CHINA

Adherence to Treaties and Agreements

 

"In the 1950s, you three times threatened nuclear
strikes on China, and you could do that because
we couldn't hit back. Now we can.
So you are not going to threaten us again
because, in the end, you care a lot
more about Los Angeles than Taipei."

Lt. Gen. Xiong Guangkai,

Deputy Chief of China's General staff, 1996 (1)

 

 

Despite a policy of engagement, China continues to violate the human rights of its own people. Forced abortions and sterilization, organ selling, military suppression of free speech and due process, and government control of the media continue to this day. Since the Tiananmen Square Crisis on June 5, 1989, renewing China’s MFN (Most Favored Nation) status has been a hotly debated topic in the halls of Congress.

More importantly, China continues to repeatedly violate various non-proliferation treaties, all the while offering multiple, yet questionable, assurances to the contrary. The following information, compiled or quoted directly from CRS94002, CRS94-422S, CRS94-92F, CRS92056, CRS98018, CRS980717, and CRS98-48F reveals the pattern of violations:

 

1984

  • In 1984, "China declared a policy of nuclear nonproliferation"2 and required "recipients of its transfers to accept IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) safeguards."3

1985

  • June 5, 1989, President Bush imposed a ban on weapon sales. "President Bush announced he would prohibit all U.S. Government and commercial sales of military equipment and weapons. Congress later codified the prohibition in the State Department Authorization bill (H.R. 1487), which passed on January 30, 1990, and was signed by the President on February 16, 1990. It became P.L. [Public Law] 101-246, and is the primary source of existing U.S. sanctions against China."4

1991

  • In June of 1991, the Bush Administration first imposed sanctions on China for transferring M-11 technology to Pakistan. "The sanctions affected exports of supercomputers, satellites, and missile technology."5

1992

  • In February of 1992, China agreed to, but did not sign, the MTRC (Missile Technology Control Regime).6

  • On March 9, 1992, China signed the NPT (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty).7

  • On March 23, 1992, President Bush waived sanctions.8

1993

  • In January 1993, China signed the CWC (Chemical Weapons Convention), which would take effect on April 29, 1997.9

  • In April of 1993, "the President imposed sanctions against CGWIC (China Great Wall Industry Corporation) for providing technology to Pakistan."10

  • On May 28, 1993, "President Clinton requested authority to renew China's MFN status for another year"11, but indicated "he would consider new human rights criteria" for MFN renewal in 1994.12

  • In July of 1993, the United States called for an informal ban on underground nuclear testing.13

  • By August of 1993, the United States discovered that "China had again transferred M-11 technology to Pakistan, in violation of the MTCR and NPT. On August 23, 1993, the Clinton Administration imposed sanctions against China."14

  • "On October 5, 1993, China conducted an underground nuclear test, despite a U.S. call…for an informal ban on such testing."15 China was still under sanctions.

  • On November 11, 1993, "Secretary of State Christopher announced the United States was dropping its opposition to the sale of an $8 million Cray supercomputer to China."16 China was still under sanctions.

1994

  • On May 26, 1994, "President Clinton announced that he was recommending the renewal of China's MFN status, ‘delinking’ it from China's human rights record, and imposing an embargo on arms imports from China."17

  • On May 28, 1994, the arms import embargo against China went into effect; however, China could still purchase dual-use technology.18

  • "On June 10, 1994, China conducted a nuclear weapons test."19 The United States did not impose additional sanctions.

  • On September 2, 1994, "Secretary of Commerce Brown left China after a visit marked by the signing of over $5 billion worth of contracts involving U.S. business."20

  • On October 4, 1994, "Secretary of State Christopher and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen signed a joint statement that Washington would waive the August 1993 sanctions and Beijing would not export ground-to-ground missiles ‘inherently capable’ of delivering a 500 kg warhead 300 km (missile technology was not mentioned)."21

  • "On October 10, 1994, China conducted a nuclear weapons test, its second in 1994."22

  • Despite this, President Clinton waived sanctions on November 1, 1994.23

1995

  • "In 1995, China suspended a sale of nuclear reactors to Iran."24

  • On February 4, 1995, "the United States imposed trade sanctions worth over $1 billion because of an intellectual property rights dispute with China; China immediately announced comparable sanctions against the United States."25

  • On February 26, 1995, a "U.S.-Chinese agreement on intellectual property rights disputes was signed, averting a U.S.-China trade conflict threatening $2 billion in annual trade."26

  • "On March 27, 1995, Clinton Administration efforts to come up with a code of conduct for U.S. firms doing business in China and elsewhere were criticized by congressional and other U.S. human rights advocates."27

  • In June 1995, "China again transferred M-11 missile parts to Pakistan in violation of the MTCR."28 Further, in a National Intelligence Estimate, "the U.S. intelligence community reportedly agreed…that China was providing blueprints and equipment to Pakistan to build a plant for making missiles that would violate MTCR guidelines. There is disagreement, however, about whether the plant [would] manufacture some major missile components or whole copies of the M-11 missile. Construction of the plant in the city of Rawalpindi allegedly began in 1995. The November 1997 report by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Proliferation: Threat and Response) confirmed construction of the facility."29

  • "On July 20, 1995, the House passed H.R. 2058, The China Policy Act of 1995, by a vote of 460-10, and tabled H.J.Res. 96 (denying extension of MFN) by a vote of 321- 107."30

  • In November of 1995, China issued its first public defense white paper. On November 1, 1995, the Clinton Administration lifted sanctions.31

1996

  • In January 1996, "Vice Admiral John Scott Redd, Commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, reported that China supplied to Iran C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles. The C-802 is a subsonic (0.9 Mach) missile which has a range of 120 km. (75 mi.) and carries a 165 kg. (363 lb.) warhead. No international agreement bans transfers of anti-ship missiles, and the C-802 is not covered by the MTCR, which controls exports of ballistic and cruise missiles that can deliver 500 kg. warheads to 300 km. Nevertheless, some argue that the transfer has violated the Iran-Iraq Arms nonproliferation Act (P.L. 102-484), which requires sanctions for transfers that contribute to Iranian or Iraqi efforts to acquire ‘destabilizing numbers and types of advanced conventional weapons’ (including cruise missiles) or WMD."32

  • On February 5, 1996, the Washington Times "first disclosed intelligence reports that the China National Nuclear Corporation, a state-owned corporation, transferred [5,000 ring magnets] to the A.Q. Khan Research Laboratory in Kahuta, Pakistan."33 The 5,000 ring magnets "can be used in gas centrifuges to enrich uranium. The shipment was made after June 1994 and was worth $70,000. Iran's nuclear facility at Karaj [was] not under IAEA safeguards."34

  • The Secretary of Defense reported in April 1996 that "the Iranians have purchased an electromagnetic isotope separation unit from China."35

  • On May 10, 1996, the State Department "announced that China and Pakistan would not be sanctioned. "36

  • On the same day, then-CIA "Director John Deutch reportedly said at a White House meeting that Chinese officials at some level likely approved the sale of magnets. This view was reportedly supported by Defense Secretary Perry, but disputed by officials from the Commerce and Treasury Departments and the U.S. Trade Representative office, who cited a lack of solid proof."37

  • On May 11, 1996, the Chinese issued a statement promising to make only IAEA safeguarded nuclear transfers.38

  • In a reversal four days later, on May 15, 1996, the Clinton Administration "declared it would impose sweeping sanctions on China because of Chinese failure to adequately enforce the terms of its 1995 bilateral agreement on intellectual property rights." 39

  • In another reversal five days later, on May 20, 1996, "President Clinton announced that he would be requesting an extension of China's [MFN] trading status."40

  • On July 30, 1996, China declared a moratorium on nuclear testing.41

  • In August, 1996, "China agreed to sell accelerometers and test equipment, which could be used to build and test components for missile guidance, to Iran's Defense Industries Organization." The United States did not impose sanctions.42

  • In September, 1996, China signed the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty).43

  • In a CIA report dated September 14, 1996, China sold a "special industrial furnace" and "high-tech diagnostic equipment" to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in Pakistan.44 "In September 1996, Chinese technicians in Pakistan reportedly prepared to install the dual-use equipment. The deal was allegedly made by the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation, the same firm that sold the ring magnets. Those who suspect that the transfer was intended for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program say that high temperature furnaces are used to mold uranium or plutonium. The CIA report reportedly stated that ‘senior-level government approval probably was needed’ and that Chinese officials planned to submit false documentation on the final destination of the equipment. The report said that the Chinese equipment was set to arrive in early September 1996. The Washington Post (October 10, 1996) reported that the equipment was intended for a nuclear reactor to be completed by 1998 at Khushab in Pakistan. This facility is not under IAEA safeguards. This is a violation of the IAEA safeguards, and the May 11, 1996 statement by the Chinese."45 The White House did not impose sanctions.

  • "On October 9, 1996, the State Department responded that ‘it does not conclude’ China had violated its May 11, 1996 statement (see above); however, the State Department's statement did not address whether the reported transfers occurred before May 11, 1996, violated the NPT, or contradicted U.S. laws (including the Arms Export Control Act, Export-Import Bank Act, and the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994), which may require sanctions."46 The United States did not impose sanctions.

1997

  • On April 10, 1997, Robert Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, testified that "concerns about transfers of missile-related components, technology, and production technology persist, [raise] serious questions about the nature of China's commitment to abide by the MTCR guidelines."47

  • On April 25, 1997, China deposited its instrument of ratification of the CWC (effective April 29, 1997).48

  • On May 21, 1997, the Clinton Administration "imposed sanctions on two Chinese companies, five Chinese citizens, and a Hong Kong company for transfers to Iran contributing to chemical weapon proliferation. U.S. sanctions, affecting U.S. government procurement and imports, were imposed under the Arms Export Control Act and Export Administration Act (as amended by the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act). Sanctions were not imposed on the Chinese or Hong Kong governments. The State Department said that it has no evidence that those governments were involved in the transfers. Sanctions were not imposed under the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act, because the transfers in question apparently occurred before February 10, 1996, the date when provisions for sanctions on proliferation of WMD went into effect."49

  • According to Reuters, on June 17, 1997, "Secretary of Defense Cohen reported Iran had test-fired Chinese air-launched, anti-ship cruise missiles. They were C-801 missiles fired from F-4 fighters."50

  • In June, 1997, the Director of Central Intelligence submitted a report to Congress advising "that during July-December 1996, ‘China was the most significant supplier of WMD-related goods and technology to foreign countries.’"51

  • An intelligence report says that in June of 1997, "China completed a plant in Iran for making glass-lined equipment used in producing chemical weapons (Washington Times, October 30, 1997). The Nanjing Chemical and Industrial Group built the factory, and North Chemical Industries Corporation (NOCINCO) brokered the deal. (NOCINCO is likely a part of NORINCO.)"52 The United States did not impose sanctions.

  • On September 10, 1997, Premier Li Peng issued new nuclear export control regulations. That same day, "the Washington Times cited Israeli and U.S. intelligence sources as saying that [the] China Great Wall Industry Corp. (also the satellite launch provider) was providing telemetry equipment used in flight-tests to Iran for its development of the Shahab-3 and Shahab-4 medium-range ballistic missiles (with ranges, respectively, of 800 mi. and 1,240 mi.). Over 100 Chinese and North Korean experts are reportedly working there (Washington Times, November 23, 1997; Washington Post, December 31, 1997)."53 The United States did not impose sanctions.

  • On October 16, 1997, China joined the Zangger Committee.54

  • On November 19, 1997, "Gordon Oehler, former head of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, revealed that Pakistan has Chinese M-11 missiles and is developing the Ghauri, a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that can travel 1,500 km (932 mi). Pakistan conducted a flight-test of the Ghauri on April 6, 1998."55

  • On December 12, 1997, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen, speaking during his trip to Beijing, said that "President Jiang Zemin had assured him China would not transfer additional anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran."56

1998

  • On January 28, 1998, DCI George Tenet testified to the Senate Select Intelligence Committee that "there is no question that China has contributed to WMD advances" in Pakistan and Iran.57

  • "As uncovered during a closed hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 12, 1998, the Washington Post reported that, in January 1998, the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation negotiated with Iran's Isfahan Nuclear Research Center to provide ‘a lifelong supply’ of hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF), or hydrofluoric acid, under falsified documents." The documents falsified the identity of the end users.58 "The AHF chemical could be used to produce uranium hexafluoride used in uranium conversion facilities. AHF is also a precursor for the chemical weapon agent Sarin. After Washington protested, Beijing reportedly stopped the sale. While the Administration argues that Beijing responded positively and the chemical is controlled by the Australia Group (on chemicals) and not on a nuclear control list, critics say that Beijing is using ‘denial and deception.’"59 The United States did not impose sanctions.

  • "According to U.S. news reports, on March 13, 1998, the Clinton Administration recently discovered that China was secretly planning to sell massive quantities of uranium-enrichment material to Iran in violation of its pledge made at the October 1997 U.S.-China summit."60 The United States did not impose sanctions.

  • On June 3, 1998, President Clinton recommended that China's MFN status be extended for another year.61

  • On June 7, 1998, Congress cleared for the President's signature H.R. 2676, an IRS bill that included language renaming MFN status as "normal trade relations."62

Despite multiple violations, the Clinton Administration only imposed sanctions on three occasions (August 23, 1993 against exports to China, May 28, 1994 against imports from China, and May 21, 1997 against certain Chinese companies). Conversely, sanctions were imposed against both Pakistan and India when they tested their own nuclear weapons.

Despite objections from the Department of Defense, the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), and other military analysts, export restrictions and license requirements to China were increasingly relaxed, not strengthened, during the Clinton Administration. Chinese front companies continued to purchase sensitive dual use technology.

Despite clear evidence of Chinese weapons/nuclear proliferation to countries unfriendly to the United States, the State Department repeatedly excused the Chinese Government.

It begs the question, why?

 

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