 was actually against SR-1.
So woodpusher should savor his victory, but it's a very minor point which I'm happy to correct.

The fact is that minority Democrats did attempt to filibuster the habeas corpus bill HR-591, even after RINO Illinois Senator Trumbull removed the word "indemnification" from it.

woodpusher: "So, you were clearly talking about SR-1 of 1861 and your blather about 1863 is merely an attempt at diversion.
Be that as it may, the question was about where is your cited filibuster? "

My mistake here was to conflate 1861 SR-1 with 1862 HR-591, both of which attempted to indemnify Lincoln on habeas corpus.
HR-591 passed in March 1863 despite Democrats' attempted filibuster and after RINO Illinois Senator Trumbull removed the word "indemnification".
It seems to me now that our FRiend woodpusher has not yet grasped the fact, or is unwilling to admit it, that there was indeed an 1863 Revocation of Habeas Corpus law.

woodpusher on HR-591: "It was then agreed to take up the bill at 7 p.m. that evening.
Its passage was at about 2 a.m. in the morning.
It was done and dusted in seven hours, from time debate started until the voice vote was recorded.
When did your alleged 1863 filibuster take place? "

Here is one report on it:

The Senate spent the evening

several Democratic Senators attempted a filibuster

woodpusher: "Let us look at the "overwhelming majority" as recorded in the record.
As you state that an overwhelming majority voted for the bill, do tell how many voted for and against."

Here is one report on that:

"The following Monday, March 2, the day before the Thirty-Seventh Congress had previously voted to adjourn, the House voted to accept the new bill, with 99 members voting in the affirmative and 44 against.[33]" The whole Senate accepted HR-591 by voice vote.

woodpusher: "You explicitly stated that "In 1864, Trumbull's abolition bill became the US 13th Amendment."

For those keeping score, woodpusher wins another minor technicality -- in my efforts to be as brief as possible, I conflated the introduction of Trumbull's 1864 abolition resolution with the 1865 ratification of the 13th Amendment.
So let's give woodpusher a few minutes to spike the football and do his little end-zone victory dance.

woodpusher

"Of course, if you had bothered to actually look up the record, you could not help but notice that it was a Resolution.
Your posts reveal your lack of even the most basic knowledge of what you are talking about, and your disinclination to be bothered to research any of your purported facts or hallucinations about the law."

On second thought, I don't think that's a six-point touchdown, not even a sack of the quarterback.
All our FRiend woodpusher really did was divert attention away from his own lies and misstatements by focusing on the difference between a "bill" and a "resolution", in the mean time failing to block my game winning score which was that RINO Senator Trumbull was not yet 100% Democrat because he did introduce the... ah... resolution in 1864 which eventually became the 13th Amendment in 1865.

woodpusher: "When Trumbull started working on it is irrelevant.
And stop calling it a bill.
It was not a bill.
Bills become Federal laws.
Resolutions propose constitutional Amendments. "

Again we're into the minutia of legalistic distinctions, but in this case our FRiend woodpusher loses yardage because:

these called for a

constitutional amendment

a bill

proposal

joint resolution

Lyman Trumbull

proposals

a constitutional amendment

amendment proposal

So notice the different terms used for virtually the same things:

"called for constitutional amendment"
"a bill"
"proposal"
"joint resolution"
"submitted a constitutional amendment"
"amendment proposal"

Sure, doubtless there do exist legalistic definitions for each of these, definitions which may be important in certain contexts, but I'm not sure why for layman's purposes they matter.

[BroJoeK #293] I'm a citizen and student of history.
I notice that the 1867 Tenure in Office Act was amended for President Grant in 1869, then repealed entirely in 1887.
In 1926, Chief Justice (former President) Taft wrote for the 6-3 majority that a similar law was unconstitutional, also referring back, in dicta, to parts of the 1867 Tenure act as "invalid".
Sure, all that is well and good, some 59 years later, but at the time, in 1867 the precedent, as pointed out by Brandeis in 1926, was Marbury vs. Madison which:

"...assumed, as the basis of decision, that the President, acting alone, is powerless to remove an inferior civil officer appointed for a fixed term with the consent of the Senate; and that case was long regarded as so deciding."

You are a "student of history" to the extent that you selectively cut and paste from Wikipedia, and you fake legal knowledge by selectively and misleadingly quoting from Wikipedia, from a six paragraph article about the Court's 244 pages of Myers v. United States, of which the Opinion of the Court occupies 102 pages. It is patently obvious that you have neither read the Court opinions in Marbury nor Myers. Your total commentary is gleaned from six paragraphs of Wikipedia, and filled in with your ridiculous, make believe, legal commentary.

A further look at the six paragraphs of Wikipedia shows that you are primarily a student of dishonesty.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myers_v._United_States

In 1920, Frank S. Myers, a First-Class Postmaster in Portland, Oregon, was removed from office by President Woodrow Wilson. An 1876 federal law provided that "Postmasters of the first, second, and third classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate." Myers argued that his dismissal violated this law, and he was entitled to back pay for the unfilled portion of his four-year term.
Chief Justice William Howard Taft, writing for the Court, noted that the Constitution does mention the appointment of officials, but is silent on their dismissal. An examination of the notes of the Constitutional Convention, however, showed that this silence was intentional: the Convention did discuss the dismissal of executive-branch staff, and believed it was implicit in the Constitution that the President did hold the exclusive power to remove his staff, whose existence was an extension of the President's own authority.
The Court therefore found that the statute was unconstitutional, for it violated the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches. In reaching this decision, it also expressly found the Tenure of Office Act, which had imposed a similar requirement on other Presidential appointees and played a key role in the impeachment of President Andrew Johnson, to have been invalid; it had been repealed by Congress some years before this decision.
In a lengthy dissent, Justice McReynolds used an equally exhaustive analysis of quotes from members of the Constitutional Convention, writing that he found no language in the Constitution or in the notes from the Convention intended to grant the President the "illimitable power" to fire every appointed official, "as caprice may suggest", in the entire government with the exception of judges.
In a separate dissent, Justice Brandeis wrote that the fundamental case deciding the power of the Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, "assumed, as the basis of decision, that the President, acting alone, is powerless to remove an inferior civil officer appointed for a fixed term with the consent of the Senate; and that case was long regarded as so deciding."
In a third dissent, Justice Holmes noted that it was within the power of Congress to abolish the position of Postmaster entirely, not to mention to set the position's pay and duties, and he had no problem believing Congress also ought to be able to set terms of the position's occupiers.

Brandeis dissenting at 242: [footnotes omitted]

In Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 167, it was assumed, as the basis of decision, that the President, acting alone, is powerless to remove an inferior civil officer appointed for a fixed term with the consent of the Senate; and that case was long regarded as so deciding. In no case, has this Court determined that the President's power of removal is beyond control, limitation, or regulation by Congress. Nor has any lower federal court ever so decided. This is true of the power as it affects officers in the Army or the Navy and the high political officers like heads of departments, as well as of the power in respect to inferior statutory offices in the executive branch. Continuously for the last fifty-eight years, laws comprehensive in character, enacted from time to time with the approval of the President, have made removal from the great majority of the inferior presidential offices dependent upon the consent of the Senate. Throughout that period these laws have been continuously applied. We are requested to disregard the authority of Marbury v. Madison and to overturn this long established constitutional practice.

The majority, the prevailing opinion of the Court, held that the Constitution intended to, and did, confer the full authority of removal to the President, with no power of the Senate to interfere. Assumptions do not make holdings or precedents, and control nothing.

Recall that Lincoln appointed and removed military officers with some regularity, and he did not seek or obtain the consent of the Senate. So much for the meritless and rejected proposition that Marbury was binding precedent.

Chief Justice Taft, in writing the Opinion of the Court in Myers, spent dozens of pages reducing the Brandeis dissent to a smoking ruin. Taft eviscerated the dissent, with constitutional history and legal precedent. The following is a sample of what you chose to ignore.

Myers, Administratrix, v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926)

Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 139
The words of a second great constitutional authority, quoted as in conflict with the Congressional decision, are those of Chief Justice Marshall. They were used by him in his opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137 (1803). The judgment in that case is one of the great landmarks in the history of the construction of the Constitution of the United States, and is of supreme authority, first, in respect of the power and duty of the Supreme Court and other courts to consider and pass upon the validity of acts of Congress enacted in violation of the limitations of the Constitution, when properly brought before them in cases in which the rights of the litigating parties require such consideration and decision, and, second, in respect of the lack of power of Congress to vest in the Supreme Court original jurisdiction to grant the remedy of mandamus in cases in which by the Constitution it is given only appellate jurisdiction. But it is not to be regarded as such authority in respect of the
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 140
power of the President to remove officials appointed by the advice and consent of the Senate, for that question was not before the Court.
The case was heard upon a rule served upon James Madison, Secretary of State, to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue directing the defendant, Madison, to deliver to William Marbury his commission as a justice of the peace for the County of Washington in the District of Columbia. The rule was discharged by the Supreme Court for the reason that the Court had no jurisdiction in such a case to issue a writ for mandamus.
The Court had, therefore, nothing before it calling for a judgment upon the merits of the question of issuing the mandamus. Notwithstanding this, the opinion considered preliminarily, first, whether the relator had the right to the delivery of the commission, and, second, whether it was the duty of the Secretary of State to deliver it to him, and a duty which could be enforced in a court of competent jurisdiction at common law by a writ of mandamus. The facts disclosed by affidavits filed were, that President Adams had nominated Marbury to be a justice of the peace in the District of Columbia, under a law of Congress providing for such appointment, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, for the term of five years, and that the Senate had consented to such an appointment ; that the President had signed the commission as provided by the Constitution, and had transmitted it to the Secretary of State, who, as provided by statute, had impressed the seal of the United States thereon. The opinion of the Chief Justice on these questions was, that the commission was only evidence of the appointment; that, upon delivery of the signed commission by the President to the Secretary of State, the office was filled and the occupant was thereafter entitled to the evidence of his appointment in the form of the commission; that the duty of the Secretary in delivering the commission to the officer entitled
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 141
was merely ministerial and could be enforced by mandamus; that the function of the Secretary in this regard was entirely to be distinguished from his duty as a subordinate to the President in the discharge of the President’s political duties which could not be controlled.
It would seem that this conclusion applied, under the reasoning of the opinion, whether the officer was removable by the President or not, if in fact the President had not removed him. But the opinion assumed that, in the case of a removable office, the writ would fail, on the presumption that there was in such a case discretion of the appointing power to withhold the commission. And so the Chief Justice proceeded to express an opinion on the question whether the appointee was removable by the President. He said: “As the law creating the office, gave the officer a right to hold it for five years, independent of the executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country.”
There was no answer by Madison to the rule issued in the case. The case went by default. It did not appear, even by avowed opposition to the issue of the writ, that the President had intervened in the matter at all. It would seem to have been quite consistent with the case as shown that this was merely an arbitrary refusal by the Secretary to perform his ministerial function, and, therefore, that the expression of opinion that the officer was not removable by the President was unnecessary, even to the conclusion that a writ in a proper case could issue. However this may be, the whole statement was certainly obiter dictum with reference to the judgment actually reached. The question whether the officer was removable was not argued to the Court by any counsel contending for that view. Counsel for the relator, who made the only argument, contended that the officer was not removable by the President, because- he held a judicial office and
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 142
under the Constitution could not be deprived of his office for the five years of his term by Presidential action. The opinion contains no wider discussion of the question than that quoted above.
While everything that the great Chief Justice said, whether obiter dictum or not, challenges the highest and most respectful consideration, it is clear that the mere statement of the conclusion made by him, without any examination of the discussion which went on in the First Congress, and without reference to the elaborate arguments there advanced to maintain the decision of 1789, can not be regarded as authority in considering the weight to be attached to that decision—a decision, which as we shall see, he subsequently recognized as a well-established rule of constitutional construction.
In such a case we may well recur to the Chief Justice’s own language in Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399, in which, in declining to yield to the force of his previous language in Marbury v. Madison, which was unnecessary to the judgment in that case and was obiter dictum, he said:
“It is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. The reason of this maxim is obvious. The question actually before the court is investigated with care and considered in its full extent. Other principles which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated.”
The weight of this dictum of the Chief Justice as to a Presidential removal, in Marbury v. Madison, was considered by this Court in Parsons v. United States, 167
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 143
U. S. 324. It was a suit by Parsons against the United States for the payment of the balance due for his salary and fees as United States District Attorney for Alabama. He had been commissioned as such, under the statute, for the term of four years from the date of the commission, subject to the conditions prescribed by law. There was no express power of removal provided. Before the end of the four years he was removed by the President. He was denied recovery.
The language of the Court in Marbury v. Madison, already referred to, was pressed upon this Court to show that Parsons was entitled, against the Presidential action of removal, to continue in office. If it was authoritative and stated the law as to an executive office, it ended the case; but this Court did not recognize it as such, for the reason that the Chief Justice’s language relied on was not germane to the point decided in Marbury v. Madison. If his language was more than a dictum, and was a decision, then the Parson’s case overrules it.
Another distinction, suggested by Mr. Justice Peckham in Parson’s case was that the remarks of the Chief Justice were in reference to an office in the District of Columbia, over which, by Art. I, sec. 8, subd. 17, Congress had exclusive jurisdiction in all cases, and might not apply to offices outside of the District in respect to which the constant practice and the Congressional decision had been the other way (p. 335). How much weight should be given to this distinction, which might accord to the special exclusive jurisdiction conferred on Congress over the District power to ignore the usual constitutional separation between the executive and legislative branches of the Government, we need not consider.
If the Chief Justice, in Marbury v. Madison, intended to express an opinion for the Court inconsistent with the legislative decision of 1789, it is enough to observe that he changed his mind; for otherwise it is inconceivable that
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 144]
he should have written and printed his full account of the discussion and decision in the First Congress and his acquiescence in it, to be found in his Life of Washington (Vol. V, pages 192-200).
He concluded his account as follows:
“After an ardent discussion which consumed several days, the committee divided; and the amendment [i. e. to strike out from the original bill the words ‘to be removable by the President ’] was negatived by a majority of thirty-four to twenty. The opinion thus expressed by the house of representatives did not explicitly convey their sense of the Constitution. Indeed the express grant of the power to the president, rather implied a right in the legislature to give or withhold it at their discretion. To obviate any misunderstanding of the principle on which the question had been decided, Mr. Benson [later] moved in the house, when the report of the committee of the whole was taken up, to amend the second clause in the bill so as clearly to imply the power of removal to be solely in the president. He gave notice that if he should succeed in this, he would move to strike out the words which had been the subject of debate. If those words continued, he said the power of removal by the president might hereafter appear to be exercised by virtue of a legislative grant only and consequently be subjected to legislative instability; when he was well satisfied in his own mind, that it was by fair construction, fixed in the constitution. The motion was seconded by Mr. Madison, and both amendments were adopted. As the bill passed into a law, it has ever been considered as a full expression of the sense of the legislature on this important part of the American constitution.”
This language was first published in 1807, four years after the judgment in Marbury v. Madison, and the edition was revised by the Chief Justice in 1832. 3 Beveridge, Life of Marshall, 248, 252, 272, 273.
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 145
Congress, in a number of acts, followed and enforced the legislative decision of 1789 for seventy-four years. In the act of the First Congress, which adapted to the Constitution the ordinance of 1787 for the government of the Northwest Territory, which had provided for the appointment and removal of executive territorial officers by the Congress under the Articles of Confederation, it was said “in all cases where the United States in Congress assembled, might, by the said ordinance revoke Any commission or remove from any office, the President is hereby declared to have the same powers of revocation and removal.” 1 Stat. 53, c. 8. This was approved eleven days after the act establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs, and was evidently in form a declaration in accord with the legislative constitutional construction of the latter act. In the provision for the Treasury and War Departments, the same formula was used as occurred in the act creating the Department of Foreign Affairs; but it was omitted from other creative acts only because the decision was thought to be settled constitutional construction. In re Hennen, 13 Peters 230, 259.
Occasionally we find that Congress thought it wiser to make express what would have been understood. Thus, in the Judiciary Act of 1789, we find it provided in § 27, 1 Stat. 87, c. 20, “that a marshal shall be appointed in and for each district for the term of four years, but shall be removable at pleasure, whose duty it shall be to attend the District and Circuit Courts.” That act became a law on September 24th, a month after the Congressional debate on removals. It was formulated by a Senate committee, of which Oliver Ellsworth was chairman, and which presumably was engaged in drafting it during the time of that debate. Section 35 of the same act provided for the appointment of an attorney for the United States to prosecute crimes and conduct civil actions on behalf of
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 146
the United States, but nothing was said as to his term of office or as to his removal. The difference in the two cases was evidently to avoid any inference from the fixing of the term that a conflict with the legislative decision of 1789 was intended.
In the Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 582, c. 102, Congress provided that thereafter all district attorneys, collectors of customs, naval officers, surveyors of the customs, navy agents, receivers of public moneys for land, registers of the land office, paymasters in the army, the apothecary general, the assistant apothecaries general, and the commissary general of purchases, to be appointed under the laws of the United States, should be appointed for the term of four years, but should be removable from office at pleasure.
It is argued that these express provisions for removal at pleasure indicate that, without them, no such power would exist in the President. We can not accede to this view. Indeed, the conclusion that they were adopted to show conformity to the legislative decision of 1789 is authoritatively settled by a specific decision of this Court.
In the Parsons case, 167 U. S. 324, already referred to, the exact question which the Court had to decide was whether under § 769 of the Revised Statutes, providing that district attorneys should be appointed for a term of four years and their commissions should cease and expire at the expiration of four years from their respective dates, the appellant, having been removed by the President from his office as district attorney before the end of his term, could recover his salary for the remainder of the term. If the President had no power of removal, then he could recover. The Court held that under that section the President did have the power of removal, because of the derivation of the section from the Act of 1820, above quoted. In § 769 the specific provision of the Act of 1820 that the officers should be removable
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 147
from office at pleasure was omitted. This Court held that the section should be construed as having been passed in the light of the acquiescence of Congress in the decision of 1789, and therefore included the power of removal by the President, even though the clause for removal was omitted. This reasoning was essential to the conclusion reached and makes the construction by this Court of the Act of 1820 authoritative. The Court used, in respect of the Act of 1820, this language (167 U. S. 324, 339):
“The provision for a removal from office at pleasure was not necessary for the exercise of that power by the President, because of the fact that he was then regarded as being clothed with such power in any event. Considering the construction of the Constitution in this regard as given by the Congress of 1789, and having in mind the constant and uniform practice of the Government in harmony with such construction, we must construe this act as providing absolutely for the expiration of the term of office at the end of four years, and not as giving a term that shall last, at all events, for that time, and we think the provision that the officials were removable from office at pleasure was but a recognition of the construction thus almost universally adhered to and acquiesced in as to the power of the President to remove.”
In the Act of July 17, 1862, 12 Stat. 596, c. 200, Congress actually requested the President to make removals in the following language:
“the President of the United States be, and hereby is, authorized and requested to dismiss and discharge from the military sendee, either in the army, navy, marine corps, or volunteer force, any officer for any cause which, in his judgment, either renders such officer unsuitable for, or whose dismission would promote, the public service.”
Attorney General Devens (15 Op. A. G. 421) said of this act that, so far as it gave authority to the President,
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 148
it was simply declaratory of the long-established law; that the force of the act was to be found in the word “ requested,” by which it was intended to re-enforce strongly this power in the hands of the President at a great crisis of the state—a comment by the Attorney General which was expressly approved by this Court in Blake v. United States, 103 U. S. 227, 234.
The acquiescence in the legislative decision of 1789 for nearly three-quarters of a century by all branches of the Government has been affirmed by this Court in unmistakable terms. In Parsons v. United States, already cited, in which the matter of the power of removal was reviewed at length in connection with that legislative decision, this Court, speaking by Mr. Justice Peckham, said (page 330):
“Many distinguished lawyers originally had very different opinions in regard to this power from the one arrived at by this Congress, but when the question was alluded to in after years they recognized that the decision of Congress in 1789 and the universal practice of the Government under it, had settled the question beyond any power of alteration.”
We find this confirmed by Chancellor Kent’s and Mr. Justice Story’s comments. Chancellor Kent, in writing to Mr. Webster in January, 1830, concerning the decision of 1789, said:
“I heard the question debated in the summer of 1789, and Madison, Benson, Ames, Lawrence, etc. were in favor of the right of removal by the President, and such has been the opinion ever since and the practice. I thought they were right because I then thought this side uniformly right.”
Then, expressing subsequent pause and doubt upon this construction as an original question because of Hamilton’s original opinion in The Federalist, already referred to, he continued:
“On the other hand, it is too late to call the President’s power in question after a declaratory act of Congress and
Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 149
an acquiescence of half a century. We should hurt the reputation of our government with the world, and we are accused already of the Republican tendency of reducing all executive power into the legislative, and making Congress a national convention. That the President grossly abuses the power of removal is manifest, but it is the evil genius of Democracy to be the sport of factions.” 1 Private Correspondence of Daniel Webster, Fletcher Webster ed., 486; 1903 National ed., Little, Brown Co.

[BroJoeK #293At the time precedent was the SCOTUS Marbury vs. Madison decision and Tenure was the law.

Nonsense. The comment from Marbury was obiter dictum, and if it were more, the decision in Parsons overruled it. Myers, Opinion of the Court at 272 U.S. 142.

Marbury v. Madison 5 U.S. 137 (1803) was a case about an appointment, not a removal. It was impossible for Marbury to issue a holding, or set a precedent, about the President's removal authority. A dictum never controls anything.

Marbury is definitive precedent for the fact that an act, repugnant to the Constitution, cannot become a law. "[A] legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law."

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 5 U.S. 154:

In the order in which the court has viewed this subject, the following questions have been considered and decided.
1st Has the applicant a right, to the commission he demands?
2dly. If he has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his country afford him a remedy ?
3dly. If they do afford him a remedy, is it a mandamus issuing from this court ?

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 5 U.S. 156

It follows too from the existence of this distinction that, if an appointment was to be evidenced by any public act other than the commission, the performance of such public act would create the officer, and if he was not removable at the will of the President, would either give him a right to his commission or enable him to perform the duties without it.

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 5 U.S. 157

Some point of time must be taken when the power of the Executive over an officer, not removable at his will, must cease. That point of time must be when the constitutional power of appointment has been exercised. And this power has been exercised when the last act required from the person possessing the power has been performed. This last act is the signature of the commission.

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 162

Where an officer is removable at the will of the Executive, the circumstance which completes his appointment is of no concern, because the act is at any time revocable, and the commission may be arrested if still in the office. But when the officer is not removable at the will of the Executive, the appointment is not revocable, and cannot be annulled. It has conferred legal rights which cannot be resumed.

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 162

The discretion of the Executive is to be exercised until the appointment has been made. But having once made the appointment, his power over the office is terminated in all cases, where by law the officer is not removable by him. The right to the office is then in the person appointed, and he has the absolute, unconditional power of accepting or rejecting it.
Mr. Marbury, then, since his commission was signed by the President and sealed by the Secretary of State, was appointed, and as the law creating the office gave the officer a right to hold for five years independent of the Executive, the appointment was not revocable, but vested in the officer legal rights which are protected by the laws of his country.
To withhold the commission, therefore, is an act deemed by the Court not warranted by law, but violative of a vested legal right.

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 165-166

By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and, being entrusted to the Executive, the decision of the Executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived by adverting to the act of Congress for establishing the Department of Foreign Affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the Courts.

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 166

The conclusion from this reasoning is that, where the heads of departments are the political or confidential agents of the Executive, merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in which the Executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion, nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law, and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy,

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 173

The Secretary of State, being a person, holding an office under the authority of the United States, is precisely within the letter of the description, and if this Court is not authorized to issue a writ of mandamus to such an officer, it must be because the law is unconstitutional, and therefore absolutely incapable of conferring the authority and assigning the duties which its words purport to confer and assign.

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 176-178

The authority, therefore, given to the Supreme Court by the act establishing the judicial courts of the United States to issue writs of mandamus to public officers appears not to be warranted by the Constitution, and it becomes necessary to inquire whether a jurisdiction so conferred can be exercised.
The question whether an act repugnant to the Constitution can become the law of the land is a question deeply interesting to the United States, but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. It seems only necessary to recognise certain principles, supposed to have been long and well established, to decide it.
That the people have an original right to establish for their future government such principles as, in their opinion, shall most conduce to their own happiness is the basis on which the whole American fabric has been erected. The exercise of this original right is a very great exertion; nor can it nor ought it to be frequently repeated. The principles, therefore, so established are deemed fundamental. And as the authority from which they proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.
This original and supreme will organizes the government and assigns to different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here or establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The Government of the United States is of the latter description. The powers of the Legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits may at any time be passed by those intended to be restrained? The distinction between a government with limited and unlimited powers is abolished if those limits do not confine the persons on whom they are imposed, and if acts prohibited and acts allowed are of equal obligation. It is a proposition too plain to be contested that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it, or that the Legislature may alter the Constitution by an ordinary act.
Between these alternatives there is no middle ground. The Constitution is either a superior, paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means, or it is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.
If the former part of the alternative be true, then a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law; if the latter part be true, then written Constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people to limit a power in its own nature illimitable.
Certainly all those who have framed written Constitutions contemplate them as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and consequently the theory of every such government must be that an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void.
This theory is essentially attached to a written Constitution, and is consequently to be considered by this Court as one of the fundamental principles of our society. It is not, therefore, to be lost sight of in the further consideration of this subject.
If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory, and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on. It shall, however, receive a more attentive consideration.
It is emphatically the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the Courts must decide on the operation of each.
So, if a law be in opposition to the Constitution, if both the law and the Constitution apply to a particular case, so that the Court must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the Constitution, or conformably to the Constitution, disregarding the law, the Court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.
If, then, the Courts are to regard the Constitution, and the Constitution is superior to any ordinary act of the Legislature, the Constitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which they both apply.
Those, then, who controvert the principle that the Constitution is to be considered in court as a paramount law are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that courts must close their eyes on the Constitution, and see only the law.
This doctrine would subvert the very foundation of all written Constitutions. It would declare that an act which, according to the principles and theory of our government, is entirely void, is yet, in practice, completely obligatory. It would declare that, if the Legislature shall do what is expressly forbidden, such act, notwithstanding the express prohibition, is in reality effectual. It would be giving to the Legislature a practical and real omnipotence with the same breath which professes to restrict their powers within narrow limits. It is prescribing limits, and declaring that those limits may be passed at pleasure.
That it thus reduces to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on political institutions — a written Constitution, would of itself be sufficient, in America where written Constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence, for rejecting the construction. But the peculiar expressions of the Constitution of the United States furnish additional arguments in favour of its rejection.

Marbury, Opinion of the Court at 180

Why does a judge swear to discharge his duties agreeably to the Constitution of the United States if that Constitution forms no rule for his government? if it is closed upon him and cannot be inspected by him?
If such be the real state of things, this is worse than solemn mockery. To prescribe or to take this oath becomes equally a crime.
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation that, in declaring what shall be the supreme law of the land, the Constitution itself is first mentioned, and not the laws of the United States generally, but those only which shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution, have that rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written Constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void, and that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.
The rule must be discharged.

And thus, the Act under discussion was declared "void" and "entirely void," and "a legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law."

And because the Act, repugnant to the Constitution, was not a law, Marbury was S.O.L.

Nowhere does Marbury set a precedent that the President may not remove a cabinet officer without the consent of the Senate.

Marbury does not involve the removal of anyone from anything. Marbury never held the office to get removed from it.

The Constitution controls any statute found repugnant to it. Such statute is declared entirely void, and could never have been a law. As the statute was declared void, it never empowered or limited anyone. As the statute was declared void, the Court dismissed Marbury's case, while stating that Marbury established every element of his case other than showing that the statute was constitutional.

You repeat your legal error ad nauseam, that an unconstitutional act became a law, in various forms, the following being just a sample:

[BroJoeK #297] Woodpusher's suggestions to the contrary, my point here is not to defend the repealed law, but simply to notice that it was a law and President Andrew Johnson broke it, for which he was impeached.
[BroJoeK #297] Johnson did break the 1867 Tenure of Office law, woodpusher's propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding.

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/impeach/imp_tenure.html

In 1926, in the case of Myers vs. United States, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Taft, held unconstitutional a law requiring the consent of the Senate for removal of certain non-Cabinet officials.

I cite the comment of a law school, not an anonymous Wikipedia article. It is well beyond clear the the U.S. Supreme Court held the 1867 statute to be repugnant to the Constitution.

The holding in Marbury is well beyond argument that a legislative act, repugnant to the Constitution, cannot become a law.

Legally, the 1867 Statute, and all subsequent statutes to the same effect, never became laws. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

The other branches treat a statute as law until the Judiciary proclaims otherwise. When the Judiciary proclaims a statute to have been enacted as repugnant to the Constitution, it holds that the Legislature had no authority to issue the statute in the first place, and its act of issuance was entirely void.

As Marbury stated at 5 U.S. 178

If an act of the Legislature repugnant to the Constitution is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the Courts and oblige them to give it effect? Or, in other words, though it be not law, does it constitute a rule as operative as if it was a law? This would be to overthrow in fact what was established in theory, and would seem, at first view, an absurdity too gross to be insisted on.

For a statute, repugnant to the Constitution, to have ever been effective as a law, one must recognize the power of Congress to change the Constitution with a statute. There is no such power. The the statute was enacted, the Constitution was the superior, supreme law, and any law in conflict with the Constitution is a nullity.

Statutes are treated by the other branches with a presumption of regularity until the Judiciary decides otherwise. A judicial holding of repugnance to the Constitution holds that the offending statute never became a law.

Your ignorant blustering is no substitute for knowledge.

Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 - 443 (1886), Justice Field, Opinion of the Court

But it is contended that if the act creating the board was void, and the commissioners were not officers de jure, they were nevertheless officers de facto, and that the acts of the board as a de facto court are binding upon the county. This contention is met by the fact that there can be no officer, either de jure or de facto, if there be no office to fill. As the act attempting to create the office of commissioner never became a law, the office never came into existence. Some persons pretended that they held the office, but the law never recognized their pretensions, nor did the supreme court of the state. Whenever such pretensions were considered in that court, they were declared to be without any legal foundation, and the commissioners were held to be usurpers.
[...]
Their position is that a legislative act, though unconstitutional, may in terms create an office, and nothing further than its apparent existence is necessary to give validity to the acts of its assumed incumbent. That position, although not stated in this broad form, amounts to nothing else. It is difficult to meet it by any argument beyond this statement: an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.

A decision striking down a law as unconstitutional must, of necessity, operate retroactively, even to just apply to the case decided. All relevant acts must have occurred before the case was decided by the Court.

Randy Barnett, Constitutional Law, Cases in Context, Aspen Publishers, 2008, at 105:

The fact that judicial nullification was taken as given by all members of the Constitutional Convention does not mean everyone liked this power. John Mercer (Maryland) “disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law void.” Instead he “thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be uncontroulable.” But Mercer’s was a lone voice. Even John Dickenson (Delaware) who “was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the Judges to set aside the law,” said he “was at the same time at a loss to know what expedient to substitute.” Gouverneur Morris took issue with Mercer more sharply, stating that he could not agree that the judiciary “should be bound to say that a direct violation of the Constitution was law. A control over the legislature might have its inconveniences. But view the danger on the other side.”

Hamilton, Federalist 78

Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged that the authority which can declare the acts of another void, must necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void. As this doctrine is of great importance in all the American constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests cannot be unacceptable. There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves; that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid. If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the people to substitute their WILL to that of their constituents. It is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their agents.